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ABSTRACT 
For the past 30 years the dominant approach to managing rural water services 
in low and lower middle income countries has been the community 
management approach. Yet there is increasing evidence the model is not fit for 
purpose as too many services fail. The next generation ideas for community 
management emphasise the need for continuous on-going support to 
communities – an approach known as the community management plus 
approach. This thesis tests and develops this next generation community 
management plus paradigm. It analyses field data from twenty case studies of 
‘reportedly successful’ community management programmes across seventeen 
states in India. Bringing together data from 2,355 household surveys, 272 
interviews and 130 focus groups it provides a synthesis that assesses the type 
and level of support found in successful examples of community management. 
The evidence from these case studies demonstrates that communities receive 
significant recurrent subsidy covering between 7-48% of operational 
expenditure. This is in marked contrast to the conventional principles of 
community management whereby communities cover 100% of these costs. 
Analysis of organisation types also shows how community management has 
been shaped by the devolution of governance in rural India. Many community 
management programmes involve a structural overlap between the local self-
government institution of the Gram Panchayat and water committees. The 
thesis argues this represents a shift to the ‘institutionalised co-production’ of 
rural water services, involving both the state and private citizens in public 
service delivery. Overall, the research shows that successful community 
management in India involves continuous on-going support as per the 
community management plus paradigm. However this has required the nesting 
of the model within the broader system of local self-government which blurs the 
lines between public and community management.  
Keywords: Rural, Water, Services, Community, Management, India, Finance, 
Subsidy, Maintenance, Participation, Public, Political, Economy, Governance. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains the research background, purpose and context. It also 
outlines the thesis structure. 
1.1 Research background 
The expansion of safe water services to an ever larger proportion of the global 
population has been a cause for celebration in recent years. In 2012 the WHO 
and UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) for Water Supply and 
Sanitation announced the achievement of Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 
target 7c three years ahead of schedule (WHO and UNICEF, 2012). This meant 
that from 1990 to 2012 the world had halved the proportion of the global 
population without access to an improved drinking water source1, expanding 
access to 2.6 billion more people (WHO and UNICEF, 2013). Now, as the world 
enters the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) era, the global water sector is 
faced with an aspiration to deliver universal access to every person on the 
planet by 2030 (United Nations, 2015). In 2015 there were still 663 million 
people around the world who lacked basic access - eight out of ten of whom live 
in rural areas (WHO and UNICEF, 2015). 
More fundamentally, however, the lack of sustainability in rural water service 
provision threatens progress (Fisher et al., 2015; Mandara et al., 2013; 
Schweitzer and Mihelcic, 2012; Stalker Prokopy and Thorsten, 2009). Research 
shows that over 30% of rural water supply infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Adank et al., 2012; Sutton, 2005) and India (Government of India, 2009a; 
                                            
1 An improved drinking-water source is used as the basic measure of access in 
the monitoring programmes for the MDGs and SDGs. It is “defined as one that, 
by nature of its construction or through active intervention, is protected from 
outside contamination, in particular from contamination with faecal matter” 
(WHO and UNICEF, 2013). This definition will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Two. 
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Reddy et al., 2010) are either below the designed-functionality or in a non-
functioning state. This situation threatens the progress made under the MDGs 
and, if it is not addressed, makes achieving the universal aspiration of the SDGs 
all but impossible. 
Within the context of this sustainability problem the thesis focuses on the future 
of the most common management model for rural water services – the 
community management approach (Broek and Brown, 2015; Harvey and Reed, 
2006; Moriarty, Butterworth, Franceys, et al., 2013; Schouten and Moriarty, 
2003). As outlined in this researcher’s Hutchings et al. (2015) paper, community 
management can be defined loosely as an approach whereby:  
“the basic principles were that communities should be involved in the development of water 
supply systems, then take ownership of them, and have overall responsibility for operation and 
maintenance (Harvey and Reed, 2006; Moriarty, Butterworth, Franceys, et al., 2013)”. 
The historical and ideological reasons behind the widespread application of this 
management model will be discussed in the following chapters. However, for 
now, it is important to understand that community management has been the 
favoured approach to managing rural water services in low and lower middle 
income countries since at least the 1980s playing an important role in the 
expansion of water services to hundreds of millions of people (Harvey and 
Reed, 2006; Lockwood and Smits, 2011; McCommon et al., 1990; Paul, 1987; 
Schouten and Moriarty, 2003).  
Yet in light of the challenges outlined above there is a growing consensus that 
the approach needs to be reformed (Baumann, 2006; Broek and Brown, 2015). 
Moriarty et al. (2013, p.329) succinctly clarify a generally held belief that 
community management is “at the beginning of the end…not principally 
because community management has failed, but because it is reaching the 
limits of what can be realistically achieved in an approach based on informality 
and voluntarism.” Simply put, community management has conventionally been 
an approach in which governments or other agencies can concentrate on 
developing infrastructure and not worry about operating or maintaining it. This 
can be considered an appropriate and efficient model when the challenge is 
expanding access to water services but one of the primary challenges the 
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sector now faces is to ensure the sustainable operation and maintenance of 
water services (Hutton and Varughese, 2016; Lockwood and Smits, 2011; 
Moriarty, Butterworth, Franceys, et al., 2013).  
In response to this situation there have been calls to make governments (and 
other supporting agencies) take greater responsibility for providing continuous, 
on-going support to communities beyond the conventional focus on 
infrastructure creation (Kleemeier, 2000; Lockwood, 2002, 2004). As will be 
discussed this on-going support can take different forms and numerous terms 
have been used to describe it: institutional support mechanisms (Lockwood, 
2002), follow-up support (Lockwood et al., 2003), post-construction support 
(Bakalian and Wakeman, 2009), direct support (Smits et al., 2011) and support 
to service providers (Smits et al., 2013). Collectively, they have become known 
by the term “community management plus”, a phrase coined by Baumann 
(2006) with the ‘plus’ signifying the on-going support that is required to ensure 
community management is sustainable. Yet whilst the turn to community 
management plus has become a widely accepted shift there remains a lack of a 
robust guidance on how best to structure and finance such support services 
(Smits et al., 2011). Beyond this, it is also contended there remains a lack of 
robust interrogation of the core claims that such support actually ensures better 
service outcome.  
1.2 Research purpose 
This research therefore positions community management plus as a potential 
new paradigm for rural water services that needs further interrogation. In the 
classic work on the structure of scientific revolutions, Kuhn (1970, p. 175) 
defined a paradigm in two ways:  
“On the one hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, 
techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community. On the 
other, it denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-
solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as 
a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science” 
 4 
In this view, paradigms are owned and created by a community of practitioners 
and most professionals spend their lives working within a certain paradigm 
using model solutions to respond to model problems (Kuhn et al., 1970, p. 175) 
Building on this definition the research positions the conventional approach to 
community management as representing a consensus of beliefs, values and 
techniques that were applied to the ‘problem’ of providing rural water services in 
low and lower middle income countries by development professionals and 
public servants (Harvey and Reed, 2006). However, in recent years, there is 
now a new consensus among many of these practitioners that rural 
communities cannot independently manage rural water services and therefore 
need continuous on-going support from government (or other agencies) to 
deliver such services (Baumann, 2006; Hutchings et al., 2015; Hutchings, 
Franceys, et al., 2016; Kleemeier, 2000; Lockwood, 2002; Moriarty, Butterworth, 
Franceys, et al., 2013; RWSN, 2009). The shift to community management plus 
therefore represents a potential new consensus around the world about what a 
model solution for rural water services should look like.  
Synthesising evidence from India, a large and diverse country in which 
community management has played a significant role in national rural water 
policy since the late 1990s (Government of India, 2003, 2013a; James, 2004, 
2011), this thesis seeks to investigate the assumptions that underpin this new 
‘community management plus paradigm’. Building on the typologies of research 
from Bryman (2012) and Denscombe (2010), the research exhibits descriptive 
qualities as it seeks to answer questions about the forms of successful 
community management in India but also moves to an evaluation approach to 
interrogate whether the principles of community management plus do deliver 
the benefits they are supposed to, as per the paradigmatic understanding. The 
specific research questions the study responds to are: 
1. What are the type and characteristics of organisational arrangements 
found in successful community management programmes in India? 
2. What are the indicative financial costs of supporting successful 
community management programmes in India? 
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3. To what extent do the findings from questions 1 and 2 support the 
justification for the community management plus paradigm as a dominant 
management model for rural water services in India and other relevant 
contexts? 
The thesis is intentionally designed to be empirically-driven in answering such 
questions with its contribution to knowledge being about describing and testing 
the ‘common-sense’ assumptions that underpin the community management 
plus paradigm. In order to conduct such a study it has been necessary to 
operate at a resolution that allows the synthesis of knowledge across different 
analytical levels and case studies to be conducted in a systematic and robust 
manner. This has meant adopting different theoretical bodies of knowledge into 
the study. As explained in the literature review and methodology chapter, this is 
an appropriate approach as it reflects the diverse theoretical justifications for 
community management, that range from communitarian ideals about local 
determination to neoliberal scepticism of the state (Broek and Brown, 2015). 
1.3 Research context – the Community Water Plus project 
This research was conducted as part of the Community Water Plus research 
project which was funded by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the 
Australian Government through the Australian Development Research Awards 
Scheme (ADRAS). The Australian Government funded the project to a value of 
just over AUD$1 million with the objective to understand how effective support 
services for community management can be designed and funded. Focusing 
the study in India meant that the research could learn from a country whereby 
significant progress had been made in expanding rural water services in recent 
decades (WHO and UNICEF, 2013) but which was large enough to provide a 
rich diversity of different states with varying socio-economic and geographical 
challenges.  
The project ran from March 2013 to March 2016 with Cranfield University as the 
lead-partner. Five other organisations were collaborating partners including four 
research institutions in India: Administrative Staff College of India, Centre for 
Excellence for Change, Malaviya National Institute of Technology and Xavier 
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Institute for Social Service and the IRC, a WASH ‘think-and-do-tank’ based in 
the Netherlands. The primary aim of the project was clarified as:  
“Community Water Plus…is a research project which aims at gaining further 
insights into the type and amount of support (the ‘plus’) that have been needed 
for community management to be successful, as well as into the resources 
implications of the ‘plus’, across a range of technologies and conditions in India. 
Specifically, the project will focus on the following main research question: What 
type, extent and style of supporting organisations are apparent in sustainable 
community managed water service delivery relative to varying technical modes 
of supply?” (Smits et al., 2015, p. 17) 
The project followed a multi-case study research design which aimed to provide 
twenty rich examples of successful community management which would form 
the evidence base from which to conduct a cross-case analysis and synthesis 
to answer the main research question. This author was responsible for 
conducting this cross-case analysis and synthesis which forms the core 
empirical backbone to this thesis. The researcher’s contribution as the led-
researcher on this task involved co-authoring the overall project methodology 
(Smits et al., 2015), developing the fieldwork protocols (see: Appendix B), 
collating and harmonising the cross-case data, and conducting the overall 
analysis and synthesis of findings.  
Beyond this the author was also the main author on two published literature 
reviews that provide further background to this study (Hutchings et al., 2015; 
Hutchings, Franceys, et al., 2016). He also led the fieldwork for one of the case 
studies (Hutchings, 2015) and made supporting field visits to six other case 
studies (Harris et al., 2016a; Javorszky et al., 2016; Ramamohan Roa and 
Raviprakash, 2016a, 2016b; Saraswathy, 2015, 2016a). The role of the 
collaborating partners has been focused on delivering the other nineteen 
individual case study reports. The thesis is therefore indebted to their hard work 
and contribution which provided a rich and unique dataset from which to build 
this thesis. In total across the 20 cases the project conducted 2,355 household 
surveys, 272 interviews and 130 focus groups. The challenge of bringing 
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together such a rich set of data is discussed in more detail in the methodology 
chapter and the fruits of that labour are presented in this thesis. 
1.4 Thesis structure 
Structuring a thesis that draws on such a large number of different case studies 
was a challenge. Various formats were considered including whether to have a 
detailed write-up and analysis of each case study within the main body of the 
thesis. Yet in the end it was considered more appropriate to concentrate on the 
synthesised data and arguments with a summary of each case study available 
via Appendix C. Based on this approach the following thesis structure was 
adopted: 
- Chapter One ‘Introduction’ – is this chapter which introduces the thesis 
- Chapter Two ‘Rural water services and community management: 
concepts, history and theory’ - presents the review of the ‘global’ 
community management literature. It initially focuses on providing a basic 
overview of concepts for studying rural water services. It then focuses on 
the community management literature to assess the history of the model 
and contemporary trends in its application linked to community 
management plus. It also provides an overview of relevant theoretical 
perspectives on community management and public service delivery that 
will be developed through the thesis.  
- Chapter Three ‘Research context - rural water services in India’ – 
concentrates the thesis on the Indian context showing that there are 
different levels of economic development, human development and rural 
water supply coverage across the Indian states. This is linked to a 
number of broader structural factors at the state level including political 
economy tendencies and geography, which make useful stratifications 
for grouping case studies. An overview of Indian governance and a 
review of community management in the Indian context are also given in 
this chapter. 
- Chapter Four ‘Methodology’ – this chapter explains and justifies the 
research design and methods. It explains the multi-case study research 
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design and the fieldwork methods for individual case studies. It then 
provides an overview of the cross-case analysis and synthesis approach 
including a review of a number of indicators which are used to compare 
the case studies and build the overall arguments. The chapter also 
discusses issues such as data cleaning and harmonisation, data 
analysis, research ethics, reflections on collaborative research and 
reflections on the limitations of the methodological approach. 
- Chapter Five ‘Organisational types and characteristics for successful 
community managed rural water services’ – presents the empirical 
findings from the research related to research question one. It assesses 
the types and characteristics of organisational arrangements for 
successful community management in India. A comparative analysis is 
conducted regarding the levels of success across different set-ups. 
Findings are reflected back against the ideas underpinning the 
community management paradigm developed in Chapter Two and the 
concept of “institutionalised co-production” (Joshi and Moore, 2004; 
Ostrom, 1996) is applied to describe the close relationship between 
government and communities in rural water service delivery. 
- Chapter Six ‘The cost of good community managed rural water services’ 
– provides a quantitative analysis of the service levels received across 
the case studies to validate the level of success found. It then presents a 
financial analysis of the cost of providing those services levels to help 
answer research question two on the ‘indicative financial costs’ of 
supporting community management in India. The similarities and 
differences in the cost sharing arrangements between communities and 
enabling support entities are considered with a discussion about how 
these relate to the cost sharing principles of the community management 
paradigms.  
- Chapter Seven: ‘Discussion - the institutionalised co-production of rural 
water services in contemporary India’ – further develops the theoretical 
contribution of the thesis in terms of “institutionalised co-production” 
(Joshi and Moore, 2004; Ostrom, 1996) and considers its implications for 
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the community management and community management plus 
paradigms. It argues that what has been studied in India represents a 
distinct Indian-paradigm of community management that is shaped by 
the extent of decentralisation in the country and considers in more detail 
how and why this is the case 
- Chapter Eight ‘Conclusions’ – develops the conclusions from the 
research to clarify the research’s contribution, implications, limitations 
and consider future research.  
Beyond the chapters in the main body of the thesis the Appendices provide 
supplementary material to the thesis. To maintain an appropriate length it was 
decided to include what is considered to be the most relevant information 
directly in this document and then provide links to publically available 
documents for the full supplementary information. Appendix A contains details 
on and links to two published literature reviews (Hutchings et al., 2015; 
Hutchings, Franceys, et al., 2016) which were first-authored by the researcher 
and which provide an even broader overview of the evidence base that the 
thesis draws on. Appendix B provides access to the fieldwork protocols 
developed by this researcher and used by various research teams to deliver the 
individual case studies. It also provides an overview of the household survey 
and the ethics approval form for the research. Appendix C provides access to 
the summarised overview of each of the twenty difference case studies which 
were drafted by this author as part of the analysis of the different case study 
reports. Finally, Appendix D provides further information on the data storage 
policy and management including links to the key databases the research 
analyses. 
1.5 Chapter summary and contribution to thesis 
This chapter has introduced the thesis by setting out the background to the 
research which responds to the myriad calls for the reform of community 
management into what has been conceptualised as the community 
management plus paradigm. The purpose of the research has been defined as 
the need to test the veracity of the key assumptions underpinning this new 
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paradigm and provide clearer guidance to sector stakeholders on how to 
structure and finance on-going support to community management. The context 
of the research forming part of the broader Community Water Plus project was 
also explained. This helped clarify the overall contribution of this author which 
was to deliver the cross-case analysis and synthesis of evidence from that 
project. Finally, the structure of the thesis was outlined. 
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2 RURAL WATER SERVICES AND COMMUNITY 
MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS, HISTORY AND THEORY 
This chapter serves two purposes. It first provides a basic overview of concepts 
related to rural water services which the thesis draws on. It then reviews the 
literature on the community management of rural water services to provide a 
historical overview of its emergence and the theories which underpin it. With an 
effort to sketch the shift from the community management approach to the 
community management plus paradigm, there is also a review of the evidence 
on what constitutes effective support services for community management. The 
chapter provides a general overview of these issues that brings together both 
academic and practice-based grey literature discussing global trends and 
evidence with a more focused overview of the Indian sector provided in the 
following chapter. The material presented augments a series of papers that the 
author has published on these subjects (Hutchings et al., 2015; Hutchings, 
Franceys, et al., 2016; Smits et al., 2015). In each instance, any elements from 
these papers which are directly drawn on in this literature review were originally 
undertaken by this author. If the author did not undertake the work directly this 
is clearly referenced in the text or not presented in the thesis. 
2.1 Basic concepts in rural water services 
In order to develop the appropriate understanding of community management, it 
is first useful to clarify a number of basic concepts from the literature which will 
be used throughout the thesis. This includes clarifying what is meant by a ‘rural 
water service’, which is explained in the context of a ‘service delivery cycle’ 
(Lockwood and Smits, 2011). Such an understanding is linked to the ‘life-cycle 
costs approach’ that helps categorise the different financial costs of delivering 
rural water services (Burr and Fonseca, 2013; Fonseca et al., 2011). This leads 
into a discussion about the difference between ‘access’ and ‘service levels’ as a 
means of measuring the level of performance associated with rural water 
services. The section then clarifies what the thesis considers to be ‘rural’ and 
also how it defines ‘community’. This helps provide a basic agreed conceptual 
framework from which to interrogate the literature and conduct the research. 
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2.1.1 Service delivery cycle and life-cycle costs 
There are different ways to think about water supply. The most tangible aspect 
is often the material infrastructure that conveys water to people – ‘the system’. 
Yet this thesis adopts the concept of a rural water service, which is a socio-
technical configuration of technology, management entities and support 
services that enable the continued delivery of water to people (Fonseca et al., 
2011; Lockwood and Smits, 2011; Moriarty, Butterworth, Franceys, et al., 2013). 
Such thinking reflects a broader shift to reject a static and narrow focus on 
systems and to think about services – an approach that has been labelled as 
the Service Delivery Approach (Lockwood and Smits, 2011; Moriarty, 
Butterworth, Franceys, et al., 2013). Broek and Brown (2015) have raised 
concerns that the use of the term ‘services’ represents a commodification of 
water, which challenges its status as a public good and a human right. Yet the 
adoption of the service discourse is considered appropriate because it makes 
explicit the way services undergo a cycle of phases that have different demands 
on the socio-technical configuration of technology, management entities and 
support services. It also aligns with the most widely used system of categorising 
financial costs for rural water supply – known as the “life-cycle costs approach” 
(Burr and Fonseca, 2013; Fonseca et al., 2011). This approach will be 
explained alongside the different phases of the service delivery cycle and then 
this issue of financing rural water services is returned to in more detail in 
Section 2.2.2 of this chapter. 
As outlined in Figure 2-1, the service delivery cycle starts with a capital 
intensive phase in which physical water systems are built and management 
systems developed. This is labelled as the ‘Implementation Phase’. This stage 
is often the most capital intensive, with a standard approach being where 
governments or other agencies build new infrastructure and support the 
development of institutions that will take on the on-going management of the 
infrastructure (RWSN, 2009). During this implementation phase the financial 
investment required to build the infrastructure will be referred to as ‘Capital 
Expenditure (CapEx) on hardware’ whilst the financial investment needed to 
support the development of the management entity, such as training community 
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members to be members of a water committee, will be referred to as ‘CapEx on 
software’. In both cases CapEx is a ‘lumpy’ one-off investment rather than a 
recurrent cost (Fonseca et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 2-1 Phases in the service delivery cycle with associated cost categories in 
brackets (adapted from Smits et al. 2015) 
Implementation is followed by what is labelled as the ‘service delivery phase’, in 
which the targeted population receives the desired water supply. The physical 
water system has to be operated and maintained by a service provider, 
including suitable administrative activities and, ideally, on-going support by 
support agencies (Lockwood and Smits, 2011). In this stage, the financial 
investment required is an on-going recurrent cost, rather than a lumpy one-off 
investment (Fonseca et al., 2011). Two recurrent cost categories are used to 
describe this investment including ‘Operating and Minor Maintenance 
Expenditure’ which covers routine maintenance and items such as labour, fuel, 
chemicals, materials and regular purchases of bulk water. These are usually the 
Implementation 
Phase (CapEx) 
Service delivery 
phase  
(OpEx and OpEx 
Enabling Support) 
Capital 
maintenance 
phase  
(CapManEx) 
Service expansion 
or enhancement 
phase 
(CapManEx or 
CapEx) 
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costs directly incurred by the service provider. In this thesis, the other cost 
category is termed ‘OpEx Enabling Support’ which includes the investment in 
the support activities conducted beyond the core service provision tasks, such 
as monitoring service provider performance and on-going capacity building of 
service providers.  
The service delivery phase is usually clearly defined within many rural water 
supply programmes but it is the next stage, known as the ‘Capital Maintenance 
Phase’, in which problems often occur (Bakalian and Wakeman, 2009; 
Fogelberg, 2013; Harvey and Reed, 2006). This capital maintenance stage 
usually comes a number of years after the implementation phase although an 
issue here is that it is hard to discretely define (Lockwood and Smits, 2011). 
Essentially, it occurs when physical assets or institutional systems reach the 
end of working lives and need to be replaced or renewed to ensure continued 
service delivery. When such a situation occurs there is a need to invest in 
Capital Maintenance Expenditure (CapManEx) which covers maintenance 
beyond the routine investments incurred during the service delivery stage. 
Again, CapManEx can be in the form of hardware or software investments 
reflecting the fact that both technology and management systems can degrade. 
The final stage in the service delivery cycle is labelled the ‘Service Expansion 
and Enhancement Phase’ and recognises that services should be reviewed as 
fit for purpose and appropriately adjusted. The phase occurs, hopefully some 
years after initial implementation, when a significant upgrade of the physical or 
institutional system is required, either to expand it as both populations and need 
grow, or to enhance it to improve the level of service delivered. The cost 
categories associated with each stage are further clarified in Table 2-1 below. 
Together, this service delivery cycle and associated cost categories represent a 
way to conceptualise a lasting rural water service. It is considered especially 
important in this research context because it provides a framework for 
comparing how types of support services and organisational arrangements vary 
at different stages of the cycle.  
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Table 2-1 - Definitions of life-cycle cost categories (Adapted from Fonesca, 2011 
and Smits et al. 2015) 
Cost category Description 
Capital or ‘one-off’ Investment costs 
Capital 
expenditures – 
hardware and 
software 
(CapEx) 
The capital invested in constructing fixed assets such as concrete structures, 
pumps and pipes. Investments in fixed assets are occasional and ‘lumpy’, and 
include the costs of initial construction and system extension, enhancement and 
augmentation (also called CapEx on hardware), as well as once-off work with 
stakeholders prior to construction or implementation, extension, enhancement 
and augmentation, such as costs of one-off capacity building (called CapEx on 
software). 
Recurrent or annual costs 
Operating and 
minor 
maintenance 
expenditures 
(OpEx) 
Expenditure on labour, fuel, chemicals, materials, regular purchases of any bulk 
water. Minor maintenance is routine maintenance needed to keep systems 
running at peak performance, but does not include major repairs. 
Operation 
expenditure 
enabling 
support (OpEx 
Enabling 
Support)
2
 
This includes expenditure on support activities direct to local level stakeholders, 
users or user groups, such as support to service providers and ensuring that local 
government staff have the capacities and resources to help communities when 
systems break down or to monitor performance. It could also include elements of 
macro-level support, planning and policy making that contributes to the service 
environment, but is not particular to any programme or project. Indirect support 
costs include government macro-level planning and policy-making, developing 
and maintaining frameworks and institutional arrangements, and capacity-building 
for professionals and technicians. However, these are usually hard to define. 
Capital 
maintenance 
expenditure 
(CapManEx) 
Expenditure on asset renewal, replacement and rehabilitation costs, based upon 
serviceability and risk criteria. CapManEx covers the work that goes beyond 
routine maintenance to repair and replace equipment in order to keep systems 
running. Accounting rules may guide or govern what is included under capital 
maintenance, and the extent to which broad equivalence is achieved between 
charges for depreciation and expenditure on capital maintenance.  
2.1.2 Service levels and access 
This section is about how to think about successful performance in the context 
of rural water services. It is an important topic as a core claim of the research 
methodology is that the study is synthesising evidence from successful 
examples of community managed rural water services and hence the research 
                                            
2 This category has been adapted from the Expenditure on direct support 
(OpexpDS) and Expenditure on indirect support (OpexpIDS) in the life-cycle 
costing approach. This is because during the WASHCost research there was 
extremely limited data available on OpexpIDS and therefore it becomes useful 
to consolidate it together into an overall OpEx Enabling Support category. 
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needs to validate the level of success studied. The dominant measure of 
success in the global water sector is the demarcation between “improved 
drinking water sources” and “unimproved drinking water sources” used to 
assess progress towards the MDGs and now the SDGs (Clasen, 2012). At the 
core of the JMP is a classification that certain types of drinking water sources 
are more prone to contamination by faecal matter by the nature of their design 
than others – for example, an unprotected open well is considered unimproved 
whilst a borehole-fed piped system is considered improved (WHO and UNICEF, 
2013). This indicator is based on a probabilistic understanding of the level of 
service a population receives from certain types of water source (Hutchings, 
Parker, et al., 2016)3. Yet it has been shown to significantly over estimate the 
number of people around the world with safe and sustainable water supply 
(Clasen, 2012). Based on analysis of over 10,000 household surveys across 
India and three African countries, one piece of research assessing the service 
levels from improved water sources, concluded: “even where communities 
appear in national or international databases as having access to an improved 
water source and therefore as “covered”, most people who live there do not 
receive a minimum basic level of service” (Burr and Fonseca, 2013, p. 1).  
This quote juxtaposes the measure of access with the concept of a service 
level. At a basic level, a service level refers to the characteristics of the actual 
flow of water users receive from a water service (Burr and Fonseca, 2013). In 
most situations the definition for such characteristics is set by the governing 
authority of a country or region – in the context of India this is set out in the 
National Rural Drinking Water Programme guidelines (Government of India, 
2013a). This represents the normative service level of a country and service 
providers are mandated to provide services that reach these characteristics. 
                                            
3 For a discussion about the dangers of technologically determinism in rural 
water supply please see the (Hutchings, Parker, et al., 2016) paper which was 
authored by this researcher. 
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The specific elements of a service level usually relate to the quantity, quality, 
accessibility, continuity and reliability of water services. To measure the level of 
success in the case studies this research therefore adopts the service level 
approach and specifically the Service Level Ladder developed by Snehalatha et 
al. (2011) for assessing service levels in India. The service levels displayed in 
Table 2-2 relate to Government of India norms, which in turn are set to reflect 
evidence on what factors impact whether services delivery safe and acceptable 
services to targeted populations (Government of India, 2013a).  The score of 
basic in Table 1 for each parameter equates with the normative service level 
prescribed by the Government of India, whilst the other stages in the ladder are 
designed to provide greater granularity and understanding about the level of 
service populations receive. How the measurement of these factors will be 
incorporated into the study is discussed in Chapter Four but for now the concept 
of a service level has been explained as the ultimate measure of whether a rural 
water service can be considered successful. 
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Table 2-2 Service ladder for India (Adapted from: Snehalatha et al., 2011; 
as presented in Smits et al. 2015) 
Service 
level 
Quantity 
(lpcd) 
Accessibility 
(cumulative time 
spent per day by 
the family on 
fetching water) 
Water 
quality: 
perception 
Continuity 
(hours/ 
day)
4
 
Reliability: piped 
supplies 
Reliability: 
handpumps 
High > 80 lpcd 0-10 minutes per 
day  
Good > 3 Supply above the 
agreed schedule 
and duration, and 
response time 
does not exceed 
24 hours.  
Response time is 
less than 24 hours 
and handpumps 
are down for not 
more than 12 days 
per year. 
Improved 60-80 
lpcd 
10-20 minutes per 
day 
2-3 Supply above the 
agreed schedule 
and duration, and 
response time 
doesn’t exceed 48 
hours. 
Response time is 
less than 48 hours 
and handpumps 
are down for not 
more than 12 days 
per year. 
Basic 40-60 
lpcd 
20-30 minutes per 
day 
Acceptable 1-2 Supply according 
to an agreed 
schedule and 
duration and 
response time 
doesn’t exceed 48 
hours. 
Response time is 
less than 48 hours 
and handpumps 
are not broken 
down for more than 
15 days per year. 
Sub-
standard 
20-40 
lpcd 
30-60 minutes per 
day 
Bad < 1 Supply has 
scheduled times, 
duration and 
delivery but this is 
not always met, or 
response time 
exceeds 48 hours.  
Response time is 
more than 48 
hours or 
handpumps are 
broken down for 
more than 15 days 
per year. 
No 
service 
< 20 lpcd > 60 minutes per 
day 
Supply has 
scheduled times, 
duration and 
delivery but this is 
hardly ever met, or 
response time 
more than two 
weeks. 
Response time it 
more than two 
weeks or 
handpumps are 
broken down for 
more than 30 days 
per years. 
2.1.3 Community service providers and enabling support entities 
This researcher is aware that there are different models for delivering rural 
water services that can involve varying constellations of actors. Lockwood and 
Smits (2011) have produced a visual overview of different service delivery 
models, as presented in Figure 2. What this figure suggests is that there is a 
hierarchy in the professionalisation of service delivery models that range from 
self-supply – whereby households invest in and manage water services 
independently of any support (Sutton, 2008) – to what could be described as an 
                                            
4 For piped water supply only. 
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urban-utility model – whereby a fully professionalised organisation manages 
services in a financially sustainable manner based largely on user fees. This 
study recognises this diversity but is focused exclusively on community 
management as it is the dominant and most common management approach in 
low and lower middle income countries for rural areas (Broek and Brown, 2015). 
As the figure indicates, the research recognises that management models can 
overlap and that hybrid systems can develop. It is these conceptually blurred 
areas of overlap, particularly between direct local government providers and 
community management that this research will consider in more detail later in 
the thesis.  
 
Figure 2-2 - Service Delivery Models (adapted from: Lockwood and Smits, 2011) 
For now it is useful to clarify a distinction between two layers of organisations 
that operate within the community management model. This includes the 
service provider level, which is the organisation(s) “carrying out all the day-to-
day tasks of operation, maintenance and administration of the water system.  
Typically these tasks include: Operation: operating the engine of a pump, 
managing a treatment or disinfection facility; Maintenance: small preventive 
maintenance, like greasing of mechanical parts, cleaning of reservoirs, repairing 
leakages in the network and broken-down pumps and other corrective 
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maintenance; and Administration: billing, tariff collection, book-keeping, 
reporting, governance” (Hutchings et al. 2016, p.27). Within an urban utility 
context the entity undertaking such tasks could be called an operator but as this 
research is focused on community management, the service provider will be 
referred to as the ‘community service provider’. Under the Government of India 
(2013a) National Rural Drinking Water Programme (NRDWP) it is mandated 
that the community service provider should be a community committee know as 
a Village Water and Sanitation Committee, which will be discussed in more 
detail in the following chapter. 
It is now widely argued that the community service provider should be 
recurrently supported and monitored by a range of other organisations 
(Bakalian and Wakeman, 2009; Baumann, 2006; Kleemeier, 2000; Lockwood 
and Smits, 2011; Lockwood, 2002, 2004; Smits et al., 2013). These 
organisations will be known as the ‘enabling support environment’ that can 
provide support to and monitor the performance of the community service 
provider. The purpose of the enabling support environment will be explained in 
greater detail later in this chapter but it is succinctly summarised in the joint-
authored Smits et al. (2015, pp. 22–23) paper as: “The main objective of such 
support is to help communities in addressing issues they cannot reasonably 
solve on their own and gradually improve their performance in their service 
provider functions.” Although there is a strong consensus that this type of 
support is important to ensure sustainable and successful community 
management, there remains a lack of understanding about how to best 
structure and finance such support (Mcintyre et al., 2014; Smits et al., 2011). 
This research is designed to fill such a knowledge gap which will be 
investigated further in the reminder of this literature review. However, for now, 
the concept of community management involving two layers of community 
service providers and enabling support environments is an importance 
conceptual building block of the research. 
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2.1.4 Rurality and communities 
This research focuses on the community management of rural water services 
but in practice the difference between an urban and rural area is not an easy 
thing to define. The UN Statistics division has no agreed upon definition of what 
is rural as it varies from country to country but cites a number of factors 
conventionally associated with defining it, including the population size of a 
settlement, population density and the proportion of households employed in 
certain sectors, for example,. agriculture (United Nations, 2016). In an age of 
substantial population growth and urbanisation around the world, defining an 
area as ‘rural’ is arguably becoming even more difficult (Danert and Flowers, 
2012). It is easy to conceive of a scale of rurality ranging from very small 
hamlets with tens of households to concentrated rural growth-areas that can 
have many thousands of households, especially on the borders of urban areas 
(Danert and Flowers, 2012). This research does not attempt to navigate the 
debate about rurality in great detail but is aware of the contested nature of the 
definition. It simply accepts the definition of rural that is adopted by Ministry of 
Statistics and Programme Implementation of the Government of India, which 
defines rural areas as all areas that do not meet the following criteria of an 
urban area: 
The urban area of the country was defined in 1971 census as follow: (a) all places with a 
municipality, Corporation or Cantonment and places notified as town area (b) all other places 
which satisfied the following criteria: (i) a minimum population of 5000, (ii) at least 75 percent 
of the male working population are non-agriculturists, and (iii) a density of population of at 
least 1000 per sq. mile (390 per sq. km.)…The rural sector covers areas other than the urban 
areas. (Government of India, 2001, pp. 5–6) 
Based on this definition a core aspect of rurality in India is the governance 
system. As indicated in the quote, urban areas tend to have municipality, 
corporation or cantonment governance systems. Yet the system of governance 
for rural areas is through the ‘Panchayat Raj Institutions’ (PRI) (Banerjee, 2013; 
Government of India, 2015a). This is a three tiered system of local self-
government with elected officials at the village, block (a sub-district 
administrative unit) and district levels. The PRI system will be discussed in 
greater detail in the following chapter.  
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For now it is useful to clarify that the lowest governance unit of the PRI is known 
as the Gram Panchayat and in 2013 there were 238,617 different Gram 
Panchayats that were made up of almost 600,000 villages (Government of 
India, 2013b). The approximate 3 to 1 disparity between the number of Gram 
Panchayats and villages show there is a distinction in scales. Yet, due to the 
way the National Rural Drinking Water Programme (Government of India, 
2013a) and past policies (Government of India, 2003) have scaled community 
management in correspondence to the local self-government system, the Gram 
Panchayat is the most common unit described as a village in most states for 
rural water services. The research therefore adopts the existence of a Gram 
Panchayat as both representative of a rural area and also as the standard 
definition of a village (unless otherwise clarified).  
It is recognised that there is a conceptual distinction between the terms village 
and community, with an extensive socio-theoretical literature that discusses the 
concept of ‘community’. (for example, for a seminal paper from the 
pyschological literature see: McMillan and Chavis, 1986). Here, the intention is 
not to review that broad literature but rather to focus on how community is 
defined within the context of rural water services. One definition quoted from a 
practitioner handbook is: 
“A group of people bounded by geographical links, such as a village, settlement or district, 
politics or natural boundaries but also includes those brought together by lifestyle, culture, 
religion, hobby and interest.” 
(Wasonga et al. 2010, p. 167 as quoted in Broek and Brown, 2015, p.52) 
In the context of rural water services the term community is invariably used as 
merely another word for a geographically bounded group of people, normally a 
habitation or village. This is because of the materiality of the water infrastructure 
which will provide services within a given area. As explained, in India the 
boundaries of this geographical unit are defined by the administrative 
boundaries of the Gram Panchayat. In this sense, this thesis will use community 
to indicate the people living within a geographically defined area which is 
conventionally at the scale of a Gram Panchayat. 
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2.1.5 Summary of basic concepts for rural water services 
This section has provided an overview of how the thesis understands a series of 
basic concepts related to the research problem. It has explained that rural water 
supply is conceptualised as a service that undergoes a continuous cycle of 
change, rather than as a static system. Under the community management 
model a community service is the organisation that delivers this service but is 
supported by an enabling support environment. Although the concept of access 
is important in assessing performance in rural water services it is only a crude 
measure and therefore this thesis adopts the concept of service levels as more 
granulated measures of success in service delivery. Finally, the section has 
clarified that rural areas in India can be defined by the governance system in 
place and that communities are considered geographically bounded groups of 
people living together who can be supplied water together, usually living within 
the unit of the Gram Panchayat. 
2.2 Community management for rural water services 
Building on the previously described understanding of rural water services, this 
section now interrogates the literature on the community management of rural 
water services. It places an emphasis on what is loosely described as as the 
global literature on community management noting that a more specific review 
of the Indian context is provided in the following chapter. It begins with a review 
of the history of community management, its problems with financial 
sustainability and the types of support found in community management plus. It 
then moves to more theoretical territory to consider how community 
management links to ideas about collective action and public service delivery. 
2.2.1 A brief history of community management for rural water 
services 
In order to understand the community management approach, it is useful to 
trace its emergence to becoming the dominant service delivery option for rural 
water services. Around much of the low and lower middle income world in the 
period from roughly the 1950s to the 1980s the norm was for a “top-down state-
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led paradigm for water provision” (Broek and Brown, 2015, p. 116; McCommon 
et al., 1990; Paul, 1987). Initiatives such as the Accelerated Rural Water Supply 
Programme (1972) from India reflected this approach with government directly 
funding Public Health Engineering Departments to construct infrastructure in a 
supply-driven model (James, 2004). These types of public agencies proved 
effective at constructing infrastructure but these were failing “nearly as quickly 
as they were being built” leading to concerns particularly among donors who 
were supporting the sector that money was being wasted (Churchill, 1987). 
Sauders and Warford (1976, p. 198) summarised one of the central problems: 
“The major problem associated with providing water supplies in rural areas of 
lower income countries relates to the operation and maintenance of systems.” 
In this sense, the problems associated with the supply-driven paradigm reflect 
the ones that sector faces today – the on-going management of services was 
the critical failure point. 
More broadly, the 1970s was a period in which there was growing scepticism 
about state planning to solve rural people’s problems (Scott, 1998). The decade 
saw the emergence of the “appropriate technology” paradigm (Schumacher, 
1973) for rural development which advocated shifting beyond complicated and 
expensive infrastructure to focus on low-cost solutions that could be managed 
more effectively by local people (Black, 1998). Within the water sector, such 
thinking was adopted internationally in the 1977 Mar Del Plata UN Conference 
on Water and was propagated throughout the 1980s UN International Decade 
for Drinking Water and Sanitation (McCommon et al., 1990). At the core of 
policy shift was the principle to provide more appropriate technology but also to 
shift the responsibility for operation and maintenance to rural communities and 
away from the cumbersome state (Schouten and Moriarty, 2003). 
Such an idea was attractive in part because it paradoxically responded to the 
two dominant ideological positions that influenced the international development 
community during this period (Blaikie, 2006; Broek and Brown, 2015; Harvey 
and Reed, 2006; Moriarty, Butterworth, Franceys, et al., 2013). This included 
what Broek and Brown (2015, p. 51) describe as left-wing “grassroots post-
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Marxist developmentalists” and right-wing market-orientated neoliberals. Both 
groups were in favour of promoting local control and rolling back the state, 
although they justified this from different perspectives (Chowns, 2014). With the 
political left keen to avoid what they perceived to be the corrupt state and 
market; and, the political right seeking to reduce the size of the state by 
promoting a stronger community role (Blaikie, 2006; Harvey and Reed, 2006).  
Such ideological justifications were only part of the story, however. The notion 
that water supply infrastructure could be constructed and then handed over to 
communities also appealed to the structural set-up of the development industry 
(Harvey and Reed, 2006). Short project cycles were favoured by NGOs and 
donors who could undertake implementation and then pass responsibility to 
communities with little or no on-going support (Lockwood, 2002, 2004). 
Community management can therefore also be described as a strategy through 
which international donors and NGOs could bypass what they deemed to be 
inefficient (domestic) government agencies in low-income and lower middle-
income states and work directly with rural communities (Harvey and Reed, 
2006). 
The exact configuration of community management varied over time and 
setting. In Sub-Saharan Africa, where handpumps are particularly common, the 
community management model often became equated with the acronym of 
Village Level Operation and Maintenance (VLOM) (Colin, 1999). These 
relatively low-maintenance technologies would be installed sometimes in 
remote villages and communities would be trained to undertake maintenance 
work when required. However, sustainability problems remained as key 
assumptions that the VLOM model relied on, such as the private sector being 
an effective route for accessing spare parts, often did not materialise (Hankin, 
2011).  
In many settings, however, the community management paradigm became 
aligned with the neoliberal call for demand-driven public service provision 
(Broek and Brown, 2015). In this form it became known as the demand-
responsive approach (DRA) to community management which is considered the 
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declared approach of many governments, donors and NGOs today (Marks and 
Davis, 2012; Moriarty, Butterworth, Franceys, et al., 2013; Whittington et al., 
2009). The DRA follows the principle that water services should be delivered 
where demand exists and equates this with a willingness-to-contribute to the 
implementation costs and cover the operation and minor maintenance costs 
through tariffs during the service delivery phase (Schouten and Moriarty, 2003). 
It has been described as the ‘declared’ approach because in practice rural 
communities rarely cover the full recurrent costs of water services (Burr and 
Fonseca, 2013). This means there remains a significant problem with the 
financial sustainability of community management (and rural water services, 
more generally), which will be the focus of the next section.  
2.2.2 Financial sustainability and community management 
Water services, like all public services, cost money. The UN-Water Global 
Analysis and Assessment of Sanitation and Drinking Water report makes clear 
that there are three sustainable sources of finance for water services in low and 
lower middle income countries. These are known as the 3Ts (tariffs, taxes and 
transfers): “(a) the monies paid by the users of the services (“tariffs”), (b) the 
monies provided by domestic taxpayers through governments (“taxes”), and (c) 
the monies provided by foreign countries (“transfers”) (UN Water and WHO, 
2014). Getting the right mix of these 3Ts is of “strategic importance” in terms of 
delivering sustainable services (OECD, 2009) yet it remains one of the biggest 
challenges (Burr and Fonseca, 2013; Hutton and Varughese, 2016; Hutton, 
2013; Hutton et al., 2007). At the global level it is estimated that capital 
financing of $114 billion per annum would be required to achieve the SDG for 
water supply (universal coverage of safely managed water supply), which is 
three times the current investment levels (Hutton and Varughese, 2016).  
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However, the greater challenge relates to the growing operation and 
maintenance costs5 (Baumann, 2006; Briscoe and Malik, 2005), with these 
becoming a larger annual cost than capital investment during the fifteen year 
period between 2015 and 2030 (Hutton and Varughese, 2016). They are set to 
rise from around $18 billion to $128.8 billion over that period (Hutton and 
Varughese, 2016) (this is a combined estimate for water and sanitation services 
as the data is not available at the granularity of just water supply but this 
illustrates the magnitude of increase).  
In this context, a basic tenet of the DRA to community management is that user 
tariffs should cover the operation and maintenance costs of rural water supplies 
and users should contribute 10% of the capital costs (Joshi, 2003). Taxes or 
transfers should then cover the remaining 90% of the capital costs with the 
belief that as countries get wealthier (like India has been getting in recent 
decades) a greater proportion of capital costs will be covered by domestic tax  
(Franceys and Cavill, 2011). Yet research has shown that user tariffs rarely 
cover even basic OpEx costs and even more rarely cover the full recurrent 
costs including CapManEx (Burr and Fonseca, 2013; Moriarty, Butterworth, 
Franceys, et al., 2013; Ratna et al., 2010). In a review of the costs of rural water 
services for UNICEF, it was concluded:   
“Analysis of the monitoring and evaluation literature suggests that subsidies (on-going, long-
term) to recurrent costs of hardware (capital) maintenance are necessary in rural areas if 
improved services (already subsidised in implementation) are to remain serviceable...There is 
no evidence in the literature to suggest that these costs can be funded through user charges.” 
(Franceys and Cavill, 2011) 
The available evidence suggests that users cannot cover operation and 
maintenance costs at the magnitudes required and with these costs due to 
                                            
5 Adopting here the terminology used in the latest Water and Sanitation 
Program Technical Paper (Hutton and Varughese, 2016) that does not 
distinguish between OpEx, OpEx Enabling Support and CapManEx but rather 
combines into a broader category labelled Operation and Maintenance. 
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substantially increase over the coming years this is likely to become an ever 
growing problem (Burr and Fonseca, 2013).  
The described situation points to a fundamental flaw in the logic of the DRA to 
community management – that rural people in low and lower middle income 
contexts will consistently have the ‘willingness-to-pay’ for water services at a 
sustainable level. The rationality of focusing on willingness-to-pay – as a proxy 
for the concept of ‘demand’ – can be summarised as: “If people are willing to 
pay for the full costs of a particular service, then it is clear indication that the 
service is valued (and therefore most likely to be used and maintained) and that 
it will be possible to sustain and even replicate the project” (Whittington et al., 
1990, p. 294).  
However, willingness to pay is variable between and within communities and is 
often not at the required level (Marks and Davis, 2012). There is evidence that 
there is a threshold effect in terms of effective demand with service levels 
having to be sufficiently high for users to pay (Fonseca, 2014; Koehler et al., 
2015). Moreover, there is recent evidence that communities have a lower 
willingness to pay for community managed services than service delivery option 
(Hope, 2015). Even if there is some evidence that rural water service users are 
willing to pay a tariff at some level, the most fundamental problem is that it 
rarely covers the actual operation and maintenance costs of supply leading to 
sustainability problems in the service delivery cycle (Franceys and Cavill, 2011; 
Franceys et al., 2016; Marks and Davis, 2012).  
With this identified ambiguity in the financial sustainability of community 
managed rural water services, this section now briefly considers the available 
evidence on the costs of rural water services. A global research project 
supported by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation called the “WASHCost 
project (2008-2013)” provides the most comprehensive dataset on these issues 
(Cross, 2013). It also uses the cost categories adopted in this thesis so enables 
direct comparison with the empirical findings reported later. The research 
involved fieldwork in four countries – India (Andhra Pradesh state only), Ghana, 
Burkina Faso and Mozambique (Mcintyre et al., 2014) – and provides an 
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estimated cost of services at the per person level (converted to 2014 costs for 
comparison with the data from this study using World Bank inflation rate for mid-
2014 USD (World Bank, 2016a)). The costs provided were based on the data 
from schemes where the majority of people received accepted service levels 
but as explained above this represents only a minority of water systems they 
investigated with the “vast majority” not delivering acceptable service levels. 
They also adopted a lower service level benchmark for quantity than will be 
used in this research (20 litres per capita per day (lpcd) versus Government of 
India norms of 40 lpcd). Despite these differences the data presented is 
considered to be the most relevant international benchmarks to compare 
findings from this research to.  
Table 2-3 - Estimate of costs for rural water services (adjusted to 2014 prices 
from Burr and Fonseca, 2013) 
Cost category Technology LIQR
6
 UIQR 
CapEx (per person) Borehole - handpump $21 $62 
CapEx (per person) Small piped schemes up to 5,000 
people 
$31 $132 
CapEx (per person) Intermediate and large piped 5000+  $21 $153 
Recurrent costs (per person 
per year) 
Borehole - handpump 
$4 $7 
Recurrent costs (per person 
per year) 
Piped schemes 
$4 $16 
Table 2-3 above shows the inter-quartile range of the cost of services by 
different technical-modes of supply (Mcintyre et al., 2014). Whilst as would be 
expected costs vary depending on the technical-mode of supply, the most 
relevant finding is the range of costs reported in each category which suggests 
there is a low degree of standardisation in the cost of rural water services. 
Overall the recurrent costs are estimated to be 1-8% of the initial capital outlay 
with the costs higher for piped water supply schemes than handpumps. The 
WASHCost project provided greater granularity on the recurrent costs of 
                                            
6 Due to the variability of the data from the WASHCost study the data was 
presented as benchmarks based on the lower and upper interquartile ranges. 
 30 
services, which is presented in Table 2-4. In the context of the community 
management plus emphasis on the enabling support environment for rural 
water services, this gives the range of costs for the OpEx Enabling Support 
category between $1 and $3 per person per year.  
Table 2-4 - Estimate of recurrent costs for rural water services (adjusted to 2014 
prices from Burr and Fonseca, 2013) 
Recurrent Costs Handpump Piped schemes 
LIQR UIQR LIQR UIQR 
OpEx $0.5 $1.1 $0.5 $5.3 
CapManEx $1.6 $2.1 $1.6 $7.4 
OpEx Enabling Supportr $1.1 $3.2 $1.1 $3.2 
Total Recurrent $3.2 $6.3 $3.2 $15.8 
Focusing on the India-specific data as presented in Burr (2015) from a dataset 
of 5,000 household surveys in Andhra Pradesh, we can see the ranges are on 
average lower than the international context, as shown in Table 2-5. This  
reflects the lower operating costs that are often associated with the Indian water 
sector compared to Sub-Saharan Africa countries (Mcintyre et al., 2014). Lower 
operating costs are largely due to comparatively lower labour costs and more 
developed supply chains, among other factors. Such differences should be 
accounted for to some extent by the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) conversion 
into US dollars that was used within the WASHCost project (and will be used in 
this research) but notwithstanding this conversation India still retains a 
comparatively lower operating cost (Burr and Fonseca, 2013). Overall, the 
India-specific benchmarks for piped water supply range from around $20 to $80 
per person, with the total recurrent costs reported between $0.2 to $2.5 per 
person (Burr, 2015). The research found data on recurrent costs hard to come 
by in India especially for CapManEx (Burr and Fonseca, 2013). 
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Table 2-5 - Costs of rural water services in Andhra Pradesh, India (Burr, 2015) 
Service delivery model CapEx OpEx CapManEx 
LIQR HIQR LIQR HIQR LIQR HIQR 
Handpump $16 $46 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 
Single-village scheme 
(mechanised borehole) 
$23 $49 $0.2 $0.3 $0.0 $1.2 
Single-village scheme 
(household connections) 
$38 $66 $0.5 $1.5 $0.0 $1.0 
Multi-village scheme $26 $53 $0.4 $1.8 $0.0 $0.6 
Mixed piped supply $38 $81 $0.7 $2.2 $0.0 $0.5 
This section has reviewed the literature on financing rural water services 
showing that getting the financing rights remains a major challenge to achieving 
the SDGs. The particular cost sharing arrangements for the DRA for community 
management were explained that include user tariffs covering 100% of 
operation and maintenance costs. The evidence suggests that this is rarely met 
and is a likely cause of low levels of sustainability. A series of benchmarks were 
given that are considered to reflect useful guidelines for the level of financing 
required to deliver sustainable services.  
2.2.3 Next generation trends in community management – toward 
the “plus” 
Beyond the problems with financial sustainability, the community management 
approach can be placed as a subset of a broader movement that can be 
summarised as the ‘participatory turn’ in development thinking (Chambers, 
1983, 2008). This concept of participation has been the subject of a vast and 
often highly critical literature (Brown and Ashman, 1996; Cleaver, 1999; 
Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Hickey and Mohan, 2005; Mansuri and Rao, 2004). 
It is a contested term which has been criticised as a meaningless “development 
buzzword” (Cornwall and Brock, 2005) that too often becomes materialised as a 
“managerial exercise” (Cleaver, 1999). Yet the concept of participation, however 
it is defined (an issue tackled below), is part of the justification for community 
management (Harvey and Reed, 2006) especially in the early literature 
(McCommon et al., 1990; Paul, 1987). 
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Some research has shown that a high level of community participation is 
associated with successful rural water services (Paul, 1987; Prokopy, 2005). 
However, it has also been shown that the ability to participate is uneven across 
communities and a focus on participation often leads to patronage (i.e. a 
reinforcement of the existing, often unequal, power relations found in rural 
communities) (Chowns, 2014; Isham et al., 2002). More generally, the 
prevailing levels of unsustainability in services in places such as Sub-Saharan 
Africa where participation has been a policy focus has led to an increasing 
scepticism about the relationship between highly participatory rural water 
services and the long-term sustainability of services (Broek and Brown, 2015; 
Jones, 2011; Marks and Davis, 2012).  
This thesis positions participation as a still untested assumption that underpins 
the initial community management paradigm and therefore will seek to measure 
it within the research. For this purpose, the research tracks the definition of 
participation back to its popularisation within the community development 
movement in the United States of America in the 1960s. Sherry Arnstein defines 
it as a “categorical term for citizen power” and proposed a ladder that reflects 
the different degrees of participation that citizens can have in a planning and 
development process (Arnstein, 1969). Similar ladders have been developed for 
measuring participation in development projects (Bolt and Fonseca, 2001; 
Dayal et al., 2000; Deverill et al., 2002; Lammerink and de Jong, 1999). In the 
next methodology chapter, such a ladder is adapted to help measure the 
degree of decision-making power that community institutions have in different 
stages of the service delivery cycle. For now, it is important to note that the 
“participatory turn” has fundamentally shaped ideas around appropriate 
development in rural areas although it is an increasingly questioned condition 
for success, especially in the more recent literature.  
Instead, in the contemporary practice-orientated literature, there is growing 
focus on the perceived importance of professionalising service delivery (Le 
Gouais and Webster, 2011; Lockwood and Smits, 2011). Professionalisation is 
about moving the community management model from one that relies on 
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community members volunteering time and using ad hoc management 
techniques, to a model whereby properly qualified, paid-for-staff complete the 
operation and maintenance tasks, but decision-making power remains within an 
appropriate community institution (Lockwood and Smits, 2011). The 
professionalisation of rural water services has been associated with a shift to 
the private sector away from community management (Le Gouais and Webster, 
2011). This thesis rejects that as being necessarily true and instead hypotheses 
that professionalisation can happen within the community management model 
based on a number of potential forms:  
  “The adoption of good business practices, such as billing, book keeping and auditing, 
systematic carrying out operation and maintenance tasks, managing customer 
relations, etc. One of the examples of this is the Programa de Cultura Empresarial 
(business culture programme), ran by the Government of Colombia which sought to 
professionalise the community-based service providers, retaining their non-for-profit 
status, but promoting good business practices and hiring of paid-for staff (Tamayo and 
Gracia, 2006).  
 The contracting of paid-for staff, such as plumbers or an administrator to carry out the 
different functions as a dedicated task. In larger and more complex systems, such as 
multi-village schemes serving rural growth centres, CBOs may fully contract out all 
these operational functions. 
 Calling down professional support. This refers to cases where the CBO proactively seeks 
and obtains support from a professional support agent. It requires professionalism of 
the CBO to recognise its limitations and the willingness to contract specialised 
support.” (Smits et al. (2015, pp. 22–23) 
The emphasis on professionalisation rather than participation in community 
service delivery is considered to reflect a shift in thinking towards a community 
management plus approach. The research will therefore attempt to test whether 
the shift to professionalisation is reflected in the Indian landscape. 
The call for professionalisation is also considered to be part of the same 
movement that advocates a shift towards more structured support services to 
communities throughout the service delivery cycle (Bakalian and Wakeman, 
2009; Baumann, 2006; Kleemeier, 2000; Lockwood and Smits, 2011; 
Lockwood, 2002, 2004). This often practice-orientated literature suggests the 
major challenge in contemporary community management is about how to 
institutionalise this more bipartite sense of responsibility between communities 
and support agencies. This section now presents the evidence collected as part 
of a systematic review into the success factors found in successful community 
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managed rural water services programmes around the world (Hutchings et al., 
2015- the full paper is provided via Appendix A). The study compiled case 
studies largely from the grey literature from 1980 to 2010 scanning over 2,544 
potential cases of community management in low and lower middle income 
countries. This led to a sample of 174 case studies that was refined down to 72 
of the most successful case studies of community managed rural water supplies 
for further interrogation to understand the basis for success in community 
management. 
Focusing on the types of external support provided across the cases, as shown 
in Figure 2, the review showed that direct financial and/or material support is 
found in over 90% of successful community management programmes. Other 
common forms of support were capacity building of management and capacity 
building of technical skills. The study showed that there was not much 
standardisation in the support services with many case studies not documenting 
such support despite being reported as successful cases of community 
managed rural water services.  
This demonstrates that there have been many cases of successful community 
management that do not follow the community management plus model which 
are still successful. The systematic review also highlighted the importance of 
what can be described as ‘internal community plus’ factors which were 
characteristics of communities where successful cases were found. These 
highlighted characteristics that were classified as collective initiative, strong 
leadership and institutional transparency at the community service provider 
level (Hutchings et al., 2015). This raises an important point that although much 
focus in the contemporary community management literature has been the 
discussion of external support, the characteristics and contexts of communities 
are still likely to have a significant impact on success in service delivery. 
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Figure 2-3 - External support functions provided in the most successful cases of 
community management (Hutchings et al. 2015) 
This section has explained a number of contemporary trends in the community 
management literature. It has highlighted the link with the ‘participatory turn’ in 
development which is increasingly called into question, then focused on the 
perceived importance of professionalisation and support to community service 
delivery. Such factors are considered to reflect some general hypotheses that 
need further investigation, as clarified at the end of this chapter.  
2.2.4 Theorising contemporary trends in community management 
This section attempts to shift this chapter to more theoretical territory in an 
attempt to introduce some new concepts to the community management 
literature that are considered useful for theorising the contemporary trends 
above. It begins, however, by explaining the conventional links that are often 
made with the literature on the community-based management of natural 
resources (CBMNR). There is a considerable body of work that can be 
described under CBMNR that uses different labels such as community-based 
resource management (Armitage, 2005; Blaikie, 2006; Leach et al., 1999) and 
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common-pool resource management (Blaikie, 2006; Dynamics and Berkes, 
2006).  
At the core of these works is the management of “the commons” which can be 
described in the terminology of economics as common-pool resources that are 
non-excludable and rivalrous (Agrawal and Gupta, 2005). This means that 
people cannot be excluded from using them but each individual can potentially 
damage the overall value of the resource – they usually refer to resources such 
as forests or animal grazing grounds. The basic problem the literature engages 
with can be characterised as the “collective action problem” – for example, it 
investigates whether communities can avoid free-riding by individuals within 
their group (Olson, 2002; Ostrom, 1990, 2010). Hope (2015) argues this 
literature has been key to challenging the notion that community management is 
an effective and apolitical strategy for managing natural resources and by 
extension has fed into the broader critique of community managed rural water 
services.   
The most famous perspective to emerge from this body of literature is Elinor 
Ostrom’s work “Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action” that has developed a positivist model of institutional analysis 
(Ostrom, 1990, p. 25). Through this and subsequent work Ostrom developed 
eight design principles that typified successful collection management systems 
(Cox and Arnold, 2010; Ostrom, 1990). The principles were to have clear 
boundaries between users and non-users, adapt rules to local conditions, 
enable participation in decision making from users, monitor and sanction users 
and non-users who deviate from the rules, have a constitution and link local 
governance within a broad nest of institutions (Ostrom, 1990). A more recent 
review of 91 case studies of collective action problems, concluded that that the 
efficacy of the eight generalisations continue to be empirically supported (Cox 
and Arnold, 2010). The work can be considered a cornerstone of the CBMNR 
literature and has since been developed, tested or critiqued in a considerable 
number of works (Agrawal and Yadama, 1997; Cleaver, 2012; Cox and Arnold, 
2010; Dynamics and Berkes, 2006).  
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This type of thinking has been linked with the management of rural water 
services in other studies (Chowns, 2014; Jones, 2015) in part, it is contended, 
because they provide theoretical and methodological approaches for 
understanding the functioning of community institutions. This thesis positions 
this approach as being more appropriate for studying early ideas about the 
community management approach. In the context of studying the on-going 
support of external organisations beyond the immediate community, it is argued 
that it is more useful to consider community management as an organisational 
arrangement for delivering public services rather than a collective action 
problem. As such it is argued that there is value in bringing in the literature on 
(unorthodox) public service delivery (Bovaird et al., 2015; Cepiku and Giordano, 
2014; Joshi and Moore, 2004) 
From this perspective the community management of rural water services could 
be said to share more parallels with the New Public Management movement 
that sought to reduce the role of the state and improve performance outcomes 
in public service delivery (Hood, 1995; Leftwich, 1993; De Vries and Nemec, 
2013). Whether the participatory ideals that partly underpin community 
management make it distinct from the New Public Management movement (that 
is often associated with neoliberalism and privatisation (Hood, 1995)) is open to 
debate. However, the shift to community management is considered to be at 
least part of the broader shift away from standardisation in public service 
delivery that occurred from the 1980s onwards in many parts of the world (De 
Vries and Nemec, 2013). 
Reviewing the ‘standard’ public service delivery options in developing countries, 
Joshi and Moore (2004, p. 144) propose the following basic options: 
“Self-provisioning through collective action, independently of external agencies…Direct social 
provision through private associations. In almost every part of the world there is a long 
tradition of providing basic services through private associations, notably religious 
organisations…Direct market provision, on a commercial basis…Direct social provision through 
state agencies...Indirect state provision, through sub-contracting of delivery responsibility to 
other agencies.” 
Yet they note how researchers are increasingly raising concerns about the 
deficiencies of these distinct typologies in the context of the increasing 
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“permeability of the public-private divide (Bovaird et al., 2015; Cepiku and 
Giordano, 2014; Joshi and Moore, 2004, p. 33). In response, Joshi and Moore 
(2004) emphasise the increasing importance of inter-organisational partnerships 
in service delivery.  
Developing these ideas they expand the concept of “co-production” –  originally 
defined by Ostrom (1996, p. 1073) to simply emphasise that service provision 
often involves more than one organisation – to develop the concept of 
“institutionalised co-production”, which they define as:  
“Institutionalised co-production is the provision of public services (broadly defined, to include 
regulation) through regular, long-term relationships between state agencies and organised 
groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions” (p.40) 
They develop this definition by specifying four characteristics they consider to 
be associated with it: 1) institutionalised co-production should not be temporary; 
2) it does not necessarily need to rely on formal contractual arrangements 
(although it can do); 3) it reflects a blurring of boundaries between public and 
private; and, 4) they “do not particularly associate institutionalised co-production 
with what Hood (1998)(1998) categorises as the egalitarian (participatory, 
communitarian) approach to dealing with public management issues” (Joshi and 
Moore, 2004, p. 40). This final point is thought to mean this conceptualisation 
has not been widely applied to the community management of rural water 
services, which has conventionally been associated with participation and 
collective action. Yet in the context of the calls to professionalise and continually 
support community service providers as specified through the community 
management plus paradigm, the concept of institutionalised co-production is 
considered to become more relevant.  
Co-production has previously been connected with the interface between formal 
and informal aspects of water service delivery in urban areas (Ahlers et al., 
2014). Whilst it has also been argued in a Sub-Saharan African context (Olivier 
de Sardan, 2011), that many forms of public services are delivered through the 
co-production of formal and informal processes such as maternal health 
services relying on public hospitals and community midwifes. This research has 
not attempted to interrogate the informal aspects of co-production in rural water 
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services, which it is contended are still likely to play a role in rural water 
services in India. This is partly because the resolution and scope of the 
synthesis was not considered conducive to studying such informality, as 
explained in the methodology. 
However, the concept of institutionalised co-production is considered to capture 
particularly well the organisational arrangements proposed by the National 
Rural Drinking Water Programme (NRDWP) (Government of India, 2013a) 
guidelines. The guidelines specify although a VWSC is mandated to provide 
water services this committee should be a registered sub-committee of the local 
self-government institution of the Gram Panchayat. Due to the prescribed 
overlap of members between the VWSC and the Gram Panchayat there is 
ambiguity as to whether the VWSC should be considered a public or (private) 
community organisation, as per a basic Weberian distinction of organisational 
types. It is therefore useful to introduce this concept of institutional co-
production in this research as it will be a term that helps categorise and theorise 
the organisational forms identified. 
2.3 Chapter summary and contribution 
This chapter has reviewed the literature and introduced a number of key 
concepts for understanding rural water services. It has also set out the 
emergence of the demand-responsive approach to community management 
and a number of contemporary trends in thinking related to community 
management. These trends are considered to form the basis for a series of 
‘paradigmatic claims’ that will be investigated in this research to help verify the 
validity of the ideas underpinning the community management plus approach 
and further develop the empirical and theoretical understanding of the model. 
Table 2-6 displays the paradigmatic claims which are considered to be useful 
distinctions for this purpose. It is accepted that they are only emblematic of the 
broad trends in the literature and therefore obscure the level of complexity that 
each concept individually can be framed within. However, they are considered 
useful guides for developing appropriate indicators that can be used to structure 
a cross-case analysis and synthesis of findings from a multi-case study 
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research project. The task of doing this will be picked up again in Chapter Four 
but in the following chapter the focus of the thesis narrows to consider in more 
detail the context of the Indian rural water sector.   
Table 2-6 – Paradigmatic claims in the community management of rural water 
services 
Level of investigation Conventional 
paradigmatic claims for 
community 
management 
Next generation 
paradigmatic claims for 
community management 
plus 
Research Question 1 - 
What are the type and 
characteristics of 
organisational 
arrangements found in 
successful community 
management programmes 
in India? 
- Community 
participation in 
service delivery 
will deliver 
successful service 
outcomes 
(Prokopy, 2009) 
 
- Professionalisation of 
community role in 
service delivery will 
delivery successful 
service outcomes 
(Lockwood and Smits, 
2011) 
-  
Research Question 2 - 
What are the indicative 
financial costs and cost 
sharing arrangements for 
successful community 
management programmes 
in India? 
- Community 
contributes 10% 
of capital costs 
and then covers 
recurrent costs 
through tariffs 
(Joshi, 2003) 
- Recurrent costs have 
to be subsidised by 
support agents to 
become sustainable – 
although the level of 
subsidy is not clear 
Research Question 3 - 
To what extent do the 
findings from questions 1 
and 2 support the 
justification for the 
community management 
plus paradigm as a 
dominant management 
model for rural water 
services in India and other 
relevant contexts? 
- Paradigm framed 
through ideas 
about collective-
action and 
participation 
- Institutionalised co-
production of public 
services to frame new 
generation of 
community 
management 
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3 RESEARCH CONTEXT –RURAL WATER SERVICES IN 
INDIA 
India is home to over 1.2 billion people living across 29 states with diverse 
geographies, levels of economic wealth and levels of access to rural water 
services. It is also a country with a rich history of community managed rural 
water services that range from early experiments with NGOs as far back as the 
1960s (James, 2004, 2011) to the formal adoption of community management 
with government programmes from the late 1990s (Government of India, 2003, 
2013a). The logic of undertaking a study in India is that it provides an 
appropriate level of diversity in operating contexts allowing an assessment of 
community management in varied situations whilst retaining consistency in 
some key features that more easily enable a comparative analysis such as a 
unified federal governance system and single currency.  
This chapter explains and analyses this research context. It starts by discussing 
the status of development and rural water services highlighting national trends 
and then assesses the difference between states in terms of access to rural 
water services. This includes a correlation analysis between access levels and 
a number of broader development indicators, such as GDP per capita and the 
Human Development Index. This is designed to illustrate the ‘synergistic 
character’ of water services that often follow broader levels of human and 
societal development which vary from state to state. To add an explanatory 
insight to this analysis a political economy framework for explaining differences 
between India states is introduced (Kohli, 2012). Following this an overview of 
the governance of rural water services is given that highlights the tension 
between a highly decentralised local self-government and the role of centralised 
State Rural Water Supply Agencies. The chapter ends with a review of 
community managed rural water services in India.  
3.1 Status of development and rural water services in India 
This section provides an overview of the status of development and rural water 
services in India. It does this because the research positions rural water 
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services as synergistic with broader process of human and societal 
development. Simply put this means societies that are poorer in terms of 
financial and human capital are also more likely to have poorer outcomes in 
terms of rural water services (Gerlach and Franceys, 2009; Hutchings et al., 
2015). Theoretically, this thinking is considered to reflect the synergistic logic of 
the Human Development Index (HDI) (Gandhi et al., 2011; Sen, 2004; ul Haq, 
2004). The HDI measures three composite dimensions related to health, 
education and standards of living to produce a consolidated indicator of human 
development as it has been shown that feedback loops exist between different 
tenets of human development. The logic is that these factors all act as both 
inputs and outputs of one another, in this wider process of development 
(Gandhi et al., 2011). 
Within this research context evidence suggests that rural water services are 
considered synergistic with broader measures of human development (Gerlach 
and Franceys, 2009; Hutchings et al., 2015). The expansion of water services 
leads to improved health outcomes (Fewtrell et al., 2005) and contributes 
towards economic prosperity (Hutton et al., 2007) yet the ability to deliver these 
services is dependent on an underlying level of financial and human capital 
(Harvey and Reed, 2006; Lockwood and Smits, 2011; Lockwood, 2002), that is 
in turn dependent on the prevailing health and prosperity of communities 
(Bloom et al., 2004). For this reason, it is believed to be important to frame any 
analysis of rural water services within the broader context of a synergistic 
development process. 
3.1.1 National status of development and rural water services 
India is the world’s 2nd most populous country and 7th biggest in land area. It is 
widely considered to be a future geopolitical superpower (Kugler, 2006) and at 
the time of writing it had one of the fastest growing economies of any major 
country (IMF, 2016). With a GDP per capita of $4,234 it ranks in the upper band 
of the World Bank’s definition of a lower middle income country (World Bank, 
2016b). Yet the paradox of modern day poverty is that the majority of the 
world’s poor live in populous lower middle income countries rather than smaller 
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low-income countries (Sumner, 2012). India contains 35% of the global 
population living on less than $2 a day making it the country with the most 
poverty in absolute terms (Sumner, 2012).  
Geographically, the country sits at the heart of South Asia with a geography that 
ranges from the sub-tropical south to the some of the world’s highest mountains 
in the Himalaya regions of the north. In the west of the country there are 
expansive deserts whilst the eastern hilly region has some of the highest rainfall 
levels reported on earth (Chauhan, 2008). As such water sources are unevenly 
spread across the country and so droughts can plague one region as another 
suffers from flooding. At the national scale, there is increasing pressure on 
water resources which has seen annual per capita water availability dwindle 
from 5,177 m3 in 1951 to 1,545 m3 in 2011 (TERI, 2016), largely due to massive 
population growth over the period. The country is heavily reliant on groundwater 
for agriculture and drinking water but source degradation has become endemic 
with 60% of groundwater sources threatened by overexploitation (Briscoe and 
Malik, 2005). This has led the Government of India to prioritise shifting drinking 
water services to surface water sources in the latest policy guidelines 
(Government of India, 2013c). 
In terms of rural water services, the country has an improved-water source 
coverage rate of 96% in rural areas showing that it is moving towards universal 
access (WHO and UNICEF, 2013). Analysis shows that this is above the 
international trend line for countries with a similar GDP per capita level (Smits, 
forthcoming). However, the Census of India (2011) also provides data by the 
population living with “piped-on-premises”, also known as household or yard 
connections. This figure is at the much lower level of 31% (Census of India, 
2011), which is below the international trend line when compared to countries 
with similar wealth (Smits, forthcoming).  
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Figure 3-1 Rural Water Supply coverage rates (data taken from Census of India 
(2011a) and WHO and UNICEF (2015) – and targets from Government of India 
(Government of India, 2013a)) 
This is significant as the Government of India has recently set ambitious new 
policy targets to “ensure at least 80% of rural households have piped water 
supply with a household tap connection” by 2022 (Government of India, 2013a, 
p. 2). This means that it plans to expand access to such facilities to around 400 
million people in less than a decade (Hutchings, Franceys, et al., 2016). As 
Figure 3-1 shows, this will involve an extremely ambitious jump in the level of 
access for a measure that has conventionally advanced in a very slow linear 
fashion. For this research it indicates the importance of producing guidance on 
the community management of piped water supply with household connections 
as particularly useful for the Indian policy context. 
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3.1.1 Analysis of development and rural water services by state 
Data at the national level in India obscures some significant differences from 
state to state. In Bihar state just 3% of the rural population have access to a 
household connection whilst in the state of Sikkim this rises to over 80% 
(Census of India, 2011a). This section therefore presents the results from an 
analysis of state-wise secondary data. It focuses on two key dependent 
variables which are the improved water supply coverage rate and the household 
connection coverage rate, both as reported by the Census of India (2011a). 
These are then assessed by how they relate to other development variables 
which are outlined in Table 3-1 below. The analysis used data that was 
available at the state level in India either through the academic literature or 
published by reputable institutions such as the Government of India or 
international bodies, such as the UN. Table 3-1 below shows the data that was 
examined and justifies why it was selected whilst Table 3-2 shows the dataset. 
The data was initially compiled in MS Excel with the analysis being conducted in 
SPSS. As discussed in the methods chapter, the measure used here is the 
Kendall’s tau test whilst statistical significance and effect size are assessed 
against the proposed ladders from Field (2013). The statistical output from the 
analysis is presented in Table 3-3 and explained below the tables. 
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Table 3-1 Macro-development measures as potential determinants for success in rural water supply 
Measure Description of measure Justification for use Source 
GDP Per 
Capita (PPP) 
GDP is the most widely used measure of 
economic activity given for a specific area 
over a designated time period, usually a 
year. The ‘per capita’ measure divides this by 
the population, whilst PPP makes this 
comparable across countries. 
Although the use of GDP as a development indicator 
has been criticised for being economically 
deterministic (Costanza et al., 2014), it remains 
among the most widely used due to the high 
correlations between GDP and development 
outcomes such as health (Schell et al., 2007).  
Gross Domestic Product per 
capita (2013-1014) (Reserve 
Bank of India, 2015) was 
converted at mid-2014 
conversation rate USD PPP, 
as reported by World Bank 
(2016a). 
Human 
Development 
Index 
HDI is a composite indicator; it measures 
three composite dimensions of human 
development related to health, education and 
standards of living. 
Based on the synergistic development process 
described above, it would be expected that the broad 
increase in health, education and standards of living 
would lead to positive “feedback loops” in the 
provision of public services such as rural water 
services. 
The India Human 
Development Report 2011 
Towards Social Inclusion 
(Gandhi et al., 2011) 
Devolution 
Index (Rank) 
Each year the Government of India assess 
the extent of devolution to the Panchayat Raj 
Bodies across India.  
As discussed later in this chapter there are varying 
levels of decentralisation between India states. It 
may be that there is a link between decentralisation 
and the provision of rural water services and it is 
therefore interesting to see whether any association 
can be identified in this state-level analysis 
Ranking of States on 
Devolution Index 
(Government of India, 2015a) 
Below Poverty 
Line (Rural 
Population) 
A consumption based poverty line is set for 
rural and urban areas by the Government of 
India based on a mixed reference period 
(MRP) measure of consumption data 
reported in the National Sample Survey 
(Government of India, 2009b). 
It is anticipated high rural poverty rates are likely to 
be negatively associated with progress in terms of 
water supply due to the reduced capacity for cost 
recovery from users (among other issues).  
Handbook of Statistics on 
Indian Economy (Reserve 
Bank of India, 2015) 
Literacy Rate Through the Census of India (2011b) the 
literacy rate is collected as the number of 
people living above the age of 7 that can 
both read and write in any language.   
Literacy rates are an important component of the HDI 
yet they could be especially potentially important 
indicators for rural water services where there is a 
high degree of devolution of power to rural 
communities. 
Census of India (Census of 
India, 2011b) 
Gini 
coefficient 
Gini co-efficient measures the income 
distribution of a country as the basis for 
assessing inequality among the population. 
Economic inequity has been associated with poor 
development outcomes (Easterly, 2007) so it may be 
expected that a high Gini coefficient would be 
negatively associated with high coverage in rural 
water supply. 
Data reported from 2004 
dataset at the state-level: 
(Rajan et al., 2013) 
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Growth in 
Poverty 
Elasticity 
(Rural 
Population) 
Growth in Poverty Elasticity is a measure of 
the extent to which increases in GDP lead to 
decreases in the proportional of people living 
below the poverty line.  
The measure reflects the extent to which the 
economic process in any state is leading to equitable 
outcomes in terms of its impact on the poor. 
Therefore, in a similar fashion to Gini coefficients it 
may offer insight on whether equity in terms of 
economic development impacts coverage rates. 
Using data for GDP and 
below the poverty line as 
above this was calculated for 
the 2005-2012 period for the 
rural population only. 
Physiographic 
Zones 
A simply binary variable has been created 
based on whether the state is has a largely 
mountainous physiographical zone or is 
classified as a different physiographic zone 
(plains, plateau and coast). 
After an initial analysis run and reading of the case 
studies, it was recognised that the geographical 
setting could be a determining factor for rural water 
supply success. In particular, the difference between 
those states that are largely mountainous or highland 
against the rest appeared to be particularly strong 
with regards to improved access. Pre-analysis runs 
before the correlation were conducted that identified 
statistically significant differences between the 
median outcomes for improved water supply in 
mountain classified states against the rest of the 
sample but no statistical difference between the 
plains, plateau and coast categories. Hence, it was 
considered appropriate to consolidate those 
physiographic zones into one category for the 
purpose of the correlation. The pre-correlation 
analysis tests used were the Kruskal Wallis with post 
hoc Dunn’s test for stepwise comparison, as used 
throughout the analysis in later stages of the thesis.  
Allocation geography variable 
followed Physiographic Zones 
as adapted from India State 
of the Environment Report 
(2009) and Sheikh et al. 
(2011) into four major 
physiographic zones 
(mountains, plains, plateau 
and coast) and then 
consolidated into a mountains 
versus other binary category 
for correlation run. 
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Table 3-2 - State-wise rural water supply and development indicators dataset (sources and definitions as reported in table 
above) 
State Improved 
Water 
(Rural) 
Household 
piped 
water 
supply 
(Rural) 
GDP 
Per 
Capita 
(PPP) 
Human 
Developmen
t Index 
Devolution 
Index 
(Rank) 
Below 
Poverty 
Line 
(Rural) 
Literacy 
Rate 
Gini Growth 
in 
Poverty 
Elasticity  
Physio-
graphic 
Zones 
All India 96% 31% $4,243 0.467 n.d 26% 74% 32.3 -1.2 Other 
Andhra Pradesh 97% 63% $4,643 0.473 13  11% 92% 32.9 -6.1 Other 
Arunachal Pradesh 80% 59% $4,876 0.573 20  39% 67% 32 -1.7 Mountain 
Assam 87% 7% $2,525 0.444 16  34% 73% 23.8 -2.2 Mountain 
Bihar 98% 3% $1,780 0.367 17  34% 64% 22 -1.9 Other 
Chhattisgarh 97% 9% $3,340 0.358 9  45% 71% 27.5 -2.5 Other 
Goa 94% 78% $12,786 0.617 16  7% 87% 27.6 -1.2 Other 
Gujarat 97% 56% $6,094 0.527 10  22% 79% 30.1 -1.2 Other 
Haryana 97% 64% $7,611 0.552 11  12% 77% 25.3 -1.9 Other 
Himachal Pradesh 96% 89% $5,265 0.652 12  8% 84% 27.4 -2.7 Other 
Jammu & Kashmir 78% 56% $3,382 0.529 n.d 12% 69% 23.9 -1.2 Mountain 
Jharkhand 96% 4% $2,632 0.376 21  41% 68% 27.4 -2.1 Mountain 
Karnataka 96% 56% $5,108 0.519 2  25% 76% 30.8 -1.3 Other 
Kerala 93% 25% $5,922 0.79 1  9% 94% 30.1 -2.8 Other 
Madhya Pradesh 98% 10% $2,955 0.375 4  36% 71% 27.4 -2.2 Other 
Maharashtra 98% 50% $6,679 0.572 3  24% 83% 34.8 -1.7 Other 
Manipur 46% 30% $2,372 0.573 18  39% 80% 16 -2.9 Other 
Meghalaya 65% 29% $3,511 0.573 n.d 13% 75% 21.6 -3.7 Mountain 
Mizoram 49% 41% $4,342 0.573 n.d 35% 92% 23 -1.2 Mountain 
Nagaland 79% 52% $4,423 0.573 n.d 20% 80% 19.1 -2.1 Mountain 
Odisha 94% 8% $2,998 0.362 13  36% 73% 30.7 -3.4 Mountain 
Punjab 97% 35% $5,268 0.605 19  8% 77% 27.2 -7.5 Other 
Rajasthan 87% 27% $3,763 0.434 6  16% 67% 26.8 -1.0 Other 
Sikkim 83% 83% $10,068 0.573 8  10% 82% 24.8 -1.1 Other 
Tamil Nadu 98% 79% $6,427 0.57 5  16% 80% 33.1 -1.6 Mountain 
Tripura 94% 25% $3,976 0.573 10  17% 88% 32.6 -2.2 Other 
Uttar Pradesh 99% 20% $2,068 0.38 15  30% 70% 28.1 -1.9 Mountain 
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Uttarakhand 91% 64% $5,916 0.49 14  12% 80% 29.8 -2.5 Other 
West Bengal 98% 11% $3,997 0.492 7  23% 77% 32.4 -4.3 Mountain 
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Table 3-3 Results of the bivariate analysis of development indicators against rural water supply coverage 
  Household piped water supply Improved Water Supply 
 
 
# Macro-development Indicator Kendall 
tau 
Signific
ance 
Interpretation Kendall 
tau 
Signifi
cance 
Interpretation Shapiro-
Wilk (Test 
for 
Normality) 
1 Household piped water supply 1.000 n/a n/a -.023 .865 Not significant .000 
2 Improved Water Supply -.023 .865 Not significant 1.000 n/a n/a .039 
3 GDP Per Capita (PPP) .622 .000 Large effect (positive), 
highly significant 
.117 .385 Not significant .012 
4 Human Development Index .395 .004 Medium effect (positive), 
highly significant 
-.277 .049 Small effect (negative), 
significant 
.097 
5 Devolution Index (Rank) -.013 .925 Not significant -.095 .523 Not significant .637 
6 Below Poverty Line (Rural 
Population) 
-.498 .000 Medium effect 
(negative), highly 
significant 
-.031 .821 Not significant .034 
7 Literacy Rate .364 .006 Medium effect (positive), 
highly significant 
-.026 .850 Not significant .806 
8 Gini-coefficient .117 .377 Not significant .387 .004 Medium effect (positive), 
highly significant 
.086 
9 Growth in Poverty Elasticity 
(2005-2012, Rural below the 
poverty line, State GDP) 
.193 .159 Not significant -.078 .567 Not significant .000 
10 Physiographic Zones .130 .401 Not significant -.631 .000 Large effect (negative), 
highly significant 
.000 
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The analysis showed that there is no significant correlation between states with 
improved water supply and those with high household piped water supply 
coverage, suggesting that there are different drivers for each of these factors. 
For household piped water supply, there are four states above 75% coverage, 
eight states between 50-75%, seven states from 25-50% and the rest below 
25%. On this measure GDP per capita has a highly significant, strong effect 
suggesting it is only in states that have sufficient levels of wealth that the 
transition to household piped water supply is being achieved. The same 
relationship between wealth and improved water source is not found. There are 
two likely reasons why: 1) the lower level of capital and recurrent resource 
commitment and institutional capabilities that are required for basic improved 
services mean they are within reach of lower wealth levels; 2) due to the 
inherent human right and constitutional requirement for providing improved 
access, there is greater emphasis on transfers from the Federal Government, 
international donors and non-state actors like NGOs to support these types of 
services meaning domestic-state wealth becomes less important. 
In comparison to piped water supply, there is limited variability in the improved 
water supply coverage rates with 21 out of the 29 states scoring between 90% 
and 100% coverage rates. However, out of the 8 states scoring below 90% 
seven of them come from the mountainous regions of Northeast India or the 
Himalayans (with the only exception Rajasthan that includes large areas of 
desert). This indicates that India is making progress towards universal access to 
improved water supply across all states, including the very poorest, apart from 
in areas where the mountainous geography becomes a key factor. This was 
confirmed by the highly significant association found between the physiographic 
variable and improved coverage as reported in Table 3 above. Although there 
could be different reasons for this, it is speculated that there could again be two 
overarching reasons: 1) mountainous physiographic settings tend to not be 
conducive to the basic improved water source (handpumps) but rather served 
by more complex and expensive gravity-fed piped systems making the level of 
investment for improved-access higher in these regions; 2) inaccessibility of 
some villages in mountainous physiographic settings further increases the 
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challenge of delivering basic services as compared, on average, to other 
physiographic setting.  
It is accepted that this descriptive statistical analysis of trends only provides 
evidence of simple, binary correlations between a selective group of variables. 
In this sense it does not provide any evidence of causation, nor does it assess 
the compounding of one variable onto another, yet it is still considered to 
provide appropriate insights into the overarching pattern of rural water access 
across Indian states. It helps illustrate how India has largely achieved its goals 
around universal improved water supply coverage apart from in the 
mountainous states. Beyond these states, however, differences in performance 
in terms of household piped water supply can best be explained by the 
development status of the states. Whilst no single variable can predict success, 
GDP per capita (PPP) and the ‘below the poverty’ line measures are most 
strongly associated with household coverage rates. It is argued in the next 
section that these factors are reflected in the political economy of states. 
 
3.2 The political economy of development across India 
states 
This section builds on the analysis above to argue that a key driver of 
differential performance in terms of development and rural water service 
coverage can be summarised as the political economy of the state. Using a 
political economy lense has become a common approach in a series of recent 
studies into the community management of rural water services (Chowns, 2014; 
Harris et al., 2011; Jones, 2015). This reflects the general trend in the sector to 
expand analysis beyond infrastructure and service levels, to understand the 
context in which rural water services are provided (Lockwood and Smits, 2011). 
Overall, this research develops an approach that links the empirical analysis 
above with studies on the political economy of India, in particular Kohli’s (2012) 
empirically-driven “State-Society Framework” on the differences between Indian 
states. In his work Kohli argues that Indian states can be allocated into three 
broad (political economy) categories that reflect the way in which “development 
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dynamics” emerge in each to drive development outcomes. He argues that the 
“varying patterns of politics and authority across Indian States, especially the 
underlying state and class/caste relations, are a key determinant of regional 
development dynamics” (Kohli, 2012, p. 14). The political economy categories 
are ‘neo-patrimonial’, ‘social democratic’ and ‘developmental’ and are 
considered to provide an empirically valid and analytically useful set of 
categories for analysing state-wise trends in India. Each is described below.  
3.2.1 Neo-patrimonial states 
In the 1980s the Indian demographer and economist, Ashisha Bose, coined the 
phrase “BIMARU” to describe the states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan 
and Uttar Pradesh. As this acronym sounded like the Hindi word for “sick” it 
became the popular shorthand in the press for underperforming states with poor 
governance records (Sharma, 2015). It later became expanded to “BIMAROU” 
to include the state of Odisha and, since its popularisation, the states of 
Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand have been carved out of Bihar and Madhya 
Pradesh, respectively. It is these BIMAROU states that are considered to have 
the greatest ‘neo-patrimonial’ tendencies in India (Kohli, 2012). The term has 
most commonly been used in the broader development literature to describe the 
political economy of post-colonial Sub-Saharan African states (Englebert, 2000; 
Kohli, 2012). The concept is rooted in an understanding of traditional political 
authority which is based on a leader’s ability to distribute resources to 
supporters in return for political support (Kelsall, 2011). This can be described 
as clientelism but Max Weber used the term ‘patrimonialism’ (Weber, 1978). It 
has since been reapplied as ‘neo-patrimonialism’ to describe a situation where 
this type of ‘personal’ political relations ‘overlaps’ with formal, impersonal forms 
of governance (Kelsall, 2011).  
Kohli (2012) argues that neo-patrimonialism has taken particular root in these 
states of India because politics (and business) have been dominated by the 
high, often land-owning, castes who secure broader political support through 
short-term patrimonial strategies. In such a context corruption and clientelism 
become widespread, retarding the development process. Such an analysis is 
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reinforced by looking at the developmental statuses of the BIMAROU states 
with them performing badly in many of the development measures presented in 
Table 2. Before proceeding it is important to acknowledge however that “the 
problems of India’s neo-patrimonial states need to be kept in perspective; India 
is no Congo or even a Zimbabwe” (Kohli, 2012, p. 154). Nationally, India is now 
ranking mid-way in the Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency 
International, 2014) at 85 out of 175 countries. Yet it is still argued that neo-
patrimonial characteristics are strong in the BIMAROU states of the country and 
that this political economy ‘model’ has shaped and is shaping developmental 
process, including in rural water services. 
3.2.2 Social-democratic states 
In the states that exhibit social-democratic principles, political and economic 
power is dispersed more equally throughout the society. This is reflected in the 
ability of these states to be comparatively more effective at reducing poverty 
and promoting human development, even though the absolute level of 
economic wealth may be lower than some other states (see Figure 3-2 below). 
The classic example is Kerala which is only the ninth richest as measured in 
GDP per capita yet has the highest HDI score and literacy rates. The ‘social-
democratic’ mechanisms that underpin this come through the way in which 
almost all social classes and caste groups are effectively enfranchised within 
the democratic system (Kohli, 2012). As political elites generally have a broad-
base of support in these states it encourages them to favour policies that 
promote equitable development outcomes – whilst the generally high literacy 
rates and engagement in politics means the population is able to hold them to 
account (Desai, 2006). Overall, this means there is well established sense of 
‘public purpose’ within these states that is reflected in a redistributive approach 
to development (Kohli, 2012). 
Whilst Kerala is the standout example of the social-democratic class, there are 
other examples, with Kohli (2012) arguing that all the South Indian states exhibit 
some social-democratic characteristics in that the political system is less likely 
to follow entrenched caste-based politics (as is the case in many Northern 
 55 
states, especially those in the Hindi heartlands such as Bihar and Uttar 
Pradesh). There are a number of other states that perform well in terms of 
having low levels of poverty to GDP ratios. These include Punjab, Andhra 
Pradesh and Himachel Pradesh. Yet as argued by Kohli (2012) this type of 
analysis only moves towards an indicative classification as there are exceptions 
to the rules. For example, West Bengal is often considered a highly social-
democratic state because lower classes and ‘marginal’ caste groups are well-
represented in the political system. However, this has not translated well into 
strong development outcomes (Desai, 2006). This shows that the political 
economy classification should be treated as useful for explaining broad trends 
but that it is not a universally, all-encompassing explanation. 
3.2.3 Developmental States 
The final category of political economy classification of Indian states proposed 
by Kohli (2012) is the ‘developmental’ state. The use of the term developmental 
state first emerged to explain the remarkable rise of East Asian nations, such as 
Japan and South Korea, in the second half of the twentieth century. Johnson 
(1982) famously conceived the concept arguing that the key to Japan’s post 
World War II economic success was that the government took an interventionist 
approach to supporting capitalist production, as compared to the neoliberal – 
‘laissez-faire’ – economic policies that were promoted by Western countries or 
the ‘socialist’ centrally planned approach of Soviet states. This close alliance 
between government and business is in some ways found right across India as 
the extent of government bureaucracy means that the business class often has 
close alliances with government officials. Yet in some states these alliances are 
more strongly reflected in a strategic consensus between business and 
government with a collective aim to promote economic growth as the driver of 
development (rather than elites focusing on redistributive policies or serving 
piecemeal political and personal interests) (Kohli, 2012).  
Gujarat and Maharashtra are the archetypical cases where there is particularly 
close cooperation between the business and political elites. Although his 
personal preference is for a more social-democratic approach, Kohli 
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acknowledges that ultimately a developmental economy has led to significant 
public revenue generation through the tax system that in turn has enabled 
higher levels of investment in public infrastructure, especially the type of 
infrastructure that supports growth such as roads. Yet another key characteristic 
of these developmental states is that they enjoyed ‘first mover’ advantage in 
terms of economic growth as they represent the traditional heartlands of 
economic prosperity in India, so it is hard to assess whether these 
developmental policies could be translated to the poorer states that lack 
comparative advantage. Either way, the more top-down and elite-led approach 
to development is something that is thought to have significant implications for 
‘best-fit’ thinking in terms of rural water services in developmental contexts. 
3.2.4 Overview of the political economy of Indian states 
In the section above three broad political economy models were described. 
However, it is perhaps more helpful to consider them as political economy 
‘tendencies’ rather than standalone categories. In every state each of these 
tendencies exists to a greater or lesser extent so they should not be considered 
distinct or static categories. Political trends shift over time, especially in terms of 
the party politics of the states. Yet over time the broad pattern of political 
tendencies described above has persisted for long enough to lead to consistent 
associations with developmental outcomes (Kohli, 2012). This is considered to 
be particularly relevant for the ‘extreme’ cases such as neo-patrimonial Bihar, 
social democratic Kerala or developmental Maharashtra. The categories 
become more nuanced for states that do not exhibit very strong characteristics 
of a single category but more of a mixture of tendencies. Figure 3-2 is 
considered to provide a crude indicative approach for classifying states that 
ranks GDP per capita levels against the poverty rate giving an approximation of 
the balance of priorities between economic growth and redistributive policies 
(which highlights the 17 states from which case studies were taken in this study 
against the national average). 
Despite the ambiguity for some states, the categories are nonetheless 
considered useful as they can help answer some important questions, such as: 
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“How can one best explain some of these broad regional patterns [in 
development outcomes]? What might be the underlying mechanisms that retard 
development in some states and generate wealth and prosperity in others? 
Similar, why are some states more capable than others of reducing poverty?” 
(Kohli, 2012, p. 151). It is contended that such thinking also offers insight into 
important questions concerning this research such as: how can one best 
explain the differences in terms of performance in rural water services? Why are 
some states more capable of supporting community managed rural water 
services than others? And, perhaps most importantly, are there patterns of 
community management that are more likely to succeed in certain categories of 
states compared to others, and why is this? The conceptual categories will 
therefore be used when interpreting the findings from different states, especially 
for government supported programmes which are considered to be 
representative of the selected states and therefore reflect their political 
economy. 
 58 
 
Figure 3-2 - State GDP per capita versus below poverty line as proxy for political economy tendencies (data as presented in 
Table 3-2) 
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3.3 Governance of rural water services 
The difference between the political economy of Indian states is partly reflected 
in the federal structure of governance in India. This section explains this in 
relation to rural water services. It first focuses on the governance of village 
regions before scaling-out to consider the state and federal systems. 
Contemporary trends in India’s governance system can be traced back 
historically to the concept of Swaraj or ‘self-rule’. Swaraj has been associated 
with rejecting the foreign rule of British and other colonial powers (Parel, 2011) 
but also has a related meaning in its application to village-level governance 
summarised in Gandhi’s famous statement: “My idea of the village Swaraj is 
that it is a complete republic independent of its neighbours for its own vital 
wants” (Mahatma Gandhi as quoted in Bhatt, 1982, p. 87).  
This idea of autonomous village republics is reflected in the devolution agenda 
followed by the Government of India since the early 1990s (Johnson et al., 
2005a). This has involved devolving statutory powers to the Panchayat Raj 
Institutions (PRI) – the three-tier system of local self-government that was 
introduced in the previous chapter. As explained, the lowest level of the PRI is 
known as the Gram Panchayat7 which operates at (or close to) village scale and 
is elected by all adult residents of the village (known as the Gram Sabha). 
Under this system, statutory responsibility is given to the Gram Panchayats for 
delivering public services including the provision of drinking water as well as 28 
other areas such as street lighting (Government of India, 1993). For this 
purpose the Gram Panchayat usually sets up a number of sub-committees, 
such as a schooling and education committee. For rural water services it 
                                            
7 Although there is some variety in practice such as in the Tribal belts in the 
North Eastern States where the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India 
means that village administration can follow a different model involving the 
formation of a tribal council known as a Durbars (Constitution of India, 1950). 
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establishes a Village Water and Sanitation Committees (VWSCs), who will 
assist and advise the Gram Panchayat, often on a voluntary basis, on the 
provision of these services (Government of India, 2012). The key institutions at 
the village level are explained in Table 3-4. 
Table 3-4 - Descriptions of local self-government institutions for rural water 
services at the village level (as presented in Hutchings, 2015) 
Institution Description 
Gram Sabha includes every person of voting age within a village. Usually, the Gram 
Sabha meets to take key decisions during the implementation of a water 
scheme and it is responsible for approving the plans that the Gram 
Panchayat and VWSC have for water supply each year. 
 
Gram Panchayat is the lowest level of government in rural India. It is part of the Panchayat 
Raj system of local self-government which promotes self-rule within Indian 
villages. Each Gram Panchayat has a President known as the Sarpanch 
who is elected by the members of the Gram Sabha. Typically, he or she is 
supported by a Vice President and Clerk, whilst a number of elected Ward 
Members also sit within the main Gram Panchayat council. Together they 
are responsible for the provision of many public services within the village, 
including domestic water supply. The Gram Panchayat owns and manages 
(in partnership with the VWSC) the water supply with its tasks including: 
approving investment plans and getting financing; approving annual 
budgets and user fee charges after discussion in the Gram Sabha; 
approving contracts with operators; co-ordinating with the block and district 
Support Organizations; hiring trained mechanics, for regular preventive 
maintenance for handpumps, and trained operators for piped water 
supplies (Government of India, 2012). 
 
Village Water 
and Sanitation 
Committee 
(VWSC) 
is a standing committee of the Gram Panchayat of between 6 and 12 
members that takes on the responsibility for the everyday operation, 
maintenance and administration of the water supply service. It is chaired by 
the President of the Gram Panchayat and includes some ward members – 
it should also include at least 50% women and representatives from all 
social classes and castes with the village. The existing members nominate 
new members onto the committee but any decision must take into account 
the predetermined quota system. Key tasks include: collecting household 
contributions and user fees; opening and managing a bank account; 
preparing annual budgets and recommendations for user fee charges; 
organising people to be vigilant about not wasting water and keeping water 
clean; ensuring professional support for handpump caretakers and piped 
water supply operators; ensuring access to spare parts for handpumps and 
trained mechanics for regular preventive maintenance; ensuring the 
operators handling piped water supply systems are provided with adequate 
training to gain the technical and financial skills needed to do the job 
(Government of India, 2012). 
The Gram Panchayat is considered to represent a form of local self-government 
rather than simply local government. The difference being that local self-
government, which has its own elected officials and statutory powers over a 
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considerable range of functions, has greater autonomy, compared to local 
government which can be considered to have less autonomy and direct 
accountability to the local population (Datta, 2007; Rajesh and Thomas, 2012). 
The local self-government system had some historical precedent in pre-colonial 
and colonial times but its power had been eroded in much of the post-colonial 
period as the Government of India and state governments sought to drive a 
relatively centralised programme for rural development (Banerjee, 2013). This 
was until 1993 and the 73rd amendment to the Constitution of India reversed 
those decades of centralisation. 
Recognising that decentralisation has become a global mega-trend attracting 
praise and criticism alike (Asthana, 2003; Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003), it is 
useful to reflect on the maturity and character of devolution in India. Devolution 
is a strong form of decentralisation that involves the formal statutory transfer of 
powers to lower levels of government (James, 2011; Robinson, 2007). 
However, the transfer of these functions should also be accompanied by the 
appropriate transfer of funds to finance the activities and functionaries to 
undertake any necessary work.  
Following 25 years of devolution there are concerns that the devolution of 
power to Panchayats has been hampered by a lack of devolution of funds and 
functionaries (Banerjee, 2013). Such concerns are not universal, with key 
differences between the states. Some states, such as social democratic Kerala, 
are renowned for advanced and genuine devolution to the Panchayat Raj 
Institutions (Heller et al., 2007), whereas other states retain a largely centralised 
character in public administration. Each year the Ministry of the Panchayati Raj 
publishes a devolution list that ranks states against one another depending on 
the devolution of functions, functionaries and funds which is presented as part 
of the dataset in Table 3-2 in section 3.1.2 of this chapter (Government of India, 
2015a). It shows there is no pattern in terms of the level of devolution and the 
wealth of a state. This is one of the key challenges of conducting research 
across Indian states – although there is a federal government the set-up for 
governance within each state can vary considerably. Part of these differences 
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relates to how the system of local self-government functions alongside the 
centralised agencies of the state government, which are now explained below. 
At the Federal level there is a Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation that 
sets policy, budgets and oversees the entire drinking water and sanitation 
sector (James, 2011). The administration of the country is then divided into 29 
states, with nine of these having populations of over 50 million people. A 
cabinet of state ministers lead departments in the various domains of public 
administration, and would usually include a State Rural Water Supply Agency. 
These agencies set the budgets and overall plan for rural water supply in the 
state. They are meant to provide technical services to the Gram Panchayat but 
often retain decision making power over budgets and technical design 
(Banerjee, 2013). This is considered to be partly a hangover from the supply-
driven era of expansion of rural water services prior to the 1990s.  
Through research into the functioning of such agencies within the sanitation 
sector, Hueso and Bell (2013, p. 1013) described these organisations as 
representing the “technocratic governing machinery” of the Indian state. They 
argued they represent “a hierarchical and technocratic bureaucracy that is well 
suited to send down technical designs and subsidies for physical infrastructure 
projects” (Hueso and Bell, 2013, p. 1013). In this sense, the paradox in the 
governance of rural water services in India is the extremely advanced 
devolution of local self-government alongside centralised and often bureaucratic 
State Rural Water Supply Agencies. The balance between these decentralised 
and centralised agencies is specific to each state and shapes how rural water 
services are governed within them.  
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3.4 Community management of rural water services in India8 
India has a long history of community management. Early experiments were 
conducted as far back as 1964, with the World Health Organisation and 
UNICEF Banki and Mohkampur projects in Uttar Pradesh running with some 
limited success until 1994 and 1976 respectively, and the sister Pharenda 
project reported as still ongoing at the time of the last citation (WSP, 2002). 
Tracing the genealogy of community management from these early initiatives to 
the present day, this section draws on James’ (2004, 2011) synthesis reports to 
identify four broad categories of community management initiatives. These 
include independent cases where communities have simply taken complete 
charge of water services when government services have failed, small scale 
NGO initiatives, larger scale donor-NGO schemes support by bilateral and 
multilateral agencies, and then the post-Sector Reform government-supported 
programmes that emerged from 1999 onwards. The learnings from each 
category will be briefly discussed in order to demonstrate how community 
management has changed throughout this period.  
With the provision of safe drinking water constitutionally mandated as the 
government’s responsibility in India (Constitution of India, 1950) it is rare for 
communities to be completely autonomous in the management of drinking water 
(James, 2004). However, there are limited cases of reportedly independent 
piped schemes such as the case in Kolhapur (Maharashtra) that ran from 1979 
until the 1990s (James, 2004). This occurred after the District Administration 
refused to take on a government-constructed piped water network, so taking 
their own initiative, community members from four villages came together to 
                                            
8 This section is an extract from the paper Hutchings et al. (2016). This section 
was completely undertaken by this author and reproduced here as part of the 
thesis, although to promote consistency in this thesis the rural water supply has 
been replaced with the term rural water services and some stylistic elements 
have been adapted. 
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form an unofficial committee that took responsibility for the piped network. 
Without any further support they managed the scheme for 20 years, even 
creating a big surplus in the committee’s accounts (James, 2004). Whilst this 
case of unsupported community managed piped water supply is relatively rare, 
it does demonstrate that it is possible. Yet its eventual failure also highlights 
how “even a successful community management initiative requires a support 
structure to cope with external shocks and stresses” (James, 2004, p. 39).  
As opposed to the paucity of completely independent cases, there have been 
many small-scale NGO projects that have been significant in developing the 
contemporary practices of community management in India. James (2004) 
illustrates a number of examples, including:  
 the Utthan programme from Gujarat, started in 1981, which 
demonstrated the influential role of women as ‘spearheads’ of community 
water services campaigns;  
 Self-Employed Women Association’s experience, also in Gujarat from 
1972, that illustrated the need for capacity building of women’s groups if 
they are to be successful spearheads;  
 the work of the Watershed Organisation Trust in Maharashtra and 
Karnataka from 1996 emphasising the importance of trust between 
support entities and service providers as a basis for successful 
community management;  
 Gram Vikas, whose work began on water services in 1981 in Odisha, 
who pioneered an intensive participatory approach based on the 
equitable principles that including ‘every household’ is the key to 
sustainable outcomes. 
These examples merely touch the surface of the numerous NGO programmes 
operating over the past decades yet they serve to demonstrate the importance 
of NGOs in the establishment of community management. But arriving at such 
outcomes involved time consuming “trial and error-based experimental” 
approaches that were often costly in terms of resource and which required 
specialist skill sets (James, 2004, p. 49). This makes this kind of approach 
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limited in its scalability – as such resources and skills sets are often not 
available, and cannot easily be employed in programmes that cover many 
thousands of villages.  
Throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s, the (supposedly) demand-
responsive approach to community management was introduced to the country 
through a number of bilateral and multilateral donor-NGO programmes (Black 
and Talbot, 2004). The demand-responsive approach was based on the 
principles that users should express their demand through what they are willing 
to pay, and based on that the appropriate level of technology is put in place 
(Isham et al., 2002). This was usually based on the notion that communities 
contribute 10% of capital costs and then cover operation and maintenance 
through tariffs. However, in India as elsewhere, the demand-responsive 
approach has been implemented only to a limited extent (Black and Talbot, 
2004). Yet the concept of the demand-responsive approach has been extremely 
widespread in internationally supported programmes with examples including 
the KFW (German Development Bank) funded Aapni Yojna Project in Rajasthan 
(1994-2004), World Bank programmes in Maharashtra and Karnataka (1991-
2000), and the World Bank Swajal Project in Uttar Pradesh (1990s). As 
opposed to the smaller-scale NGO approaches, these initiatives had budgets 
between $60-100 million and sought to serve a larger number of villages (500-
1000), often making use of smaller NGOs as partners (James, 2004).  
Professional approaches to community management were developed in this 
period, including building participatory methods into the design stage of 
programmes, scheduled training schemes with community members to build 
capacity, and tripartite agreements between Village Water and Sanitation 
Committees (VWSC), support organisations and overall programme managers. 
However, despite professional practice, government requirements in areas such 
as procurement prevented community management from flourishing beyond 
these programmes as community entities were unable to make use of allocated 
government funds or access government procurement processes (James, 
2004, 2011).  
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A new form of government-supported community management emerged from 
1999 onwards. In that year, the Government of India implemented Sector 
Reform Pilot Projects (SRPP) in 67 districts across 26 states and so began the 
process of integrating community management into its national policy. In many 
states, new institutions were formed, including District level Water and 
Sanitation Committees, which received funds directly from the Federal 
Government bypassing state level agencies. Whilst there was some success in 
the pilot programmes, there was also resistance to change from officials who 
were used to a supply driven model and inadequate support at state and district 
level “to provide backstopping and trouble-shooting” when initiatives failed 
(James, 2004, p. 39).  
Despite these flaws, in 2002, the Government of India launched the 
Swajaldhara programme. The Swajaldhara programme advocates community 
management along the following principles: a demand-driven approach; village 
level capacity building for community management through VWSCs; integrated 
service delivery mechanisms that streamlined the functioning of the government 
agencies involved; demand-responsive approach based on cost-sharing by 
users (100% of operation and maintenance costs; 10% of capital costs); and, 
water conservation measures through rainwater harvesting and groundwater 
recharge measures (Government of India, 2003).  
In practice it is questionable whether these claims were met even in successful 
schemes as the Swajaldhara claim of 100% operation and maintenance 
covered by the community does not reflect the many indirect (and hidden) 
subsidies in India that support rural drinking water services. There are also 
cases where the programme has been poorly implemented, such as the one 
highlighted by Srivastava (2012), where the Swajaldhara programme in one 
area merely became a sham with no community management but water 
services run by local elites for their own benefit. The sheer scale of the reform 
meant institutions at many levels did not have the capacity to implement the 
aspirational objectives and the Swajaldhara programme “had roughly the same 
impact on sustainability as the regular…supply-driven model followed in the 
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country since 1972-1973…largely because of the inadequate preparation and 
capacity building – especially among the engineers as well as the community 
and NGOs” (James, 2011, p. 54). 
Notwithstanding the criticism, Swajaldhara was still significant as it legalised 
community management within the prevailing governance model, providing a 
formally recognised legal basis for communities to become service providers 
and thus removed barriers regarding their access to government funds and 
procurement procedures. Perhaps most significantly the Swajaldhara provided 
an impetus for a number of highly successful state-based programmes to 
flourish in the last decade including the Water and Sanitation Management 
Organisation (WASMO) in Gujarat, Jal Nirmal in Karnataka, Jalanidhi in Kerala 
and Jalswarajya in Maharashtra (James, 2011; Lockwood and Smits, 2011).  
Following Swajaldhara India is now home to a rich diversity of community 
management experiences. However the latest policy programme from the 
Government of India has sought to further formalise the model within the 
broader system of local self-government. Launched in 2009, the National Rural 
Drinking Water Programme (NRDWP) the successor to Swajaldhara has 
consolidated the importance of the Gram Panchayat institution in rural water 
services with greater responsibility and funds devolved to this level. Under 
these guidelines a VWSC is still formed, however it operates as a sub-
committee of the local self-government (Government of India, 2012). The close 
institutional relationship with the Gram Panchayat means the VWSC is far from 
autonomous. Experience from the field indicates that this has often led to dual 
systems developing whereby in certain villages the Gram Panchayat simply 
becomes the direct service provider whilst in other villages the VWSC are 
formed to enact community management with support from the panchayat 
institutions (Rout, 2014). 
In many ways, the NRDWP promotes an institutional structure that is both 
robust and admirably malleable in that various institutional variations can 
emerge, even within the same programme. Yet this can also mean a lack of 
clarity over the exact nature of institutional arrangements, leading to questions 
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over who takes key roles such as service provision or service monitoring. 
Furthermore, the diversity of approaches to rural drinking water services is likely 
to grow further as the NRDWP came to the end of its 5 year cycle in 2014. The 
Government of India has also abandoned its Planning Commission replacing it 
with the NITI Aayog (National Institutions for Transforming India) which has less 
direct power over policy and, hence, in the long term this move is likely to mean 
more freedom for States governments to promote different models for rural 
drinking water services (Government of India, 2015b).  
Together, this historic review shows that there are different types of community 
management in India and current policy trends are likely to lead to even greater 
diversity in practice. Yet the range of models and changes in the policy 
landscape now mean there are tensions – or at least conceptual uncertainties – 
with regards to the role of communities vis-à-vis the state. It is contended that 
this ambiguity is poorly reflected in the discourse of community management 
that tends to characterise it as one identifiable approach when in reality the 
label is used to describe many different institutional arrangements. Through 
better differentiation it is felt that the more appropriate forms of support can be 
tailored to specific forms of community management. 
3.5 Chapter summary and contribution 
This chapter has focused the thesis on the Indian context. It has explained that 
India is a vast and populous country that has varying levels of human 
development and access to rural water services. The diversity means the 
research can investigate community management across different contexts. To 
provide explanatory insights into why such differences can exist in a single 
country, this chapter has provided an overview of the political economy 
tendencies that can be found in India. It was argued these represent a useful 
contextual background when considering trends across case studies from 
different states. The governance system for rural water services was also 
explained with the tension between a highly decentralised mode of local self-
government and the legacy of centralised State Rural Water Supply Agencies 
highlighted. Finally, an overview of different community management models 
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across India was explained. This identified four main types of community 
management programmes which were independent cases, small scale NGO 
initiatives, larger scale donor-NGO schemes and government-supported 
programmes. This illustrates that different types of enabling support 
environments are present in India and can be captured in the study. 
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4 METHODOLOGY 
The thesis contribution is based on the analysis and synthesis of findings from 
twenty case studies of community managed rural water service programmes 
compiled as part of the Community Water Plus project. Critical to providing an 
appropriate basis for this work was the common research framework and methods 
that was used in each specific case study. This was jointly developed with 
collaborators (Smits et al., 2015) but then refined by this author into the Fieldwork 
Protocols, which are accessible via Appendix B, and further conceptually developed 
in this thesis. The protocols were piloted and refined by this researcher in the initial 
scoping study for the case study that this author led in Tamil Nadu (Hutchings, 
2015).  
The fieldwork and report writing for the other nineteen cases were conducted by 
collaborating researchers (references given in table later in this chapter). To ensure 
consistency across the cases a series of data collection tools were developed which 
then fed into cross-case databases that were analysed in this research. To promote 
consistency in the application of the fieldwork protocols on-going support was 
provided by this author to the field research teams both remotely and in the field. The 
researchers were exposed to and familiarised with the protocols during a series of 
project workshops in Delhi in September 2013, Chennai in February 2014 and Jaipur 
in November 2014.  
Support from this researcher also included field visits to seven case studies to 
support data collection and extended working sessions in India at the institutional 
headquarters of each of the collaborating research partners to ensure harmonised 
data processing and analysis. This chapter outlines this process in more detail. It 
begins by explaining the overall research design. 
4.1 Research process overview and candidate’s contribution 
As this thesis was conducted as part of the collaborative Community Water Plus 
project, this section makes clear the role of the candidate in the overall project. After 
providing an overview of contributions made by the author to different stages of the 
research it then focuses on his role in the design and implementation of the cross-
case study analysis, which forms the primary contribution towards the thesis. Figure 
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4.1 provides a summary of the role of the candidate during different phases of the 
Community Water Plus research. 
 
Figure 4-1 - Community Water Plus Research Process with Candidate's Contribution 
In Phase 1, in which the overall project methodology was developed, the author’s 
role was as a contributing author to the concept and methodology working paper 
(Smits et al., 2015). Specific contributions focused on “Section B – Research 
Methodology” in terms of: overall research design for the case selection and 
sampling sections; comparative frameworks for qualitative-quantitative data 
processing tools; approach for understanding contextual factors and history of case 
studies; and, overall editing of the remaining document (although final copy editing 
and print setting was also conducted separately by a specialist agency). Secondary 
contributions were also made to “Section A – Conceptual Framework” in terms of the 
literature review for the community participation, community management and 
organisational partnering and relationships sections. 
Phase 6 - Cross-case analysis and synthesis 
Lead Researcher (individual contribution) 
Phase 5 - Case Study Data Collection, Analysis and Write-Up 
Contributing Author (one case study) 
Phase 4 -  Sampling Frame and Case Selection 
Contributing Researcher 
Phase 3 - Pilot Study and Testing of Data Collection Tools 
Lead Researcher 
Phase 2 - Data Collection Protocols Developed 
Lead Author 
Phase 1 - Overall Community Water Plus Methodology Developed 
Contributing Author 
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Overall, the collaborative methodology set the trajectory of the Community Water 
Plus project and, by extension, this thesis through providing the foundation for the 
cross-case study analysis. This was in terms of the basic comparative frameworks 
that were used in this thesis to compare different case studies, as explained in 
Section 4.3.1. However, how these were operationalised into data collection and 
processing tools was part of Phase 2 of the Community Water Plus project, which 
was the responsibility of this author. This included designing the data collection 
methods, data processing tools and data analysis approach for individual case 
studies, with the associated protocols totalling over 90 pages as presented via 
Appendix B. Part of the associated activities in this stage involved conducting 
workshops and training sessions with research partners, as discussed in Section 
4.10. In Phase 3 of the research, these data collection protocols were piloted, tested 
and refined by this author during a three-week pilot study in what would become the 
“Tamil Nadu – Public-Private Hybrid” (Hutchings, 2015) case study (which was also 
used to confirm that suitability of that case study for full inclusion within the 
research). 
In Phase 4 of the research, this author contributed to the sampling and case 
selection processes by conducting a literature review of case studies from India to 
contribute to an overall sampling frame. Case selection was then directly actioned by 
in-country researchers in terms of the selection process that involved review of 
secondary evidence, speaking to local informants (i.e. civil servants) and pilot 
studies. This process was conducted by this author for the “Tamil Nadu – Public-
Private Hybrid” case study only. In Phase 5 the data collection, analysis and write-up 
of each individual case study was conducted by research partners. This author 
completed this process for the Tamil Nadu – Public-Private Hybrid” and was also 
involved in data collection in six other case studies and provided guidance and 
checked the veracity of the data analysis on all twenty case studies.  
Phase 6 of the Community Water Plus project on the cross-case study analysis was 
completed solely by this researcher and forms the core empirical contribution to this 
thesis. The overall research process is visualised separately in Figure 4.2. As 
explained above, the overall project methodology set the broad trajectory for the 
research. However, it did not specify how the synthesis should be conducted so 
Phase 6.1 involved developing, refining and clarifying the approach to the cross-case 
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study analysis. The approach brings together principles from the comparative 
ranking systems of the case survey method (Yin and Heald, 1975) with basic 
qualitative and quantitative analysis from multi-case study research projects (Yin, 
2003). With this mix-methods design, the principle was to ‘ring-fence’ the qualitative 
and quantitative data separately during the analysis stage but then promote 
triangulation of those findings during the combined analysis and write-up phases.  
 
Figure 4-2 – Research processes for community 
Phase 6.2 on case study processing and Phase 6.3 on case study consolidation are 
explained in Sections 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 of this chapter. However, in summary, they 
involved assessing whether individual case study report contained all the requested 
information as per the fieldwork protocols. This was in terms of the completeness of 
the information but also an assessment of its quality. Significant work was 
Write-up 
Phase 6.6 - Combined analysis 
Triangulation Interpretation Conclusions 
Phase 6.5 - Quantitative analysis 
Service level analysis Financial analysis 
Phase 6.4 - Qualitative analysis 
Immersion 
Case summary 
production 
Organisational 
arrangement 
classification 
Phase 6.3 - Case study consolidation 
Build database Populate database 
Phase 6.2 - Case study processing 
Data cleaning Data harmonisation 
Phase 6.1 - Cross-case study approach developed 
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undertaken verifying and harmonising data through discussion and consultation with 
the fieldwork partners. Four overview databases were built for the main analytical 
levels of the research – enabling support environments, community service 
providers, household service levels and financial costing. These were then populated 
with data from each of the twenty case studies which was then subject to quantitative 
analysis as discussed below and in Section 4.8. The qualitative data for this research 
were the case study reports themselves and, as the reports were peer-reviewed by a 
team of core researchers (including this author), the data cleaning process had 
already been completed for these documents. 
Phase 6.4 on the qualitative analysis and Phase 6.5 on the quantitative analysis are 
explained in Section 4.7. In summary, the qualitative analysis followed an immersive 
approach in which the case study reports were read and then summarised in terms 
of key features of that case study. This ‘recursive abstraction’ approach (Stebbins, 
2001) to data analysis was considered appropriate as compared to the more 
common thematic coding approach for qualitative analysis, as the case studies were 
already arranged thematically by the prescribed structural set-up of the case study. It 
follows the principles advocated by Ritchie et al. (2013) in large-scale qualitative 
policy research in which the process of summarizing case study features promotes 
learnings and research insights about key trends and patterns. A process of 
classification was also applied to the organisational arrangements found in each 
case study at the enabling support environment and community service provider 
level. This involved developing typologies that covered the organisational forms 
described in the reports and then allocating the case studies within these groups. 
The results of that classification process are presented in Chapter Five. The 
quantitative analysis sought to provide a descriptive statistical overview of key trends 
and patterns across the case studies in terms of the service levels reported via the 
household surveys and the financial costs reported in the case study reports. Basic 
descriptive analysis was also applied to the qualitative-quantitative data from the 
scoring tables related to participation, partnering and other institutional elements. 
The precise tests used are presented in Table 4.9 later in this chapter. 
In Phase 6.6 on the combined analysis, the emphasis was on data triangulation 
between the different analysis streams – a key strength of a mix-methods approach 
(Teddlie and Yu, 2007). For example, this means assessing whether the 
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qualitatively-defined organisational typologies had different quantitatively-assessed 
characteristics, such as financial cost sharing arrangements or service level 
outcomes. It also involves checking the empirical and theoretical-logical coherence 
of the findings from each form of analysis and using this to inform any interpretation 
of the findings. The interpretation of the findings and the conclusions drawn from the 
study have been shaped by the literature review chapters and, in particular, the 
comparison of the two sets of paradigmatic claims associated with community 
management and community management plus. In the main discussion of findings, 
presented in Chapter Seven, the author has sought to further develop 
institutionalised co-production (Joshi and Moore, 2004) as a key concept for 
explaining and interpreting the results. In summary, this section has described the 
author’s significant contribution to the broader Community Water Plus project 
through all phases of the research. It has then focused on the author’s primary and 
individual contribution to the design and implementation of the cross-case study 
analysis. Further details on the different stages of the methodology are presented 
throughout the remainder of this chapter.  
4.2 Case framework, selection and sampling 
The Community Water Plus research was organised around a framework of 
elements that reflect the core components of a successful community management 
rural water services programme, as explained in Chapter Two and visually outlined 
in Figure 4-3. The primary unit of analysis and therefore the determining component 
for case selection was the ‘enabling support environment’ in the form of a particular 
programme supporting community managed rural water services. This reflects the 
importance the research places on understanding how to design and finance 
effective supporting organisations for community management plus. The 
programmes were purposively selected based on what is described by Flyvbjerg 
(2006) as “most likely cases” of community management plus in India with the 
principle that they can be used to verify or falsify the hypotheses associated with the 
model outlined in Chapter Two.  
 77 
 
Figure 4-3 - Community Water Plus Research Elements Framework (Smits et al., 2015) 
The case selection process led to the selection of twenty case studies that are 
placed on the map of India in Figure 4-4 and named in Table 4-1 below. The 
selection was made from an all India sampling frame of 92 cases that was developed 
from the literature and feedback from government and other sector stakeholders 
working in the Indian sector. The case studies were then selected through 
consultation with local officials and pilot visits were made by individual research 
teams to verify that they would make an appropriate case study. An initial condition 
of selection was that the cases should have been operational for at least five years. 
In the end, the average age of case study was seven years but there were five that 
had been operational less the five years.   
In selecting the cases a key stratification was to cover different GDP per capita 
measures at the state level with 17 different states being covered. These ranged 
from the poorest state in the study, Jharkhand having a 2014 GDP per capita of 
$2,632, to the richest state Sikkim, at over $10,000 GDP per capita. These are 
comparable to levels found in Chad and Albania (World Bank, 2016a), respectively, 
showing the study covers a range of wealth from a poor Sub-Saharan Africa context 
to a middle-income Eastern European country. Selecting by state also ensured the 
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study had a good geographical coverage of different regions in India, as shown in 
Figure 4-2 below. 
Figure 4-4 - Location of Community Water Plus case studies across India 
 
Beyond wealth, two other selection stratifications were to cover different types of 
support programmes, from government support programmes to small-scale NGOs 
programmes. The full range of different support systems is the subject for discussion 
in the following chapter so will not be explained here. The stratification for the 
technical design of the system was designed to cover different forms of piped supply 
and also non-piped supply. In considering how to design the technical stratification 
criteria there was a consideration of adopting the WASHCost categories (Mcintyre et 
al., 2014) yet these were not widely recognised in India so it became easier to adopt 
the Indian terminology for different types of water supply set-ups. These were: 
Meghalaya 
Sikkim 
Himachal Pradesh 
Uttarakhand 
Jharkhand 
Odisha 
Chhattisgarh 
Rajasthan 
West Bengal 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
Andhra Pradesh Karnataka 
Punjab 
Kerala I & II 
Gujarat I & II 
Tamil Nadu I & II 
Maharashtra 
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 Borehole Handpump – a borehole with handpump attached. 
 Single-Village Scheme (Tubewell) – reticulated water supply serving the 
population of a village through piped water supply either to household 
connections or public stand posts (or both). The source for the system is a 
local borehole. 
 Single-Village Scheme (Surface) - reticulated water supply serving the 
population of a village through piped water supply either to household 
connections or public standposts (or both). The source for the system is a 
surface water source usually a river in the plains 
 Single-Village Scheme (Gravity-fed) – reticulated water supply serving the 
population of a village through piped water supply either to household 
connections or public standposts (or both). The source for the system is 
spring or similar in a hilly or mountainous area. 
 Single-Village Scheme (Mixed) – reticulated water supply serving the 
population of a village through piped water supply either to household 
connections or public standposts (or both). The source for the system comes 
from a mixture of borehole, surface and/or gravity-fed sources. 
 Multi-village Scheme - reticulated water supply serving the population of 
multiple villages through piped water supply either to household connections 
or public standposts (or both). The source for the system can come from 
either borehole, surface or gravity-fed sources. 
 Water Kiosk – a type of point source in which users pay to access water from 
a vending point in the village as they use it. The source for the system can 
vary but usually a Reverse Osmosis plant or equivalent treats the water 
before vending.  
A problem in specifying the technical design of a water system in India is that often 
multiple systems can overlap and these can even be managed by different entities 
(Reddy and Batchelor, 2012). This research focused on the technical system that 
was implemented and/or maintained under the enabling support environment being 
studied. As shown in Table 4-1 below, the study covers different forms of piped 
supply adequately but is weak on other forms of supply, such as handpumps and 
water kiosks, with only one case study each focusing on these, respectively.  
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Table 4-1 - List of Community Water Plus case studies 
#  State
9
  Case Name and reference Tech Type  Household 
Connection 
(% from 
survey) 
Years of 
Operations 
State 
GDP 
Per 
Capita 
State 
GDP per 
person 
relative 
to All 
India 
Physio-
geographic 
Zone
10
 
1 Jharkhand  Drinking Water and Sanitation Department 
(Ranchi West Division), Ranchi West District, 
Jharkhand (Javorszky et al., 2015) 
Single-Village 
Scheme 
(Tubewell) 48% 
4  $ 
2,632  
62% 
Plateau 
2 Madhya 
Pradesh  
VASUDHA and PHED support in Dhar district, 
Madhya Pradesh (Ramamohan Roa and 
Raviprakash, 2016a) 
Single-Village 
Scheme 
(Tubewell) 100% 
2  $ 
2,955  
70% 
Plateau 
3 Odisha  Gram Vikas model in Ganjam, Bargarh and 
Jharsuguda districts, Odisha (Javorszky et al., 
2016) 
Single-Village 
Scheme 
(Tubewell) 95% 
3  $ 
2,998  
71% 
Coast 
4 Chhattisgarh   Chhattisgarh Public Health Engineering 
Department, Rajnandgaon district (Javorszky et 
al., 2015) 
Single-Village 
Scheme 
(Tubewell) 54% 
14  $ 
3,340  
79% 
Plateau 
5 Meghalaya The Dorbars and gravity based Piped Water 
Supply in Meghalaya (Saraswathy, 2016b) 
Single-Village 
Scheme 
(Gravity-fed) 31% 
9 $3,511 83% 
Mountai
ns 
6 Rajasthan  Swajaldhara programme in Jaipur district, 
Rajasthan (Harris et al., 2016b) 
Single-Village 
Scheme 
(Tubewell) 91% 
6  $ 
3,763  
89% 
Plains 
7 West Bengal Community-managed handpumps in 
Patharpratima, West Bengal (Smits and Mekala, 
2015) 
Tubewell 
Handpump 
0% 
6 $3,997 94% 
Plains 
8 Telangana Decentralised drinking water service delivery – Water Kiosk 
39% 
5 $4,643 109% Coast 
                                            
9
 The state name given will be used as shorthand name in text and future figures and tables 
10
 Physiographic Zones as adapted from India State of the Environment Report (2009) and Sheikh et al. (2011) 
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community managed water purification units in 
Telangana (Chary Vedala et al., 2016a) 
9 Karnataka Jal Nirmal and beyond: supporting the community 
management of rural water supply in Belagavi 
district, Karnataka (World Bank) (Ramamohan 
Roa and Raviprakash, 2016b) 
Single-Village 
Scheme 
(Surface) 
65% 
6 $5,108 120% 
Plateau 
10 Himachal 
Pradesh 
Community Water Classic: the success of 
community managed water supplies in Himachal 
Pradesh with limited on-going support (Harris, 
Brighu, & Poonia, 2016) 
Single-Village 
Scheme 
(Gravity-fed) 
92% 
6 $5,265 124% 
Mountai
ns 
11 Punjab 24x7 water supply in Punjab: international funding 
for local action (World Bank) (Harris et al., 2016a) 
Single-Village 
Scheme 
(Tubewell) 100% 
3 $5,268 124% 
Plains 
12 Uttarakhand  Support to community-managed rural water 
supplies in the Uttarakhand Himalayas - the 
Himmotthan Water Supply and Sanitation 
initiative (Smits, Shiva, & Kapur, 2016) 
Single-Village 
Scheme 
(Gravity-fed) 
0% 
8 $5,916 139% 
Mountai
ns 
13 Kerala I – 
World Bank 
Jalanidhi programme in Nenmeni Panchayath, 
Wayanad District, Kerala (World Bank) 
(Saraswathy, 2016a) 
Multi-village 
Scheme 
100% 
9 $5,922 140% 
Coast 
14 Kerala II – 
Local self-
government 
Community-managed rural water supply in 
Malappuram district, Kerala (Chary Vedala et al., 
2016b) 
Single-Village 
Scheme 
(Surface) 100% 
9 $5,922 140% 
Coast 
15 Gujarat – 
WASMO 
Gandhinagar 
WASMO in Gandhinagar District (Chary Vedala 
et al., 2015a) 
Single-Village 
Scheme (Mixed) 
100% 
11 $6,094 144% 
Plains 
16 Gujarat – 
WASMO 
Kutch 
WASMO in the desert Kutch region (Chary 
Vedala et al., 2015a) 
Single-Village 
Scheme (Mixed) 
99% 
6 $6,094 144% 
Plains 
17 Tamil Nadu 
– Local self-
government 
TWAD Board and the Panchayat Raj Institutions 
in Erode district (Saraswathy, 2015) 
Single-Village 
Scheme (Mixed) 
93% 
10 $6,427 151% 
Coast 
18 Tamil Nadu 
– Public-
Private 
Hybrid 
TWAD Board and the Hogenakkal Water Supply 
and Fluorosis Mitigation Project in Morappur 
district (Hutchings, 2015)  
Multi-village 
Scheme 
94% 
3 $6,427 151% 
Coast 
19 Maharashtra Maharashtra Jeevan Pradhikaran (MJP) and the 
Shahnoor Dam project (Chary Vedala et al., 
Multi-village 
Scheme 100% 
14 $6,679 157% 
Coast 
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2016c) 
20 Sikkim Decentralised local self-government and gravity 
based Piped Water Supply in Sikkim 
(Saraswathy, 2016a) 
Single-Village 
Scheme 
(Gravity-fed) 0% 
5 $10,06
8 
237% 
Mountai
ns 
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Within each case study there was an embedded case study design (Yin, 2003) in 
which a number of community service providers which are supported by the enabling 
support environment were studied. The intended design was for four such 
community service providers to be covered across three ‘programme villages’ and 
one ‘control village’ coming from outside the programme, although, as discussed in 
the methodological limitations section of this chapter, there is some variation on this 
arrangement across the cases. The design principle follows what is called literal and 
theoretical replication logic in case study research (Yin, 2003). The selection of the 
literal replications means having more than one case unit that exhibits the 
phenomena under study (i.e. the enabling support environment) increasing external 
validity whilst the theoretical replication is then having a case unit without that 
phenomena that improves the internal validity of the study. This design can be 
considered analogous to the concept of ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ in quantitative 
research design (Yin, 2003).  
Based on the selection of the Community Service Providers there was intended to be 
80 villages (60 programme and 20 control) as part of the study and so there was a 
need to collect data from households in the programme and control villages so to 
validate the service levels people received. For this purpose a predefined sample 
size of 30 households was selected for each village which was shaped by the 
resources available to the project and the desire to achieve a reasonably 
representative sample (which will be discussed below). Random interval sampling 
was followed based on standard practice for such household survey research in 
developing countries (Deaton, 1997). Each of the case selection and sampling 
processes is summarised in Table 4-2. 
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Table 4-2 - Case Selection and Sampling Strategies 
Analytical 
Level 
Case Selection / 
Sampling 
Approach 
Sampling Frame System of selection Units Selected 
Enabling 
Support 
Environment 
Stratified 
Purposive Case 
Selection (Patton, 
2002) 
Initial scan of the 
literature gave a 
sampling frame of 162 
reportedly successful 
community management 
programmes that was 
refined to 92 (as shown 
in Appendix X) 
Non-probability purposive approach based on literature scan 
and consultation with sector experts. Programmes selected 
to stratify type of support programme (i.e. public sector, 
NGO), geographical and socio-economic conditions at the 
state level. 
20 programmes selected 
Community 
Service 
Provider 
Embedded case 
study design 
based on literal 
and theoretical 
replication logic 
(Yin, 2003) 
All villages supported by 
programme selected at 
the Enabling Support 
Environment level  
Consultation with programme officials about identifying three 
high performing villages and one village outside programme. 
This approach is designed to enable research hypotheses to 
be tested against and is analogous to the concept of a 
“control” case in quantitative research design (Yin, 2003) 
3 programme villages and 
1 control village per case 
study. In total circa 60 
programme villages and 
20 control villages. 
Households Quasi-random 
interval sampling  
All households in the 
programme and control 
villages 
A predefined sample size of 30 households per village was 
selected due to the resources available to research partners. 
Household were selected by random interval sampling in 
which the enumerators used the size of the village and 
sample size of 30 to calculate an interval based the sampling 
on (i.e. population of 90 households divided by sample of 30 
means sampling interval (k) of 3)
11
. A household was 
selected in a quasi-random manner from the village and then 
every k household was surveyed as the research completed 
a walking transect of the entire village. 
30 households per village 
meaning 90 surveys from 
programme villages and 
30 from control villages 
per case study. In total 
circa 2400 households 
surveyed. 
                                            
11 Total Population of households (N) ÷ Sample size (n = 30)=Sampling Interval (k) 
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4.3 Embedding comparative data processing tools in the case 
studies 
The research can be described as a multi-case study research project yet the 
number of case studies is higher than is conventionally associated with this method 
(Yin, 2003). As such, comparative analysis following the in-depth qualitative coding 
approaches of conventional case study research (Flyvbjerg, 2006) would have been 
problematic. Instead the research adopted principles from the case survey method 
(Larsson, 1993; Yin and Heald, 1975) that seeks to standardise the qualitative 
information from various case studies into comparable quantified-qualitative data. As 
will be discussed later in this chapter the researcher acknowledges that this 
approach can be problematic for promoting an exclusion and inclusion bias by 
directing analysis in particular directions and for simplifying complex concepts (Yin 
and Heald, 1975). However, to promote the desired comparability it was decided this 
was an appropriate approach and, therefore, a number of data processing tools were 
developed to embed within each case study to provide a framework for comparative 
analysis. These related to the key hypotheses outlined at the end of Chapter Two. 
They include measures related to ‘professionalisation’, ‘participation’, ‘partnering’ 
and ‘institutional performance’. Each will be briefly explained here but the data 
processing tools are outlined in more detail in the fieldwork protocols available via 
Appendix B. The data collection methods will be explained after the tools.  
4.3.1 Qualitative-quantitative data processing tools 
To measure the professionalisation of the enabling support environment and the 
community service provider, the research adopted an approach called Qualitative 
Information Systems (Postma et al., 2004; da Silva Wells et al., 2013). These were 
developed as a means for standardising evaluation in water, sanitation and hygiene 
programmes. The researchers were provided with a series of questions to ask in key 
informant interview and focus groups, and then in the analysis of the data collected, 
they are asked to incorporate a quantitative logic in their assessment of the findings. 
In essence, they were asked to complete a ranking ladder, similar to a Likert scale. 
For an illustrative example, in Table 4-3, the researcher is asked to rank the formality 
of the mandate for enabling support entity’s support activities on a five-point scale 
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from 0 to 100. There were seven such tools related to professionalisation at the 
enabling support environment and community service provider levels which were 
then consolidated using the standard mean to give an overall ranking of 
professionalisation. To promote consistency in scoring, the researchers have to 
provide an explanation for the scoring which was used to harmonise the scoring 
process across the cases by this author. 
Table 4-3: Scoring table for indicator 1.1: formality of mandate for support (as 
provided via Appendix B in protocols)  
Description 
 Score Explanation of 
scoring 
The ESE has a clearly articulated vision, mission and/or objectives for 
its support function, which is also supported by a policy mandate. 
 100  
The ESE has a clearly articulated vision, mission and/or objectives for 
its support function, but this is not supported by a policy mandate. 
 75  
The ESE has a formal policy mandate for support, but it only has an 
implicit understanding of what that mandate entails in terms of 
objectives to be achieved. 
 50  
The ESE has an implicit understanding of its objectives, but lacks a 
formal policy mandate. 
 25  
The ESE operates without a clear vision or objectives and without a 
policy mandate. 
 0  
Participation and partnering were integrated into data processing tools based on 
laddered frameworks. For participation, recognising the resolution at which this can 
be meaningfully captured in a standardised way, the tool was designed to assess the 
extent to which communities had decision-making power at key stages of the service 
delivery cycle. Similarly, with the research interested in the co-production of the 
enabling support environment and community service provider organisations, the 
researchers were asked to assess the type of partnering that best described the 
relationship between these levels. Both these frameworks are given in Tables 4-4 
and 4-5. As with the other data processing tools, researchers provided narrative 
explanation of their selections in the database that enable this researcher to 
harmonise the interpretation across the cases. 
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Table 4-4: Ladder of participation (based on Pretty (1994), adapted from Adnan, et al., (1992), in key issues in rural water supplies, first presented 
in Smits et al. (2015)). 
Phase in service delivery 
cycle 
Type of  
community involvement 
Capital investment phase Service delivery phase Capital maintenance phase Service enhancement or 
expansion phase 
1. Self-mobilisation  The community practices self-
supply and seeks to improve 
this, or have developed an 
implementation plan and seek 
external support. 
The community take 
responsibility for administration, 
management and operation and 
maintenance, either directly or 
by outsourcing these functions to 
external entities. 
The community practices self 
supply and invests in asset 
renewal, or identifies need and 
seeks external support for asset 
renewal. 
The community practices self 
supply and invests in service 
enhancement or expansion, or 
identifies need and seeks 
external support for service 
enhancement or expansion. 
2. Interaction participation The community in partnership 
with the service provider and/or 
support entities engage in a joint-
analysis of implementation 
options before developing a plan. 
The community in partnership 
with the service provider and/or 
support entities engage in joint-
decision making regarding 
appropriate arrangements for 
administration, management and 
operation and maintenance. 
The community in partnership 
with the service provider and/or 
support engage in joint-decision 
making regarding asset renewal.  
The community in partnership 
with the service provider and/or 
support engage in joint-decision 
making regarding service 
enhancement or expansion. 
3. Functional participation  The community is provided with 
a detailed implementation plan 
that they discuss and they have 
a chance to amend limited 
elements.  
The community is provided with 
administration, management and 
operation and maintenance 
arrangements that they discuss 
and they have a chance to 
amend limited elements.  
The community is provided with 
an asset renewal plan that they 
discuss and they have a chance 
to amend limited elements.  
The community is provided with 
a service enhancement or 
expansion plan that they discuss 
and they have a chance to 
amend limited elements.  
4. Participation by 
consultation  
Community members are asked 
whether they want a predefined 
implementation scheme but have 
no formal decision making power 
to demand alternatives. 
The community discusses 
administration, management and 
operation and maintenance 
functions but have no formal 
decision making power to 
demand alternatives. 
Community members are asked 
about asset renewal but have no 
formal decision making power to 
demand alternatives. 
Community members are asked 
about service enhancement or 
expansion but have no formal 
decision making power to 
demand alternatives. 
5. Passive participation  Community members are 
informed that project 
implementation is going ahead 
as per an externally designed 
plan.  
Community members are 
informed how administration, 
management and operation and 
maintenance will operate without 
opportunity for changes. 
Community Service Provider 
informs community members 
about asset renewal as per an 
externally designed plan.  
Community Service Provider 
informs community members 
about service enhancement or 
expansion as per an externally 
designed plan.  
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Table 4-5 Organisational partnering typology for relation between ESE and community service provider (CSP) during different phases of service 
delivery cycle (adapted from Demirjian (2002) and first presented in Smits et al. (2015)) 
Phase in service 
delivery cycle 
 
 
Type of partnering 
Capital investment phase Service delivery phase Capital maintenance phase Service enhancement or expansion 
phase 
Collaborative 
 
ESE and CSP share 
responsibility for decisions 
regarding hardware (e.g. 
infrastructure) and software (e.g. 
capacity building) development 
during implementation. 
ESE and CSP share responsibility 
for decisions regarding 
administration, management and 
operation and maintenance. 
ESE and CSP share 
responsibility for decision 
making regarding asset renewal.  
ESE and CSP share responsibility for 
decisions regarding service 
enhancement or expansion.  
Contributory 
 
ESE and CSP pool financial 
resources to meet the costs of 
capital investment in hardware 
and software provision during 
implementation. 
ESE and CSP pool financial 
resources to cover costs of 
administration, management, and 
operation and maintenance. 
ESE and CSP save and pool 
financial resources to meet the 
costs of asset renewal. 
ESE and CSP save and pool financial 
resources to meet the costs of service 
enhancement or expansion. 
Operational 
 
ESE and CSP work together 
contributing labour and/or 
resources to deliver   
hardware and software provision 
during implementation. 
ESE and CSP work together 
contributing labour and/or 
resources to support administration, 
management, operation and 
maintenance.  
ESE and service provider 
contribute labour and/or 
resources for asset renewal. 
ESE and CSP contribute labour 
and/or resources for service 
enhancement or expansion. 
Consultative 
 
ESE and CSP communicate 
regularly during implementation 
with structured opportunities for 
feedback and dialogue. 
The ESE and CSP have a 
systematic and transparent system 
for sharing information regarding  
administration, management, and 
operation and maintenance. 
ESE and CSP systematically 
share information regarding 
service levels and technology 
status enabling proper planning 
for asset renewal.  
Information regarding service levels, 
technology status and population is 
systematically shared, enabling proper 
planning for service enhancement or 
expansion. 
Transactional 
 
ESE and CSP initially negotiate 
an implementation plan that is 
then delivered by the ESE.  
The ESE and CSP fulfil different 
elements of the 
administration, management, and 
operation and maintenance 
functions as per negotiated 
arrangements.  
Asset renewal is dependent on 
negotiations between ESE and 
CSP following a request from 
the CSP.  
Service enhancement or expansion is 
dependent on negotiations between 
ESE and CSP following a request 
from the CSP. 
Bureaucratic 
 
ESE provides CSP with a 
standardised model of hardware 
and software provision during  
implementation.  
Bureaucratic standards dictate the 
system for administration, 
management, and operation and 
maintenance.  
Asset renewal is dependent on 
generic programme timelines 
(i.e. every X years).  
Planned asset replacement, 
expansion or renewal is dependent on 
generic programme timelines (e.g. 
every X years and/or with every X% of 
population increase.) 
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The final qualitative-quantitative data processing tool was for the enabling support 
environment. It related to desire to deepen the characterisation of successful 
enabling support entities by assessing the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
them using an institutional assessment (Cullivan et al., 1988). Such a tool was 
originally developed by USAID to assess the performance of urban utilities but it was 
considered potentially useful to adapt to this new context. The tool focuses on eight 
areas that are accompanied by a series of statements which researchers then 
consider whether they agree or disagree with. The areas are: Autonomy; Leadership; 
Management & Administration; Community Orientation; Technical Capability; 
Developing & Maintaining Staff; Organisational Culture; Interactions with Key 
External Institutions. The ranking in each category were then used to compare the 
characteristics of the different support organisations covered in the study. 
4.3.2 Quantitative data processing tools 
The synthesis framework also involved developing two quantitative data processing 
tools. The first relates to how the research assesses the level of success between 
case studies, which is through the service levels delivered. The calculation of the 
service levels is based on using household survey data to calculate the service level 
benchmarks presented in the previous chapter that contains five different 
parameters: quantity, accessibility, quality, reliability and continuity. Amin et al. 
(2015) proposed a composite service level indicator that brings these different 
parameters together into one measurement unit. As they discussed, there are 
numerous approaches for producing a composite indicator of water service level, 
including nominal logic (Burr and Fonseca, 2013), the basic arithmetic mean and 
various forms of statistical weighting. To avoid over compensability between the 
different parameters (i.e. high reliability making up for low quantity), the approach 
taken draws on a mixture of nominal threshold logic and the geometric mean. This 
approach means that if any service level is either sub-standard or no service then 
the composite indicator cannot exceed this reflecting a nominal logic. However, 
above this, the geometric mean is employed as it “limits the impact of compensability 
and eclipsing (where the composite indicator is insensitive to a single variable)” 
(Amin et al., 2015, p. 14). This approach is used as the main benchmarking measure 
of service levels when comparing case studies. 
 90 
 
The final element of the synthesis framework relates to standardising the 
assessment of financial costs. Researchers were asked to collate the data related to 
the various elements of the ‘life-cycle cost approach’ described in Chapter Two. The 
focus was on financial costs only rather than economic costs so to promote proximity 
to the actual data rather than have individual researchers attempt to calculate items 
such as the opportunity-cost of voluntary labour. The costs were asked to be 
produced as follows: 
 CapEx – per person, in 2014 Indian Rupees 
 Recurrent Costs (OpEx, OpEx Enabling Support, CapManEx) – per person, 
per year in 2014 India Rupees 
The ‘per person’ scale provided a base for comparison. For historical costs, 
researchers were given an inflation calculation tool to calculate the inflation of 
hardware costs by the Indian Construction Price Index (Counstruction Industry 
Development Council (India), 2016) and software costs by the Consumer Price Index 
(Reserve Bank of India, 2015). This distinction was developed during the research 
as it was deemed an appropriate balance because of the high levels of inflation in 
the consumer price index in recent years in India not yet being reflected in the 
inflation of the unit costs of infrastructure, as per the advice of government officials in 
India. For this synthesis costs were presented using the mid 2014 exchange rate of 
INR60 to USD$1 along with the 3.42 Purchasing Power Parity adjustment (World 
Bank, 2016a).  
4.4 Data collection methods 
The data collection methods for fieldwork are outlined in detail via Appendix B which 
also explains in detail how they relate to the data processing tools outlined above 
and so this section is presented in an abridged format. The following methods were 
used at each analytical level: 
- Enabling Support Environment – key informant interviews and secondary 
records (i.e. accounts, reports). 
- Community Service Providers – key informant interviews, focus groups and 
and secondary records (i.e. accounts, reports). 
- Household level – household surveys.  
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On average in each case study 14 key informant interviews, seven focus groups and 
118 household surveys were conducted by the field research teams, as shown in 
Table 4-6. The data collected was processed by the researchers through the tools 
above to feed into four databases covering the enabling support environment, 
community service provider, household service levels and financial costs. As well as 
these databases, twenty reports were drafted that contained a rich description and 
analysis of the case studies. 
Table 4-6 - Primary datasets from across the case studies 
# Case Studies Enabling Support 
Environment 
Community Service 
Provider 
Household  
Key 
informant 
interviews 
Focus 
Groups 
Key 
informant 
interviews 
Focus 
Groups 
Focus group 
/ 
unstructured 
interview 
Survey 
1 Jharkhand 8  8 4 4 120 
2 Madhya 
Pradesh 
4 2 11 4 4 120 
3 Orissa 4  5 8  120 
4 Chhattisgarh  5  8 6  120 
5 Meghalaya 8  8 4 4 120 
6 Rajasthan 5  4   120 
7 West Bengal 4 2 2 2 4 120 
8 Telangana 8 2 6 6  68 
9 Karnataka 8  8 4 4 120 
10 Himachal 
Pradesh 
6  6 4  89 
11 Punjab 8   4 4 120 
12 Uttarakhand 5  3 2 3 98 
13 Kerala I - World 
Bank 
4  4 3  120 
14 Kerala II 10 1 4 4 4 120 
15 Gujarat I 8 2 12 4 4 120 
16 Gujarat II 8 2 12 4 4 120 
17 Tamil Nadu I 3  8 3  120 
18 Tamil Nadu II 10 1 16 1 0 180 
19 Maharashtra  8 1 2 4  120 
20 Sikkim 10  11 3 4 120 
 Total 124 13 127 62 43 2355 
 92 
 
4.5 Data cleaning, consolidation and harmonisation 
With so much data to deal with, a key process in the synthesis was data cleaning, 
consolidation and harmonisation. Spreadsheets were designed in MS Excel for the 
enabling support environment, community service provider, household service levels 
and finance data to process the fieldwork data. The field-researchers were asked to 
fill these databases, which were designed to be convergent with the fieldwork 
protocols with features built into to promote data consistency such as formatting cells 
to receive only certain types of data. The spreadsheets were then submitted to this 
researcher by the field-research teams for checking and sign-off. The following 
criteria were considered in this process: 
- Completeness: A systematic assessment was undertaken to ensure all 
sections of each case study database was completed. In cases where there 
was missing data then requests will be made to the research team to populate 
the databases. In any case where a significant amount of data remained 
missing then the case was excluded from that part of the analysis. 
- Creditability: An informed reading of the data was made to make an 
assessment of creditability. Key questions include: 
I. What was the original source of the data? Is this explicitly mentioned 
and can this be traced to a credible source (i.e. interview with relevant 
stakeholder)? 
II. What was the ‘rawest’ level of data available? How has this data been 
manipulated/interpreted? 
III. Was the data feasible? (i.e. are unit costs within the magnitudes 
expected?) 
IV. Formatting: consistent formatting was checked as coding was used to 
export the data from the case level into synthesis databases and 
therefore the formatting had to be precise 
In cases where queries arose, then clarification requests were sent to the research 
team and worked through in partnership to move to agreed resolution. It was also 
recognised that different priorities needed to be applied to each database during 
cleaning such as assessing interpretative logic for the qualitative-quantitative 
indicators or checking consistency in use of drop-down menus for the household 
survey data. 
Once the data had been cleaned it was consolidated into cross-case databases for 
each analytical level in both MS Excel and Statistical Package for Social Science 
(SPSS) software. Visual Basic Application (VBA) coding was used to accelerate the 
consolidation process. As the analysis progressed the four databases were 
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consolidated into a master database containing key data from each analytical level 
across all the cases. 
When working with the data there were times when queries with the data were 
spotted that were not initially picked up during cleaning – this particularly related to 
the inconsistent use of qualitative-quantitative frameworks and tools. It was therefore 
deemed appropriate to undergo a data harmonisation process whereby this 
researcher set-up calls with each research team to understand how they had 
interpreted the data processing tools, which led to the reallocation of scores in some 
situations. The financial data underwent a similar thorough harmonisation process 
led by the Community Water Plus principle investigator and PhD supervisor with 
support from MSc students. This involved cleaning, consolidating and harmonising 
financial data at the individual case level but no cross-case analysis which was the 
sole work of this author. 
4.6 Clarifying the resolution of analysis 
With so much potential data the resolution and granularity at which the analysis was 
conducted was a key question for this study. Part of the challenge was simply 
dealing with such large volumes of data whilst attempting to retain an appropriate 
balance between abstracted quantitative analysis and the context rich essence of the 
case study method. This resolution was experimented with during the write-up. The 
researcher re-analysed and harmonised each individual case study report. The initial 
plan was to apply ‘framework analysis’ to the reports (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; 
Ritchie et al., 2013) that seeks to code and summarise multiple qualitative transcripts 
or case studies into an overall framework to be analysed by case or theme. 
Ultimately, this approach was not followed as its robust application was not deemed 
feasible in the time frame of having the reports (with an average case study having 
approximately 50 pages and some not submitted late into the thesis process).  
However, the framework approach did highlight the importance of “data 
summarisation” as a vehicle for analysis when working with such large amounts of 
text (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). An immersive approach to report analysis was 
therefore conducted that led to the production of twenty summaries of the reports 
highlighting key themes and conclusions. This approach followed the principles of 
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recursive abstraction in which the process of the researcher summarising large-
qualitative datasets into summaries helps highlight key trends and patterns 
(Stebbins, 2001). It was debated whether to include these within the main body of 
the thesis but this approach was rejected as presenting too much case-specific detail 
to enable a meaningful synthesis of findings, so they were instead presented via 
Appendix B. However, this process was crucial to the overall synthesis process as it 
enabled an appropriate understanding of the context of each case study to be 
developed by this researcher (alongside the fieldwork undertaken directly in seven 
case studies). 
Similar questions of appropriate resolution were considered when working with the 
cross-case databases. With the enabling support environment being the primary unit 
of analysis this was the default level to which data was summarised and compared in 
the comparative analysis presented in the following chapters, unless otherwise 
stated. Yet an important issue was that whilst complete and reliable data was found 
on the enabling support environment for the programme villages in every case study, 
there was very little data at this level for the control villages. It was therefore not 
possible to compare between programme and control villages any of the data that 
was reliant on input from this level. For example, it was not possible to reliably 
understand the cost reported in the control villages as these were likely to only be 
partial costs, not including those documented at the enabling support environment 
level. Yet when it came to household surveys that data was collected at the village 
level only and had been consistently conducted both in the programme and control 
villages in all the case studies. Hence, it was possible to compare the control village 
to the programme villages for this dataset. This meant the programme-control design 
enabled the verification of comparative success in terms of service levels but not a 
full analysis of other elements of the research between programme and control. 
In conducting the financial synthesis another decision was taken regarding the 
resolution at which the synthesis was conducted. The financial data was provided at 
a granularity regarding which type of support entity was covering external costs. Yet 
the types of organisations providing finance varied from case-to-case and the 
research problem regarding costs related primarily to trying to document the level of 
financial support beyond communities needed to deliver sustainable services. The 
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cost data was therefore analysed in a simply binary form that compared community 
costs to all support costs. 
4.7 Acknowledging the representativeness issue 
The purposive selection of the case studies was not intended to develop some form 
of representative sample of community management in India. However, due to the 
use of the household survey to assess service levels, it is important to discuss the 
issues of representativeness in this element of the study. A limitation of the research 
is that based on standard tests the sampling strategy for household surveying cannot 
be considered statistically representative at the single village level, as measured by 
commonly agreed standards for calculating sample sizes, i.e. 5% confidence interval 
at a 95% confidence level when faced with a 50/50 variability in response (Field, 
2013). The average habitation size from this research is around 300 households and 
so based on those worse-case conditions described in the previous sentence the 
confidence interval for the sample is 17% which gives a larger margin of error than 
the standard level of 5%.  
When a sample is not statistically representative it is best to focus on presenting 
data with basic descriptive statistics (Black, 2012) whilst in his classic work on the 
analysis of household surveys Deaton (1997, p. 133) argues that:  
“The use of survey data…is often straightforward, requiring little statistical technique beyond the 
calculation of measures of central tendency and dispersion.”  
This approach is therefore followed when focusing on case level data with basic 
frequency and central tendency measures (i.e. means, inter-quartile range and 
standard deviation) given to describe service levels.  
However, due to the marginal returns between sample sizes and very large 
populations, the findings from the overall sample of household data can be treated 
with higher confidence. As explained, the case selection process followed a 
purposive approach so is not representative of community management across 
India, as it was designed to cherry pick high performance. However, based on the 
results from the initial scanning of the Community Water Plus project it can be said 
that: 
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The initial scanning process found 161 ‘successful’ case studies to investigate. Following database 
cleaning and the removal of duplicates or overlaps, 92 potential cases remained. These 92 cases 
represent 35,661 villages. This compares to an all India total of 597,483 villages (Census of India, 
2011), noting that there is some uncertainty regarding the consistency of the terms ‘villages’ and 
‘habitations’ used in various publications. From analysis of the data in the Census of India the 
average population size per village is 1,395. This initial scanning therefore suggests that 
approximately 49,750,000 out of the 833,463,448 rural population, or 6%, are receiving reportedly 
successful community managed rural water services. There are undoubtedly many more unreported 
successes. (Smits et al. 2015) 
Based on the assumption that the 1,766 household surveys from the programme 
villages (out of a total of 2355 from the whole study) are representative of the nearly 
50 million people reported as being served by reportedly successful community 
managed rural water services, then the confidence interval comes down to 2.33% at 
the 95% confidence level. This means the analysis of this data at the whole sample 
level can be treated with much greater confidence than analysis at the single village 
level. 
4.8 Data analysis 
Data analysis involved two main threads. The first was the immersive case study 
analysis, which was explained above in Sections 4.1 and 4.6. That led to the 
production of the twenty case study summaries. This section does not explain that 
approach again but rather how the databases were analysed containing the data 
from the qualitative-quantitative processing tools, household surveys and financial 
elements. A largely descriptive statistical approach was followed with analysis 
conducted in SPSS. This was appropriate due to the ‘fuzzy’ nature of qualitative-
quantitative data and also the representative issues discussed above. The principle 
was to structure and present the data in a format where trends and patterns can be 
analysed and triangulated with the qualitative narratives from the case studies. The 
differences between the datasets from each analytical level mean that they need to 
be treated in different ways.  
Table 4-8 provides an overview of the analysis approaches with emphasis on 
presented basic frequencies and central tendency measures alongside measures of 
dispersion. Where appropriate, these basic descriptive statistics will be accompanied 
by non-parametric statistical testing of the differences between groups and bivariate 
correlations. For this purpose the Mann-Whitney U-test or Kruskal Wallis test will be 
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used to compare medians between groups, while Kendall’s tau will be used to 
measure the association between two variables (Field, 2013; Sirkin, 2006). These 
have been selected as they are flexible tests that can be applied to data which is 
either continuous or ordinal and not normally distributed (Field, 2013). Following the 
advice of Black (2012) when the Kruskal Wallis indicates a significant difference 
between sub-groups, a post hoc Dunn-Bonferroni pairwise test will be used to further 
assess which groups are different to one-another. Kendall’s tau also has the 
advantage that it tends to be more conservative than other tests for correlation so in 
this sense it will provide more statistically robust results when effects are found. 
Table 4-7 provides a guide to assess the size of effect in correlation analysis which 
will be used to interpret the results. 
Table 4-7 - Assessing effect from Kendall’s Tau tests (Field, 2013) 
Correlation Coefficient 
Interpretation Guide  
Interpretation 
<0.1 Negligible effect 
0.1-0.3 Small effect 
0.3-0.5 Medium effect 
>0.5 Large effect 
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Table 4-8 - Data analysis approach summary 
Category 
Enabling Support 
Environment & Community 
Service Provider 
Service Level Analysis Financial Costs Overview Analysis 
Data Source 
20 – databases consolidated 
into overview database 
2239 Household Surveys 
20 – databases consolidated 
into overview database 
Overview database 
Critical Data Type 
Qualitative-quantitative 
(ordinal or categorical) 
Ordinal (composite service 
level indicator) 
Continuous 
Continuous v Ordinal (treated 
as continuous) 
Basic frequency  Count and Percent Count and Percent Count and Percent Count and Percent 
Central Tendency Mode or Median Median Mean Mean 
Dispersion 
Range and inter-quartile 
range  
Standard Deviation & Inter-
quartile range 
Standard Deviation & Inter-
quartile range 
Standard Deviation 
Shape of distribution N/A 
Visualisation & Skewness 
and Kurtosis 
Visualisation & Skewness 
and Kurtosis 
Standard Deviation & Inter-
quartile range 
Statistical Tests for 
Comparing Average of 
Groups within one Variable 
N/A 
Mann Whitney U-test or 
Kruskal Wallis test 
Mann Whitney U-test or 
Kruskal Wallis test (with post 
hoc Dunn-Bonferroni 
pairwise testing) 
Mann Whitney U-test or 
Kruskal Wallis test (with post 
hoc Dunn-Bonferroni 
pairwise testing) 
Statistical Tests for 
Association between two 
variables 
N/A Kendall's tau Kendall's tau Kendall's tau 
Level of significance N/A 
<0.05 Significant and <0.01 
Very Significant 
<0.05 Significant and <0.01 
Very Significant 
<0.05 Significant and <0.01 
Very Significant 
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4.9 Research ethics 
Research ethics are especially important in development research due to the 
uneven power relations that often exist between researchers and participants 
(Laws et al., 2003). As part of this thesis, this especially applied to the seven 
months the researcher was conducting fieldwork in India either directly or in 
support of collaborating research partners. To guide conduct during this time, 
the researcher followed the useful ‘applied guide to ethics’ from Laws et al. 
(2003) that specifies the following principles: avoiding harm to respondents; 
avoiding undue intrusion into people’s lives; communicating information clearly 
and obtaining informed consent for participation; explaining and enforcing the 
rights to confidentially and anonymity; trying to provide fair return for any 
assistance offered in the field; giving appropriate acknowledgement to 
respondents’ in publications (but not contradicting the right to confidentiality). 
Such principles were followed and, procedurally, the research underwent ethical 
review by the Cranfield University Research Ethics Committee which approved 
the research in January 2013. The form, provided in Appendix B, provides more 
details on the ethical procedures followed. 
However, perhaps of particular relevance to this study is the emphasis from 
Laws et al. (2003, p. 175) that researchers also have a responsibility to 
colleagues when conducting research. For example, they argue: “Northern 
researchers should take account of the interests and needs of Southern 
colleagues, considering the disparity in resources available to them.” As a 
researcher and individual I sought to act with integrity during the research and 
work sensitively with collaborating partners. As suggested in the quote, this 
often materialised in everyday ways such as being conscious of the contrasting 
purchasing power of myself and (some) in-country researchers, for example, 
suggesting to eat in local dhabas that have cheap (and very good!) food rather 
than expensive hotel restaurants. As will be discussed in the following section I 
am completely indebted to my Indian colleagues for providing the data that this 
thesis is based upon and hope it does justice to their hard work. 
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4.10 Reflections on collaborative research 
When conducting the complex business of collaborative development research 
it is important to reflect on challenges and limitations (Laws et al., 2003). This 
research was made possible by being embedded in the Department for Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, Government of Australia, supported Community Water Plus 
research project. Being part of this project has provided access to data that 
would have been impossible to collect as an individual PhD researcher. This 
was made possible by the close collaboration with research partners from the 
Administrative College of India (Hyderabad), Centre for Excellence in Change 
(Chennai), Malaviya National Institute of Technology (Jaipur), Xavier Institute 
for Social Service (Ranchi), the IRC (The Hague).as well as colleagues from 
Cranfield University. The research was dependent on these collaborating 
research partners to deliver the individual case study reports and associated 
databases. To support this, numerous steps were taken including: 
- Pre-fieldwork: providing extensive, prescriptive fieldwork guides and 
holding a series of researcher meetings to expose and train researchers 
to follow the guides; 
- Supporting-fieldwork: making supporting visits to accompany 
researchers undertaking fieldwork to support the delivery of case studies 
(this was personally undertaken to support two research teams); 
- Post-fieldwork: visiting each research partner to support the 
harmonisation of data processing and analysis across the cases; 
providing designed databases and case study report formats for the 
collaborating research teams to use; peer-reviewing outputs and 
working with research collaborators to harmonise analyse across the 
cases. 
These steps have been extremely important in ensuring the delivery of the 
research. However, there have still been challenges with regards to the 
dependency on research partners. These can be divided into two main areas. 
The first is with regard to the timeframe for delivery of outputs. The planned 
timeframe for fieldwork was from January 2014 to January 2015 with reports 
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and databases due to be delivered by the end of March 2015. However, it was 
not until the end of December 2015 that the final databases were submitted and 
the final reports were submitted in March 2016, which had knock-on effects in 
terms of the cross-case analysis and synthesis.  
Another issue was that due to changes in staff or recruitment of consultant 
researchers, some of the field researchers had not attended the pre-fieldwork 
researcher meetings. This was partly mitigated by accompanying any new 
researchers during their first session of fieldwork so to ensure that they were 
using and understood the fieldwork guides. Notwithstanding these challenges 
the collaborative nature of the research working closely with numerous research 
teams is considered to have greatly enriched my understanding of the research 
problem. As part of the research I have made nine visits to India spending over 
seven months in the country (having previously spent eight months in South 
Asia before the PhD). Over this time – much time spent discussing issues with 
collaborating researchers – I have learnt a great deal about the reality of Indian 
society and rural water services, which shapes my approach to this research. In 
this sense, despite the sometimes frustration of my dependency on research 
collaborators, the collaborator nature of the research is considered to have 
greatly benefited the overall thesis. 
4.11 Limitations of the methodology 
The scale of the Community Water Plus project has enabled an impressive 
dataset to be produced, yet the ambitions in research design have also 
presented significant challenges in terms of this thesis. With a need to bring 
together data from twenty case studies it was deemed appropriate to 
standardise and codify information into the qualitative-quantitative indicators yet 
it is acknowledged this can lead to an overly reductionist logic. This presents 
the danger of what is described as exclusion and inclusion bias in the case 
survey method (Yin and Heald, 1975; Yin, 2003) as it forces the field-
researchers to interpret the findings through the provided tools and conceptual 
frameworks provided. This is a danger this researcher is aware of but considers 
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to be an appropriate trade-off for providing the uniform comparison framework. 
There were efforts to mitigate it through the accompaniment of the full case 
study report which should have provided the research teams with the chance to 
go beyond the core indicators used in the study. The follow up harmonisation 
sessions between the author and the field-researchers also provided an 
opportunity to explain important factors within a specific case study beyond the 
reductionist tools. 
Partly in an attempt to gain greater insight into the potentially less tangible 
aspects of the case studies this researcher had originally designed into the 
research protocols a method called the Net-Map Tool Box (Schiffer and Hauck, 
2010). This is a participatory facilitation technique and research method 
designed to be used by the field-research teams to evaluate the informal 
institutional arrangements for rural water services. Yet researchers found it 
difficult to apply and it was eventually dropped from the study. On reflection it 
was unrealistic to expect researchers without training in participatory methods 
to use this technique. 
More fundamentally, the research bridges what could be described as the 
conventional divisions between ‘small-n’ qualitative and ‘large-n’ quantitative 
studies (Bryman, 2012). For this reason it is described as a ‘med-n’ research 
study that brings together design-principles, methods and analysis techniques 
that have traditionally been associated with what some consider to be the 
separate meta-paradigms of quantitative-orientated positivist and qualitative-
orientated interpretivist research (Morgan, 2014). This researcher perceives 
social reality as having ontological depth that goes broadly from the more 
material to the more socially constructed (Blaikie, 2007). As such, he believes 
there is value in applying positivist methods to studying ontologically shallow 
elements of social reality such as accepted social structures and concepts (i.e. 
organisational types) whilst interpretivists methods allow investigation of greater 
ontologically depth into more intangible aspects (i.e. informal mechanics of 
institutional change). Such a view is rooted in pragmatist (Dewey, 1989; Rorty, 
1996) and critical realist perspectives (Bhaskar, 1998; Sayer, 2000).  
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Connecting this thinking, a core limitation with this type of synthesis research is 
therefore that it becomes extremely hard to robustly capture those aspects 
which are considered to have greater ontological depth in a way that facilitates 
this type of systematic comparative analysis. This research has attempted to do 
this to some extent but it is accepted that in the abstraction to comparative 
indicators much contextual detail is often lost. It is still contended that the study 
offers a valid approach for studying such matter and it is hoped that the balance 
of resolutions between the abstract quantitative and context-rich case study 
actually provides novel insights that improve understanding regarding 
community management in India and elsewhere.  
4.12 Chapter summary and contribution to thesis 
This chapter has explained how the research was undertaken. It set out and 
justified the case framework and selection process for the twenty case studies. 
The synthesis approach based on a series of data processing tools was 
explained, with these designed to measure key aspects related to the 
community management paradigms described in Chapter Two. The data 
collection methods were outlined whilst a discussion was given about the 
appropriate level of resolution at which the synthesis could meaningfully be 
conducted. The largely descriptive statistical analysis approaches of the 
indicators, which will be triangulated with the analysis of the case study reports, 
were clarified. The chapter also described the ethical considerations 
underpinning the research and the challenges and rewards of working in a 
collaborative research project. Finally, the limitations in terms of reductionism 
associated with the qualitative-quantitative data processing tools were 
considered. Following this chapter the thesis will progress to present the 
synthesis of findings from across the different case studies. It will focus on 
answering the research questions in turn moving from the focus on 
organisational arrangements in the following chapter and then onto the financial 
costs of services in the subsequent chapter. 
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5 ORGANISATIONS TYPES AND CHARACTERISTICS FOR 
SUCCESSFUL COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT IN INDIA 
A key emphasis in this thesis is that there is a need to better understand how to 
structure support services to successfully enable the community management of 
rural water services (Baumann, 2006; Lockwood and Smits, 2011; Lockwood, 2002, 
2004). This chapter is designed to answer that question by considering the type and 
characteristics of organisational arrangements from across the twenty case studies. 
Based on the basic conceptual framework for rural water services, the chapter 
reviews the findings at the enabling support environment and community service 
provider levels. It does this through presenting a series of typologies of organisations 
at each level before considering the characteristics that can be associated with each 
typology.  
This chapter does present a limited amount of service level and financial data to 
compare levels of performance across the typologies but the full analysis of that 
quantitative data is the subject of the following chapter. The analysis presented here 
is therefore inclusive of every case study from the Community Water Plus project 
regardless of the performance documented in terms of service levels. As explained 
earlier in the thesis a write-up of each specific case study is not given in the main 
body but is provided via links in Appendix C. However, overleaf, Table 5-1 that 
contains the organisational typologies and characteristics found in each case study. 
A similar a table will be presented at the start of the next chapter to provide a 
reference point for the reader alongside the summaries in the appendix. 
 106 
 
Table 5-1 – Summary of finding on organisational arrangements across the case studies 
Case  State Organisational Typologies Organisational Characteristics (Summary indicators) 
Enabling Support 
Environment Type 
(ESE) 
Community 
Service Provider 
(CSP) 
 
Professionalisation 
 
Partnering 
Typology 
Participation 
in Service 
Delivery 
ESE CSP 
1 Jharkhand Centralised State 
Rural Water Supply 
Agency 
Representative 
VWSC 
55 67 Transactional 4. Interactive 
Participation 
2 Madhya 
Pradesh 
Hybrid  (NGO) Unregistered 
society 
95 67 Transactional 4. Interactive 
Participation 
3 Odisha External Agency Registered Society 75 61 Operational 4. Interactive 
Participation 
4 Chhattisgarh Centralised State 
Rural Water Supply 
Agency 
Representative 
VWSC 
50 39 Transactional 3. Functional 
Participation 
5 Meghalaya Centralised State 
Rural Water Supply 
Agency 
Representative 
VWSC 
50 33 Transactional 4. Interactive 
Participation 
6 Rajasthan Centralised State 
Rural Water Supply 
Agency 
Autonomous 
VWSC 
50 33 Collaborative 3. Functional 
Participation 
7 West Bengal Hybrid (NGO) Unregistered 
society 
30 33 Operational 4. Interactive 
Participation 
8 Telangana External Agency Registered Society 90 75 Operational 4. Interactive 
Participation 
9 Karnataka Hybrid (Donor) Representative 
VWSC 
100 89 Transactional 4. Interactive 
Participation 
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10 Himachal 
Pradesh 
Hybrid (Donor) Unregistered 
society 
60 44 Collaborative 4. Interactive 
Participation 
11 Punjab Hybrid (Donor) Registered Society 75 78 Collaborative 5. Self-
mobilisation 
12 Uttarakhand External Agency Registered Society 65 56 Operational 4. Interactive 
Participation 
13 Kerala I – 
World Bank 
Hybrid (Donor) Registered Society 70 100 Transactional 5. Self-
mobilisation 
14 Kerala II – 
Local self-
government 
Decentralised Local 
Self-Government 
Registered Society 100 64 Operational 4. Interactive 
Participation 
15 Gujarat – 
WASMO 
Gandhinagar 
Centralised State 
Rural Water Supply 
Agency 
Registered Society 90 69 Operational 4. Interactive 
Participation 
16 Gujarat – 
WASMO Kutch 
Centralised State 
Rural Water Supply 
Agency 
Registered Society 90 75 Operational 4. Interactive 
Participation 
17 Tamil Nadu – 
Local self-
government 
Decentralised Local 
Self-Government 
Representative 
VWSC 
45 81 Collaborative 5. Self-
mobilisation 
18 Tamil Nadu – 
Public-Private 
Hybrid 
Hybrid (Private) Representative 
VWSC 
75 69 Transactional 1. Passive 
participation 
19 Maharashtra Centralised State 
Rural Water Supply 
Agency 
Representative 
VWSC 
55 33 Transactional 1. Passive 
participation 
20 Sikkim Decentralised Local 
Self-Government 
Representative 
VWSC 
80 83 Operational 4. Interactive 
Participation 
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5.1 Types of enabling support environments 
This section presents the analysis of the enabling support environment across 
the case studies. This led to the classification of four typologies of 
arrangements that are considered useful for distinguishing between different 
types of support systems. There are two forms of government support systems 
that are labelled as centralised ‘State Rural Water Supply Agencies’ (SRWSA) 
and decentralised ‘Local Self-Government’ (LSG) support which partly reflect 
the different ways decentralisation has played out across India states. Another 
typology is called the ‘Hybrid Support Approach’ that involved public 
partnerships between government agencies and external agencies, such as 
donors, NGOs or the private sector. The fourth category is labelled as ‘External 
Agency Support’ which involves cases whereby NGOs or similar organisations 
(i.e. social enterprises) take on the role of an enabling support environment 
beyond the government system. Within these categories there are some sub-
types of support systems whilst the distinction between one typology and the 
other is often not completely distinct. For example, the government support 
systems can sometimes outsource minor functions to non-government entities 
such as NGOs. However, as will be shown these four typologies are considered 
conceptually distinct approaches that provide a useful set of categories to 
compare the cases by. Table 5-2 below provides a table of how the case 
studies have been allocated but each typology is explained in detail in the 
sections below. 
Table 5-2 - Overview of case studies by type of enabling support environment 
Centralised State 
Rural Water Supply 
Agency 
Decentralised Local 
Self-Government 
Hybrid (Public-
Donor/NGO/ Private 
Partnership) 
External Agency 
Typology 
1. Jharkhand 
4. Chhattisgarh 
5. Meghalaya 
6 Rajasthan 
15. Gujarat - 
Gandhinagar 
16. Gujarat - Kutch 
19. Maharashtra 
13. Kerala II 
17. Tamil Nadu I 
20. Sikkim 
2. Madhya Pradesh 
7 West Bengal 
9. Karnataka 
11. Punjab 
14. Kerala I 
10. Himachal 
Pradesh 
18. Tamil Nadu II 
3. Orissa 
8. Telangana 
12. Uttarakhand 
 
 
 
 110 
 
5.1.1 Centralised and decentralised government support 
This section focuses on the two government-supported enabling support 
environment typologies that include eleven of the case studies. It first focuses 
on the centralised SRWSAs which it will be argued have an institutional set-up 
that has its legacy in the supply-driven approach that the Government of India 
took prior to the Sector Reform Projects of the late 1990s (James, 2011). During 
that period the primary concern of government agencies was concentrating on 
expanding access to rural water services and this approach involved investing 
power in a centralised agency that had the primary function of infrastructure 
asset creation (James, 2004). The body that undertook such work was 
conventionally called a Public Health Engineering Department or ‘Water Board’ 
although a variety of names were used. In the centralised SRWSA case studies, 
this hardware-focused agency continues to be the primary provider of support to 
community management. This is both in the implementation stage of 
infrastructure asset creation but also in the on-going support during the service 
delivery phase, as shown in Figure 1 below. The centralisation of responsibility 
for CapEx is a common approach across an international context but the 
centralisation of on-going OpEx support is less common (Lockwood and Smits, 
2011). Yet in India the centralised SRWSA model is the most common 
government model reported on in this study although there are subtle 
differences between the seven case studies exhibiting this support.  
They can be divided into two broad groups which include the ‘standard’ SRWSA 
found generally in the poorer states and what is described as a ‘Reformed 
SRWSA’ that is shown in the two Gujarat case studies. The ‘standard’ SRWSAs 
reflect the hallmarks of what has been described, in the context of Indian 
sanitation policy, as the “technocratic governing machinery” of the Indian state 
which is “a hierarchical and technocratic bureaucracy that is well suited to send 
down technical designs and subsidies for physical infrastructure projects” 
(Hueso and Bell, 2013, p. 1013). As shown in Figure 5-1 and exhibited in the 
case studies from Jharkhand (Javorszky et al., 2015), Chhattisgarh (Javorszky 
et al., 2015) and Rajasthan (Harris et al., 2016b), the SRWSA develop 
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infrastructure and then provide support during this implementation period. For 
example, in Chhattisgarh, immediately following implementation the SRWSA 
operate the service for a transitional period of three to six months during which 
members of the community can shadow the agency’s staff and learn how to 
operate the water supply (Javorszky et al., 2015). On-going support involves 
periodic monitoring of water quality and functionality alongside sustained 
subsidy from the state to the VWSCs but the support remains largely focused 
on hardware and technical matters. The Rajsathan SRWSA case study follows 
the principles of the Swajaldhara policy (Government of India, 2003) whilst 
Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh reflect the NRWDP policy (Government of India, 
2013a) which has led to some subtle differences with regards to the village-level 
institutional arrangements for the community service providers which will be 
explained later in the chapter. However, the enabling support environments 
follow the same structure. 
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Figure 5-1 - Institutional Map of Centralised State Water Supply Agency Enabling 
Support Environment 
The Maharashtra case study exhibits traits of an outlier case as it follows a 
‘hierarchical and technocratic’ approach but is one of the richest states. This is 
partly shaped by the ‘developmental’ political economy of that state (Kohli, 
2012) but it can also be explained by the much more sophisticated technology 
that is being managed. As opposed to the single village scheme (SVS borehole) 
systems in the cases already discussed, in Maharashtra the case study focuses 
on a multi village scheme (MVS) for 156 villages and two small towns. Here, the 
SRWSA take on the role of direct service provider and the role of the 
community is to establish a VWSC for promoting compliance among the 
community for regular tariff payment. In this sense, the case study reflects 
hybrid forms of service delivery that includes characteristics of community 
management and standard utility-type approaches.  
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The other centralised government support is called the ‘Reformed SRWSA’ that 
come from the two Gujarati case studies but these are both focused on the 
same enabling support environment, called the Water and Sanitation 
Management Organisation (WASMO). WASMO was born out of a process of 
sector change in the early 2000s to exist alongside the Gujarati Water Supply 
and Sanitation Board with a mandate to support the community management of 
rural water services across the state (Chary Vedala et al., 2015a, 2015b). This 
led to the development of a state-level organisation that retained a centralised 
character operating alongside a conventional SRWSA but which integrated both 
technical support units with ‘Social Development Units’ that focused on 
providing specialist information, education and communication (IEC) services to 
communities to support community management (Chary Vedala et al., 2015a, 
2015b). This celebrated programme (Anekal et al., 2016; Das, 2014; James, 
2011) provides an example of how a centralised SRWSA can support a highly 
participatory model of community management when compared to the other 
SRWSA cases. The Government of India has attempted to adopt this design 
principle in the NRDWP through the promotion of Water Supply and Sanitation 
Organisations at the state level (Government of India, 2013a) but this research 
found little evidence that such organisations functioned in a meaningful way in 
any other SRWSA case study.  
The three case studies from Sikkim (Saraswathy, 2016b), Tamil Nadu Erode 
(Saraswathy, 2015) and Kerala Kodur (Chary Vedala et al., 2016b), on the other 
hand, are all considered to be forms of a decentralised LSG enabling support 
environments. Before describing these, it is important to clarify that the in the 
centralised SRWSA cases (and all other case studies) the LSG of the Gram 
Panchayat is prevalent and can play a role either in service provision or 
support. However, in these three cases the broader Panchayat Raj Institutions 
are the main support bodies during the service delivery phase and for this 
reason they are deemed to reflect a decentralised, rather than centralised, form 
of support system. This is reflected in Figure 5-2 below that shows although a 
SRWSA still leads the support during implementation through asset creation 
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and other tasks, the primary form of on-going support is channelled through the 
LSG system. This is considered to reflect the maturity of the 73rd constitutional 
amendment toward devolution within the rural water supply sector within these 
states.   
 
Figure 5-2 - Institutional map of decentralised local-self government 
Kerala is the standout example of a state that has implemented this devolution 
agenda (Desai, 2006) and this is reflected in its ranking as the most devolved 
state as per the Government of India Devolution Index (Government of India, 
2015c). The maturity and success of devolution in Kerala is considered to be 
linked to a number of advantages the state has over others in terms of 
decentralisation. Primarily, this includes a well-educated and politically engaged 
population (Kohli, 2012) but the structure of local administration also means the 
average Gram Panchayat in Kerala is approximately 50,000 people against a 
national average of 5,000. This unit of administration means that the ‘village-
level’ LSG units have greater economies of scale and capacity to undertake 
development works. In the case study from Mallappuram district, the Gram 
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Panchayat has a population of 45,000 people and it is this agency that operates 
as an enabling support environment to a series of beneficiary groups at the 
habitation level who formed Registered Societies to become community service 
providers. Implementation is still undertaken by a SRWSA, in the form of the 
Kerala Water Authority, but all on-going support is structured through the Gram 
Panchayat and broader LSG system.   
The other two decentralised LSG approaches have an extremely strong role for 
Gram Panchayats within the service provision tasks and so provide support 
directly to these institutions from the apparatus of the LSG system. In Tamil 
Nadu, which ranks sixth on the devolution index, this means that although the 
SRWSA – known as the Tamil Nadu Water and Drainage Board (TWAD Board) 
– takes on implementation work, the community service provider receives on-
going support primarily through the Block Development Officer of the 
Department of the Panchayat Raj and Rural Development (Hutchings, 2015; 
Saraswathy, 2015). Similarly, in Sikkim, which comes fourth on the devolution 
index, the Rural Management and Development Department focus on 
implementation whilst on-going service delivery and support are provided 
through the Panchayat Raj structures with the state institution for rural 
development delivering accredited training to Gram Panchayats to support 
community management of rural water services with some ongoing technical 
support to water quality management (Saraswathy, 2016b). Together, these 
decentralised case studies represent government programmes that have moved 
away from having a centralised SRWSA as the main on-going support agency 
toward a model where that function has become integrated in local government 
systems, a set-up that is more common in other low and lower middle income 
countries (Lockwood and Smits, 2011) 
5.1.2 Hybrid and external support 
Beyond the ‘pure’ government programmes, there are seven case studies with 
hybrid enabling support environments and three with external agency enabling 
support environments. The hybrid case studies include partnerships between 
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SRWSAs and other non-governmental organisations. In the case of West 
Bengal (Smits and Mekala, 2015) and Madhya Pradesh (Ramamohan Roa and 
Raviprakash, 2016a) this includes civil society NGOs who can be described as 
a ‘complementary partner’ helping to provide services in problematical areas 
where the standard government model has failed to deliver services. In Tamil 
Nadu Morappur, the hybrid model, also includes a public-private partnership 
with the private sector delivering and operating a MVS for villages alongside the 
decentralised LSG model described in the other Tamil Nadu case study 
(Hutchings, 2015). The final hybrid sub-model is public-donor partnerships with 
three World Bank supported programmes in Kerala Nenmeni (Saraswathy, 
2016a), Punjab (Harris et al., 2016a) and Karnataka (Ramamohan Roa and 
Raviprakash, 2016b) and one bilateral donor supported pilot programme in 
Himachal Pradesh (Harris et al., 2016c). The configuration of the enabling 
support environments for each sub-type is further outlined via Appendix B but 
for now this section focuses on describing the public-donor partnerships to 
outline the set-up of the hybrid model. 
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Figure 5-3 - Institutional set up of a hybrid (public-donor partnership) enabling 
support environment 
An ideal type institutional set-up for the public-donor partnership is presented in 
Figure 5-3. It shows that the conventional set-up found within World Bank 
programmes in India is to form a Project Unit within an existing SRWSA which 
will receive additional funding from the World Bank and have distinct operating 
rules to the broader SRWSA, usually including a stronger emphasis on software 
support and different cost sharing prescriptions following the principles of the 
‘demand-responsive approach’ to community management (Harris et al., 2016a; 
James, 2011; Saraswathy, 2016a). This was the case in the Jalanidhi 
programme, in Kerala, and Jal Nirmal programme, in Karnataka, however an 
issue with this approach is that there can be a lack of coordination or even 
conflict between the Project Unit and the broader SRWSA (Ramamohan Roa 
and Raviprakash, 2016a). The more recently implemented Punjab Rural Water 
Supply and Sanitation Project has avoided this issue through adopting a Sector 
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Wide Approach (SWAp) meaning that the SRWSA receives additional funding 
and capacity building from the World Bank but rolls out the support model 
across the state, rather than limiting it to a specific project office (Harris et al., 
2016a). Despite these differences, the important point in terms of support from 
the public-donor partnerships (and the hybrid enabling support environments 
more widely) is that the government agencies, usually the SRWSA, remain the 
dominant partners and are the primary agencies providing support on the 
ground but this support is shaped by conditions placed on the SRWSA by 
donors. The role of the donor is then to provide additional finance as well as 
capacity building to the SRWSA and then to closely monitor performance. 
The final typology of support is classified as external agency support and 
contains three cases whereby support is provided without the direct involvement 
of the Indian state (Chary Vedala et al., 2016a; Javorszky et al., 2016; Smits et 
al., 2016). This is a rare situation in India due to the strong role of the state in 
developmental activities and the traditional hostility between government and 
NGOs (Sen, 1999). However, where it exists, there can often be a tiered 
structure of NGO support as international or even national NGOs often operate 
through local NGOs, as shown in Figure 5-4. For example, in Uttarakhand this 
was the case with the Tata Foundation supported Himmotthan Water Supply 
and Sanitation Initiative which provided support through a local subsidiary 
known as the Himmotthan Hospital Trust. 
There are exceptions to this set up such as the Gram Vikas programme in the 
state of Odisha in which the NGO works directly at scale with thousands of 
villages (Javorszky et al., 2016). Either way, the NGO cases tend to provide 
support in relatively niche situations, such as small, remote Himalayan 
communities (Smits et al., 2016), fluoride affected areas (Chary Vedala et al., 
2016a) or areas dominated by the tribal castes that have traditionally been 
poorly provided for by the Indian state (Javorszky et al., 2016). In part due to 
this selective approach and smaller scale provision, the NGO support can often 
be much more tailored than the support provided through the government 
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systems. Such differences will now be further highlighted through a comparative 
analysis of these different enabling support environment typologies. 
 
Figure 5-4 - Institutional set up of an External Agency enabling support 
environment 
5.1.3 Characteristics of enabling support environments 
The research methodology has developed a number of indicators that can be 
used as a means for comparing and categorising the characteristics of these 
typologies. The critical indicator in terms of validating the level of success in 
rural water services is the service level outcomes and so this section starts by 
comparing the outcomes across the categories, with Figure 5-5 showing the 
results. A proportionally higher number of people in the government 
programmes achieve basic or above service levels on the composite service 
level indicator. The decentralised LSG cases achieve the highest score with 
67% of people receiving basic or above service levels whilst in the centralised 
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SRWSA the proportional of people reaches 63%. The hybrid and external 
agency categories, on the other hand, have slightly lower outcomes at 56% and 
54% respectively. This is partly explained by the inclusion within these groups 
of case studies from the most challenging contexts, such as the delta regions of 
West Bengal that have salinity in groundwater (Smits and Mekala, 2015) or the 
quality-affected areas of Madhya Pradesh (Ramamohan Roa and Raviprakash, 
2016a), which drag the average down. Overall, though, there are not large 
differences between the enabling support environment types in terms of service 
level outcomes. 
 
Figure 5-5 - Percentage of survey respondents achieving basic or above on the 
composite service level indicator by enabling support environment type 
(programme villages only: n = 1732) 
A key concept associated with the conventional community management 
approach (and rural water services more broadly) is participation (Harvey and 
Reed, 2006; Jones, 2011; Kleemeier, 2000; Marks and Davis, 2012). Measured 
Centralised 
SRWSA 
Decentralised LSG Hybrid Support External Support 
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in this research as the level of decision-making power communities have 
through the service delivery cycle, Table 5-3 below shows the median ranking 
for the ‘implementation’ and ‘service delivery’ stages across the categories. It 
shows some subtle differences across the cases with lower levels of 
participation in the centralised SRWSA cases compared to the decentralised 
LSG cases. However, the most significant difference is considered to be in the 
ranking at the service delivery phase. In the government programmes this is 
ranked as either functional or interactive whilst the hybrid and external 
typologies have a ranking of self-mobilisation. This is thought to reflect the 
Government of India moving away from the ideal that communities should be 
taking responsibility for service delivery and moving towards an on-going 
partnership approach, in the case of the decentralised LSG, or one in which 
government retains the majority of control, as is the case with the centralised 
SRWSAs. In comparison, the hybrid and external agency approaches tend to 
retain an ‘international character’ that reflects the conventional view that groups 
of private citizens in the form of a VWSC should take responsibility for service 
delivery tasks. These findings are considered to indicate a broader point about 
how community management has evolved in India to become increasingly 
embedded within the local government institutional framework. As will be further 
developed in Chapter Seven, this is considered to represent a shift towards the 
“institutionalised co-production” (Joshi and Moore, 2004) of rural water services. 
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Table 5-3 - Participation categorised ranking across the enabling support 
environment (mode) 
 Category Participation in Implementation  Participation in Service Delivery  
Centralised 
SRWSA 
3 (Functional Participation) – “The 
community is provided with a 
detailed implementation plan that 
they discuss and they have a 
chance to amend limited 
elements.” 
3 (Functional Participation) – “The 
community is provided with 
administration, management and 
operation and maintenance 
arrangements that they discuss and 
they have a chance to amend limited 
elements.” 
Decentralised 
LSG 
5 (Self mobilisation) – “The 
community practices self-supply 
and seeks to improve this, or have 
developed an implementation plan 
and seek external support.” 
4 (Interactive Participation) – “The 
community in partnership with the 
service provider and/or support entities 
engage in joint-decision making 
regarding appropriate arrangements for 
administration, management and 
operation and maintenance.” 
Hybrid 
4 (Interactive Participation) – “The 
community in partnership with the 
service provider and/or support 
entities engage in a joint-analysis 
of implementation options before 
developing a plan” 
5 (Self mobilisation) – “The community 
take responsibility for administration, 
management and operation and 
maintenance, either directly or by 
outsourcing these functions to external 
entities.” 
External 
Agency 
4 (Interactive Participation) - “The 
community in partnership with the 
service provider and/or support 
entities engage in a joint-analysis 
of implementation options before 
developing a plan.” 
5 (Self mobilisation) – “The community 
take responsibility for administration, 
management and operation and 
maintenance, either directly or by 
outsourcing these functions to external 
entities.” 
An important argument to improve outcomes within the community 
management plus paradigm is the need to drive the professionalisation of rural 
water services and move beyond an approach reliant on volunteerism and 
poorly trained individuals (Lockwood and Smits, 2011; Moriarty, Butterworth, 
Franceys, et al., 2013). As explained in the methods, the consolidated 
professionalisation indicator used to assess this was based on the mean score 
of Qualitative Information System data processing tools. In Table 5-4 the mean 
indicator data has been presented in raw form and re-categorised into the five-
point-scale that the QIS follows using basic rounding. It shows the level of 
professionalisation is categorised as high across all the enabling support 
environment categories, although the mean indicators that have the highest 
level are found in the hybrid and decentralised LSG cases.  
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Table 5-4 - Professionalisation indicator for enabling support environment and 
community service provider 
 Category 
Professionalisation of Enabling Support Environment 
Consolidated Indicator  
(out of 100) 
Categorisation 
Centralised SRWSA 63 High Professionalisation 
Decentralised LSG 75 High Professionalisation 
Hybrid 77 High Professionalisation 
External Agency 65 High Professionalisation 
The research also tried to characterise the relationship between the enabling 
support entities and the community service provider. For this purpose the 
partnering assessment tool was used, with Table 5-5 displaying the partnering 
type that was most strongly highlighted for each category of cases. For the 
external agency category the partnering type was highlighted as operational, 
reflecting that communities contribute labour and resources together with the 
enabling support entities. For example, in the case study from Odisha 
(Javorszky et al., 2016), it is common for the VWSCs to organise community 
members to contribute labour to the construction of new schemes, which are 
managed by the NGO Gram Vikas. The difference in partnering types across 
the other categories reflects the transactional approaches taken to structure 
relationships in the centralised SRWSA and hybrid approaches. This reflects 
‘low’ levels of partnering in which there is a distinct division between 
organisational responsibilities and not much joint working, but is considered 
appropriate for scaled programmes covering many hundreds of villages. The 
decentralised LSG cases are ranked as having a collaborative partnering 
typology in which the enabling support environment and community service 
provider share responsibility and take joint decisions regarding service delivery. 
This is considered to reflect the greater capacity that the community service 
providers have in the decentralised case studies. 
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Table 5-5 - Partnering assessment between enabling support environment and 
community service provider 
 Category Dominant Partnering Mode in Service Delivery 
Centralised 
SRWSA 
Transactional – The ESE and CSP fulfil different elements of the 
administration, management, and operation and maintenance functions 
as per negotiated arrangements. 
Decentralised LSG 
Collaborative – ESE and CSP share responsibility for decisions 
regarding 
administration, management and operation and maintenance. 
Hybrid 
Transactional – The ESE and CSP fulfil different elements of the 
administration, management, and operation and maintenance functions 
as per negotiated arrangements. 
External Agency 
Operational – ESE and CSP work together contributing labour and/or 
resources to support administration, management, operation and 
maintenance. 
The final research processing tool which was used to assess organisational 
elements of the case studies was the adapted Institutional Assessment Tool 
(Cullivan et al., 1988). For the purpose of the synthesis, Table 5-6 presents the 
organisational area which was ranked as the strongest and weakest for each 
category of enabling support environment. It shows that the centralised SRWSA 
are ranked as having strong technical capability but weak organisational culture. 
This is considered to reflect the “hierarchical and technocratic bureaucracy” 
described by Hueso and Bell (2013, p. 1013) that is designed to deliver physical 
infrastructure but has an organisational culture that is too static and rigid to 
adapt to providing broader support functions as the sector has changed.  
The decentralised LSG category comes out as scoring well on leadership, 
which is a characteristic associated with successful organisational performance 
across numerous sectors (Lieberson and O’Connor, 1972). The lowest ranked 
trait is autonomy which again is considered to be reflective of organisations 
embedded within the inflexible bureaucracy of the Indian state. Whilst 
potentially framed as a criticism it is noted that bureaucratic process can be a 
very powerful force for promoting standardisation (and therefore consistency) 
for enabling support entities that can have responsibility for many tens of 
millions of people, which is often the case in India. Finally, the external agencies 
have strong organisational culture reflecting the socially-orientated character of 
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many NGOs, but are limited in terms of technical capability, often as they focus 
on software elements rather than hardware.  
Table 5-6 - Institutional assessment outcomes 
 Category Strongest Organisational Area Weakest Organisational Area 
Centralised 
SRWSA 
Technical Capability - is the measure 
of the institution's competence in 
conducting the technical work 
required to carry out the 
responsibilities of the institution. 
Organisational Culture - is the set of 
values and norms which inform and 
guide everyday actions. The culture 
forms a pattern of shared beliefs and 
assumptions which translate into 
behaviour which can be observed. 
Decentralised 
LSG 
Leadership - is the ability to inspire 
others to understand the institution's 
mission, to commit themselves to that 
mission, and to work toward its 
fulfilment. 
Organisational Autonomy - is the 
institution's degree of independence 
from the national government or other 
governmental or regulatory bodies. 
While not unrestrained, this 
independence must exist to the extent 
that the institution is able to conduct 
its affairs and meet its responsibilities 
in an effective manner with minimum 
interference and controls by other 
entities. 
Hybrid 
Partnership 
Technical Capability- is the measure 
of the institution's competence in 
conducting the technical work 
required to carry out the 
responsibilities of the institution 
Leadership - is the ability to inspire 
others to understand the institution's 
mission, to commit themselves to that 
mission, and to work toward its 
fulfilment. 
External 
Agency 
Organisational Culture - is the set of 
values and norms which inform and 
guide everyday actions. The culture 
forms a pattern of shared beliefs and 
assumptions which translate into 
behaviour which can be observed 
Technical Capability - is the measure 
of the institution's competence in 
conducting the technical work 
required to carry out the 
responsibilities of the institution 
The various organisational-based assessment tools help distinguish between 
the characteristics of different enabling support environment types. Recognising 
the possible fallibility of specific tools, it is when triangulating these types of 
results together that it is possible to identify patterns across the different types 
of support. Focusing on the government support approaches, many of the 
measures support a more positive picture of the decentralised LSG model 
compared to the centralised SRWSA. It has a ‘collaborative’ partnership 
approach between entities that both rank in the ‘high professionalisation’ 
category, with higher levels of community participation and ultimately better 
overall service level outcomes. The research cannot say conclusively whether 
one of these aspects has a causal link to the other but, it is argued, these types 
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of processes are likely to be synergistic creating positive feedback loops 
between different elements to deliver better overall outcomes. It should be 
noted that the decentralised LSG cases tend to be found in richer states with 
better governance capacity and in this sense are likely to reflect the broad 
capacity to deliver services effectively that appears to comes with greater 
wealth and development (Hutchings et al., 2015). The WASMO case studies 
from the wealthy state of Gujarat also support this hypothesis as, although they 
follow a centralised approach, they have adopted what has been described as a 
reformed SRWSA approach and have better outcomes across the various 
organisational-based assessment tools as well as service levels, compared to 
the poor states following a centralised model. 
Further developing the institutional analysis, this section ends by considering 
the financial differences between the enabling support environment typologies. 
As will be examined in greater detail during the following chapter, there is a high 
degree of variability between case studies in terms of financial costs. This is 
reflected in Table 5.7 that shows the interquartile range for total CapEx and 
recurrent costs (OpEx, OpEx Enabling Support and CapManEx) by the enabling 
support environment types. With the ranges overlapping for CapEX across all 
categories there are no clear conclusion to draw from the table in terms of the 
level of total implementation-related investment across the typologies. This 
suggests that the enabling support environment categories do not tend towards 
different levels of costs and, as examined in the next chapter, that other factors 
are more important in terms of differentiating CapEx. 
Table 5-7 Enabling support environment typology overall costs 
Enabling Support 
Environment Type 
CapEx Recurrent 
LIQR UIQR LIQR UIQR 
SRWSA $85 $208 $6 $11 
Local Self Government $128 $251 $28 $73 
Hybrid $166 $342 $10 $46 
External Agency $38 $279 $2 $16 
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For recurrent costs, however, the interquartile range for the local self-
government supported case studies shows higher levels of recurrent investment 
than the other cases. The lower quartile for OpEx in that category is higher than 
the upper quartile reported for SRWSA and external agency cases, indicating 
different investment patterns between these enabling support environment 
types. The hybrid-supported cases fall in-between with higher levels of recurrent 
investment than the SRWSA and external agency but lower levels than the local 
self-government. In Chapter Two, it was argued that recurrent financing was an 
area of underinvestment in the rural water sector (Burr and Fonseca, 2013; 
Franceys et al., 2016). The data presented in Table 5.7 indicates that the local 
self-government case studies receive the highest level of recurrent expenditure 
on average. In the following chapter further evidence is presented on how these 
costs, and others, are split between the support entities themselves and the 
community helping to provide clarity of the issue of cost sharing found in 
successful cases from India.  
In summary, this section has highlighted a number of trends in the 
organisational arrangements for community management in India. It has shown 
a difference in the pattern of emphasis between programmes which are 
considered to be domestically-driven (i.e. Government of India) and those which 
are more internationally-driven (i.e. hybrid and external agency). It has been 
argued that this is leading to a split between programmes that retain a 
conventional community management approach and a shift to the institutional 
co-production (Joshi and Moore, 2004) of rural water services. The following 
section will develop these ideas by focusing on a review of the community 
service provider arrangements found across the case studies. 
5.2 Community service providers 
This section advances the analysis of organisational arrangements to focus on 
the community service provider level. Again, the intention here is to provide a 
synthesis on the types and characteristics of the community service providers 
across the case studies. There are considered to be two main types of service 
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provider found across the case studies that can be classified as ‘community 
management through local self-government’ and ‘community management 
through societies’. Across the classifications the entities that take on the service 
delivery tasks are most commonly referred to as Village Water and Sanitation 
Committees (VWSCs) and, although there are some variations, VWSC will be 
used to describe such a body in all circumstances. As will be explained there is 
a division within each classification regarding the status of the VWSCs. There is 
a split between what are described as ‘VWSCs as autonomous sub-committees 
of the local self-government’ and ‘VWSCs as representative sub-committees of 
the local self-government’ and then a distinction between ‘VWSCs as registered 
societies’ and ‘VWSCs as unregistered societies’. Table 5-8 shows the 
allocation of cases and then each typology is described below. 
Table 5-8 - Overview of case studies by type of enabling support environment 
VWSCs as 
registered 
societies  
VWSCs as 
unregistered 
societies 
VWSCs as 
autonomous sub-
committees of the 
local self-
government 
VWSCs as 
representative 
sub-committees of 
the local self-
government 
3. Orissa 
8. Telangana 
12. Uttarakhand 
11. Punjab 
13. Kerala I 
14. Kerala II 
15. Gujarat - 
Gandhinagar 
16. Gujarat - Kutch 
 
2. Madhya Pradesh 
7 West Bengal 
10. Himachal 
Pradesh 
 
6 Rajasthan 
 
1. Jharkhand 
4. Chhattisgarh 
5. Meghalaya 
9. Karnataka 
17. Tamil Nadu I 
18. Tamil Nadu II 
19. Maharashtra 
20. Sikkim 
 
5.2.1 Community management through societies 
The community management through societies approach is presented first, as 
this approach is most reflective of conventional ideas outlined in the initial 
community management paradigm. There are two cases that will be used to 
illustrate this which come from different ends of the technical spectrum. Case 
study Kerala I from Mallappuram district is an example of a Registered Society 
managing a SVS piped water supply scheme from a surface water source. The 
other case study discussed is from West Bengal case study that involves an 
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Unregistered Society managing handpumps. First it is useful to explain the 
importance of the Indian Societies Registration Act which is a piece of 
legislation from the colonial era, administered by the Ministry of Corporate 
Affairs (Government of India, 1860). All charitable bodies (as well as scientific 
and literary societies) should be registered under the act which means notifying 
the state of at least seven Board members and the agreed upon rules and 
regulations of the society. A Registered Society can then open a bank account 
and have official (i.e. contractual) agreements with government entities. They 
retain, however, independence from government as they are a distinct 
organisational body. VWSCs that are not the sub-committee of the Gram 
Panchayat should be registered under this model. 
The described principles can be seen in the Kerala I case study (and six other 
cases outlined in Table 8 above). In the Kerala example, VWSCs are formed at 
the habitation level by community members to take on the management of rural 
water services. The VWSCs are Registered Societies so have an independent 
bank account and an established set of rules and regulations for managing the 
service. The relationship with the local self-government is arranged through a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that sets out the division of responsibility 
between the VWSCs and the local self-government. In Kerala, the Registered 
Society is supported by an enabling support environment that was classified as 
a form of decentralised local self-government support in the section above. This 
situation emerged partly due to the larger administrative boundaries found in 
Kerala, which makes the Gram Panchayats at a scale whereby they can provide 
support to a number of different VWSCs, rather than being at the scale of a 
single VWSC.  
The case studies also contain examples of Unregistered Societies and in such 
situations the broad institutional model of relationships is similar to the 
Registered Society approach. The case study from West Bengal, for example, 
is of VWSCs that are established to manage single hand pump installations. 
The professionalisation of these VWSCs is comparatively very low compared to 
other cases and they follow a reactive approach to repairs by collecting money 
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as need arises and hence do not require a bank account and registered status 
(Smits and Mekala, 2015). Again, the Gram Panchayat is part of the enabling 
support environment rather than the service provider and it receives support 
from a complex of NGOs and private pump mechanics to aid it with these tasks. 
This type of Unregistered Society is rare in India and is only found in this 
research in three cases where NGOs or donors have operated (Himachal 
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal). 
Either way, the institutional architecture of community management through 
societies is outlined in Figure 5-6. This shows that the set-up follows the 
classical ideas for public service delivery set-up by the accountability triangle 
(World Bank, 2004). This means there is independence between the service 
provider and the oversight functions within the system. As illustrated in the 
diagram this means there are two routes for users to hold the service provider 
to account, which are described as ‘route of local service responsiveness’ in 
which community members can go directly to the Registered Society if there is 
a problem and the ‘route of local service oversight’ in which the users can go to 
the local self-government who have the power to effectively revoke the right of 
the Registered Society to continue their role of service provider. In this way and 
under this set-up, the village-level local self-government is part of the enabling 
support environment rather than service provider. 
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Figure 5-6 – Formal routes of accountability in the ‘community management 
through societies’ model 
5.2.2 Community management through local self-government 
Although some form of registered or un-registered society was the service 
provider in twelve of the cases, the Constitution of India mandates that rural 
water services are the responsibility of the local self-government of the Gram 
Panchayat (Constitution of India, 1950). Under the Swajaldhara (Government of 
India, 2003) and later NRDWP (Government of India, 2013a) policy 
programmes, the turn to community management sought to reconcile this 
promotion of private citizens taking on the role of service provision with this 
constitutional requirement for local self-government playing a role, through 
requiring VWSCs to be established as sub-committees of the local self-
government. This means a common model for community management within 
government programmes is one in which the VWSC is embedded within the 
broader institutional architecture of the local self-government system of the 
Panchayat Raj. However, this research has indicated that there has been a shift 
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in the more recent NRDWP (Government of India, 2013a) between the extent to 
which VWSCs operate as an autonomous body of the broader local self-
government, to a situation in which the local self-government becomes the 
direct service provider and the VWSC plays a representative role. This has led 
to the development of two sub-categories: the ‘autonomous VWSC’ and 
‘representative VWSC’. 
Having an autonomous VWSC, which is not a Registered Society as described 
in the previous section, is limited to just one case but is labelled as a sub-
category to help illustrate the change in the government approach between its 
two most recent policy programmes. The Rajasthani case study was part of the 
Swajaldhara (Government of India, 2003) programme under which the VWSC 
remains a sub-committee of the Gram Panchayat but operates largely in an 
independent manner, having a clear division of responsibility between the 
VWSC and broader Gram Panchayat. This partly reflects the greater emphasis 
the Swajaldhara placed on establishing and training VWSCs as a condition for 
receiving government support. However, as the report on the Rajasthan case 
study makes clear (Harris et al., 2016b), the VWSCs in this case can be more 
accurately described as isolated rather than autonomous. The policy design is 
considered to reflect the greater international influence on the ideas of 
community management that were incorporated into the first nation-wide 
community management programme, compared to the later NRDWP.  
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Figure 5-7 - Formal routes of accountability in the ‘community management 
through local self-government’ model 
What is described as the representative VWSC model is now more common 
across the government case studies with this model found in Chhattisgarh, 
Jharkhand, Meghalaya, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Sikkim. In these 
examples, VWSCs are formed but the effective operation of the committees is 
completely dependent on the Gram Panchayat of the local self-government. 
With the VWSCs mandated to make key members of the committees the most 
powerful figures from the local self-government it means the everyday operation 
of the systems are controlled by the Gram Panchayat office. This is considered 
to bring both benefits and dangers. It means that the institutional resilience of 
the system is much stronger as the local self-government is a permanent 
organisation that is financially supported through the broader taxation system. 
However, it does provide dangers regarding the conventional ideas about the 
local lines of accountability for this public service. 
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As indicated when comparing Figure 5-6 and Figure 5-7, having the VWSC as 
the sub-committee of local government means that that the service provision 
and oversight tasks become integrated into the same institution. At a single 
village level there is not the organisational capacity to have an executive 
division of the government providing services and a legislative/regulatory 
branch that holds the executive to account. This means it could be argued this 
set-up is less accountable to the users as it removes the principle of an 
independent service provider. This is intentional, however, as according to 
officials in various interviews and meetings conducted as part of this research, 
the primary purpose of this institutional design is to simplify the overall 
governance system and reduce the number of different bodies that operate at 
the village level. So the idea goes, concentrating power in the Gram Panchayat 
reduces the potential for conflict between opposing leaders and/or bodies with 
villages, which has been a barrier to development activities in India due to the 
‘vibrancy’ of local democracy. 
5.2.3 Characteristics of the community service provider types 
This section now compares the characteristics of the community service 
provider arrangements starting with service level outcomes. What it shows is 
that, contrary to the paradigmatic claims about the importance of the enabling 
support environment, it is the type of community service provider arrangements 
that shows the biggest differences between sub-groups. There is a group of 
cases that are clearly more successful in terms of service levels, which are 
those where the service provider is a Registered Society, where 80% of the 
population receive services meeting all the government norms. The next best 
performing category is the Representative VWSC model, which is considered 
the ‘standard’ Government of India approach to community management 
following the NRDWP. Here, over half the people receive services meeting all 
government norms and the median service level is basic. The Unregistered 
Society and Autonomous VWSC categories are much rarer across the study 
and have the worst outcomes from any type of service provider arrangements.  
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Figure 5-8 - Percentage of survey respondents achieving basic or above on the 
composite service level indicator by community service provider type 
(programme villages only: n = 1732) 
The indicator for the professionalisation of service provision tasks follows a 
similar pattern to the service level outcomes, as shown in Table 5-9. This 
indicates that professionalisation of service provision could be an important 
factor in whether services are successful. The requirements around registration 
under the Societies Act and also the requirements for representative VWSCs as 
sub-committees of the local self-government, are considered to at least be 
aligned, if not helping to drive, the higher professionalisation in these groups. 
The Unregistered Societies are by definition going to score lower on the 
professionalisation indicator that reflects partly the formal mandate that the 
entity has to deliver services. It is hard to draw too many conclusions about the 
autonomous VWSC model as it is only reflecting one case study from the older 
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Swajaldhara programme. The differences in participation are more subtle and 
harder to interpret, but they do not appear to be as critical to service level 
outcomes as professionalisation at this level.   
Table 5-9 - Participation and professionalisation of community service provision 
types 
Type of 
Community 
Service 
Provider 
Participation 
 
Professionalisation 
CapEx OpEx Score Categorisation 
Registered 
Society 
5. Self-mobilisation - 
“The community 
practices self-supply 
and seeks to 
improve this, or have 
developed an 
implementation plan 
and seek external 
support.” 
4 (Interactive Participation) 
– “The community in 
partnership with the service 
provider and/or support 
entities engage in joint-
decision making regarding 
appropriate arrangements 
for administration, 
management and operation 
and maintenance.” 
73 
High 
Professionalisation 
Unregistered 
Society 
4. Interactive - “The 
community in 
partnership with the 
service provider 
and/or support 
entities engage in a 
joint-analysis of 
implementation 
options before 
developing a plan” 
4 (Interactive Participation) 
– “The community in 
partnership with the service 
provider and/or support 
entities engage in joint-
decision making regarding 
appropriate arrangements 
for administration, 
management and operation 
and maintenance.” 
48 
Medium 
Professionalisation 
Autonomous 
VWSC 
3. Functional – “The 
community is 
provided with a 
detailed 
implementation plan 
that they discuss and 
they have a chance 
to amend limited 
elements.” 
3. Functional – “The 
community is provided with 
administration, 
management and operation 
and maintenance 
arrangements that they 
discuss and they have a 
chance to amend limited 
elements.”  
33 
Low 
Professionalisation 
Representative 
VWSC 
4. Interactive- “The 
community in 
partnership with the 
service provider 
and/or support 
entities engage in a 
joint-analysis of 
implementation 
options before 
developing a plan” 
4 (Interactive Participation) 
– “The community in 
partnership with the service 
provider and/or support 
entities engage in joint-
decision making regarding 
appropriate arrangements 
for administration, 
management and operation 
and maintenance.” 
61 
Medium 
Professionalisation 
 
The data at the community service provider level indicates that differences at 
this level appear to have a greater impact on service level outcomes than the 
 137 
 
type of enabling support environment. Recognising that the researcher does not 
believe, nor is trying to test, that there is some specific causal element for 
successful community management these findings are nonetheless relevant to 
answering the research questions about what type of organisational 
arrangements deliver successful rural water services. In terms of charateristics, 
the data suggests that the professionalisation of service providers is associated 
with higher levels of success, whilst in terms of organisation types, it indicates 
that having a Registered Society model of community management is the most 
effective model. Overall this is considered to provide important data on the 
importance of the community service provider as compared to the enabling 
support environment, which can be considered to at least partly contradict one 
of the hypotheses that underpin the community management plus paradigm. 
As was completed above for the enabling support environment categories, the 
broad levels of financing reported across the community service provider 
typologies is presented here. Table 5-10 shows that there is again significant 
variability in the CapEx costs in the categories apart from the single case study 
category of the autonomous VWSC. The Registered Society case studies have 
markedly higher CapEx, with a lower quartile starting at $176 per person. With 
this category also enjoying the standout results in terms of service levels, the 
data could indicate a relationship between higher overall CapEx costs and 
service levels outcomes. Such relationships are considered in the following 
Chapter Six, Section 6.8., that examines the correlations between service level 
outcomes and financing levels. For recurrent costs there is again some overlap 
between the interquartile ranges for all the community service provider 
categories, however the upper quartile for the Unregistered Society and the 
single data point for the Autonomous VWSCs are markedly lower than the other 
two categories. This indicates that higher ranges of recurrent investment were 
found in the Registered Society and Representative VWSC models, which also 
had the most successful outcomes in terms of service levels. 
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Table 5-10 Community service provider types overall costs 
Community Service 
Provider Types 
CapEx Recurrent 
LIQR UIQR LIQR UIQR 
Registered Society $176 $263 $8 $31 
Unregistered Society $38 $342 $2 $10 
Representative VWSC $99 $266 $6 $37 
Autonomous VWSC $93 $93 $11 $11 
This section now ends by briefly showing how these classifications match 
across the analytical levels, with an overview given in Table 5-11. It shows that 
within this study there is great diversity of potential organisational set-ups and 
that even within a specific category of enabling support environment there are 
different community service provider set-ups depending on the case study. This 
shows that there is adaptability within enabling support environments in terms of 
the type of service providers they can support. Saying this, there are also some 
broad patterns of institutional matching which can be highlighted. The concept 
of an autonomous VWSC sub-committee of the local self-government is a 
limited model for service provision which can be described as a legacy of a 
previous policy programme so it not relevant in this discussion. The 
Representative VWSC approach, however, is the most common model for 
government-run enabling support environments types. It can be described as 
the standard model in India that reflects the nexus of the local self-government 
and VWSCs at the community service provider level. However, this analysis 
shows it can be supported by either a centralised agency in the form of a 
SRWSA, within the decentralised local self-government model or the hybrid 
approach.  
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Table 5-11 - Matching of organisational arrangements across the case studies 
Type of 
Community 
Service 
Provider 
Autonomous 
VWSC 
Representative 
VWSC 
Registered 
Society 
Unregistered 
society 
Centralised 
SRWSA 
6. Rajasthan 
1. Jharkhand, 
4. Chhattisgarh 
5. Meghalaya 19. 
Maharashtra 
15. Gujarat I 
16. Gujarat II 
X 
Decentralised 
LSG 
X 
17. Tamil Nadu I 
20. Sikkim II 
14. Kerala II X 
Hybrid X 
18. Tamil Nadu II 
9. Karnataka 
11. Punjab 
13. Kerala 
2. Madhya 
Pradesh 
7.  West Bengal 
10. Himahcal 
Pradesh 
External 
Agency 
X X 
3. Orissa 
7. Telangana 
12. Uttarakhand 
X 
 
The external agency led enabling support environments operate beyond the 
local self-government system and therefore representative VWSCs are not 
found within this approach. Registered Societies are even more adaptable and 
are found across the four support models. As this is the highest-performing 
service provider form, it is encouraging that it can be adapted to each of the 
support environments. Within this model, the local self-government can remain 
involved with rural water services but it moves to becoming part of the (local) 
enabling support environment rather than as a sub-component of the 
community service provider. In contrast, the Unregistered Societies are only 
found in the hybrid enabling support environments cases where NGOs or 
donors are part of the support environment. In Madhya Pradesh and West 
Bengal NGOs have worked to establish management committees at sub-village 
level with this smaller scale considered to lend itself to the unregistered VWSC 
models. Similarly the scale of management in Himachal Pradesh is also at the 
sub-administrative village level and hence is considered to play a role in this 
informality. Overall this section has compared the performance of the different 
community service provider arrangements and has considered how they match 
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the enabling support environment types showing that there is much diversity in 
the patterns of institutional matching. 
5.3 Chapter conclusions and contributions 
This chapter has shown that the research has covered a variety of different 
organisational arrangements for community management in India. This is 
considered to reflect the effective decentralisation of rural water services from 
the federal government to the state level, whilst the diversity between states can 
be partly explained by the varied level of intra-state decentralisation. Two major 
typologies of government enabling support environments were identified: the 
centralised SRWSA and the decentralised LSG models. The centralised model, 
the most common approach, was linked to the on-going legacy of supply-driven 
rural water services whilst the decentralised local self-government approach 
was reflective of the effective maturity of the devolution processes in Kerala, 
Tamil Nadu and Sikkim, where the on-going support for service delivery has 
been transferred from the SRWSA to the local self-government institutions. 
Even among the hybrid approaches the strong role of the SRWSA and local 
self-governments was stressed.  
Recognising that the cases were purposively selected, and are not therefore 
representative of all rural water services across India, the prevalence of 
government support across the case studies is still considered to show the 
strong role of the state in rural water services in India, and thus the 
comparatively weaker role of civil society and the private sector. This is of 
relevance when considering the historical development of the community 
management model around the world which emerged in part due to NGOs and 
donors attempting to bypass failing (local) governments (Harvey and Reed, 
2006; Moriarty, Butterworth, Franceys, et al., 2013). The situation documented 
in India is completely distinct from this idea of community management as a 
way to bypass government. Rather the case studies here show that government 
– in its different forms – is the primary agent supporting community 
management. Building on this theme, at the community service provider level, 
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this chapter has highlighted the overlap and tension between the concept of 
community management as a form of autonomous – effectively private – 
management of water services by citizens and what could be described as the 
“institutionalised co-production” of services (Joshi and Moore, 2004) between 
the state and community. The implication of this tight intersection between 
government and community is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Seven. 
Yet whilst recognising these developments in India, this chapter has also 
provided important findings that can be considered, at least partly, to contradict 
one of the core research hypotheses underpinning the community management 
plus movement. That is, the type and characteristics of the community service 
provider are more closely linked to success than the type of enabling support 
environment. It is accepted that the research has not provided any causal 
analysis and as will be shown in the next chapter, various factors relate to 
successful outcomes. However, the finding echoes the results from the 
systematic review of successful community management around the world, 
which indicated that community-level aspects appear to be at least as equally 
as important as external support activities (Hutchings et al., 2015). The lesson 
here is that whilst external support may be important, programme managers 
and other stakeholders must work hard to establish the most appropriate 
service provider arrangements within villages.  
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6 THE COST OF GOOD COMMUNITY MANAGED RURAL 
WATER SERVICES IN INDIA 
This chapter progresses the thesis to consider the service level and financial cost 
data. It is designed to verify the level of success found across the case studies, as 
measured through the household surveying, and to interrogate how much it costs to 
deliver the types and levels of service found. The chapter provides a contribution to 
the literature on the financial sustainability of rural water services (Burr and Fonseca, 
2013; Hutton and Varughese, 2016; Mcintyre et al., 2014) by providing guidance on 
the levels of investment found in successful community management programmes in 
India. 
Structurally, it first focuses on the service levels across the cases to provide a 
descriptive analysis of outcomes at the whole sample level before focusing on 
individual cases and groups of cases. This is followed by the financial analysis that 
follows a similar pattern of moving from the whole sample to case-by-case data 
before analysis by different sub-groupings of cases. The chapter ends by bringing 
these two elements together to consider whether it is possible to identify patterns of 
financial costing arrangements that are associated with certain service level 
outcomes.  
As with the previous chapter, an overview of key results is presented overleaf in 
Table 6-1 to provide a reference point for readers to use alongside the summaries 
via Appendix B. 
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Table 6-1 – Summary of key service level and finaincial findings by case study 
Case State Service Level 
(median) 
% of population 
reaching basic or 
above service level 
Capital 
Expenditure 
(CapEx) 
% Support 
Contribution to 
CapEx 
Annual 
Recurrent 
Costs 
% Support 
Contribution to 
Recurrent 
1 Jharkhand Sub Standard 31% $208 100% $6 71% 
2 Madhya Pradesh No Service 35% $166 100% $10 3% 
3 Odisha High 69% $169 82% $4 10% 
4 Chhattisgarh Basic 55% $112 100% $3 26% 
5 Meghalaya Sub Standard 45% $85 95% $6 61% 
6 Rajasthan Sub Standard 19% $93 89% $11 15% 
7 West Bengal No Service 0% $38 98% $2 77% 
8 Telangana Improved 87% $279 88% $16 59% 
9 Karnataka Sub Standard 37% $282 95% $12 4% 
10 Himachal Pradesh High 65% $342 97% $6 3% 
11 Punjab High 98% $247 94% $50 46% 
12 Uttarakhand No Service 0% $536 91% $13 54% 
13 Kerala I – World Bank High 100% $184 83% $30 52% 
14 Kerala II – Local self-
government 
High 94% $221 97% $32 30% 
15 Gujarat – WASMO Gandhinagar Improved 87% $73 92% $6 73% 
16 Gujarat – WASMO Kutch High 98% $196 91% $9 52% 
17 Tamil Nadu – Local self-
government 
Improved 63% $128 90% $28 75% 
18 Tamil Nadu – Public-Private 
Hybrid 
Improved 53% $17 91% $46 72% 
19 Maharashtra Improved 94% $1,019 100% $13 53% 
20 Sikkim Sub Standard 45% $251 98% $73 94% 
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6.1 Service levels across the sample 
The analysis of service levels begins by presenting an overview of the composite 
service level indicator for both programme and control villages across the entire 
sample. Although the data distribution shares a similar U-shape, as shown in Figures 
6-1 and 6-2, there is a clear difference in the skewness of the data, with 
proportionally over twice as many households in the programme villages receiving 
high service levels as compared to the control villages. Based on the research 
methodology’s definition of success, as measured by the composite service level 
indicator, and the use of median as the appropriate central tendency measure for 
ordinal data, this difference in skewness is reflected in the median service level in 
programme villages being ‘improved’ (4) compared to ‘sub-standard’ (2) in the 
control villages. The Mann Whitney Test confirms the difference in medians as 
statistically significant at the 0.00 level, as shown in Table 6-2. This verifies that at 
the whole sample level the study compared more successful service delivery in the 
programme villages than in the control villages. 
Table 6-2 - Descriptive statistics for composite service level (programme v control; 
whole sample) 
Village type Median Mean N Std. 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skewness Mann Whitney U-Test 
Comparing Medians 
Programme 
Village(s) 
4.00
12
 3.17 1684 1.543 -1.527 -.217 Reject the null 
hypothesis (the samples 
are statistically different 
at the 0.00 significance 
level - test statistic 
358.192) 
Control 
Village(s) 
2.00 2.54 554 1.493 -1.436 .367 
Total 3.00 3.02 2238 1.554 -1.583 -.071 
However, even for programme villages, over 40% of the sample report having water 
services that score ‘sub-standard’ or ‘no service’ with regards to the composite 
indicator. This indicates that within these purposively selected high performance 
programmes there are still a significant minority of the population receiving 
inadequate services. In the WASHCost research it was reported that the ‘majority’ of 
                                            
12
 (1 = no service, 2 = sub-standard, 3 = basic, 4 = improved and 5 = high) 
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people with improved-water sources do not receive a ‘basic’ service level (Burr and 
Fonseca, 2013). Here, the results are at least reversed in that the majority of 
households (54%) in programme villages do achieve ‘basic’ or above service levels. 
However, the research can be considered to confirm a pattern of results found in 
other studies – that the improved-water source access figures can mask variable 
service levels in rural water service programmes (Clasen, 2012; Godfrey et al., 
2011).  
 
Figure 6-1 - Consolidated Service Level Indicator (programme villages) 
No Service Sub-Standard Basic Improved High 
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Figure 6-2  - Consolidated Service Level Indicator (Control villages) 
Moving onto an analysis of the disaggregate service level it is helpful to understand 
which of the service level parameters are having the most influence on the 
composite indicator. In total, across the whole sample 1,019 (31%) respondents 
failed on at least one parameter meaning that due to the nominal logic of the 
composite indicator they were labelled as sub-standard or no service. Of those 
failures, 573 failed on just one indicator, 319 failed on two indicators whilst the rest 
failed on three or more indicators. Table 6-3 illustrates there is greatest variability in 
the parameter for quantity, compared to accessibility, perceived quality, reliability 
and continuity. The distribution of the data is split for quantity with a median measure 
of ‘high’ (5) across the sample but the highest standard deviation of any measure.  
This is reflected in the number of households failing on that measure with this 
coming out at 676 (30% of the sample). Accessibility is the next measure that is most 
likely to be reported as failing to meet the service level (16%) followed by reliability 
No Service Sub-Standard Basic Improved High 
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and continuity at 11%. Only 3% of respondents reported unacceptable quality but as 
explained in the methods this is only a measure of perceived quality so has to be 
treated with caution. The disaggregated service level data therefore shows that a 
focus on increasing the quantity of water supplied will have the biggest impact in 
terms of moving populations up the service level ladder from ‘no service’ or ‘sub-
standard’ to ‘basic’ or above. Evidence indicates that having a water-source in or 
close to the home increases the quantity of water people consume (Howard and 
Bartram, 2013) and so, in this sense, the Government of India drive for household 
connections is well focused in terms of improving service level outcomes 
(Government of India, 2013a). 
Table 6-3- Descriptive statistics on the disaggregated service level indicators 
 Quantity Accessibility Quality Reliability Continuity 
(piped only) 
N Valid 2244 2207 2286 2167 1809 
Missing 74 111 32 151 509 
Mean 3.61 4.27 4.68 4.49 3.70 
Median 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 3.00 
Std. Deviation 1.607 1.380 .792 1.101 1.102 
Skewness -.575 -1.541 -2.218 -2.203 .130 
Kurtosis -1.334 .676 3.356 3.543 -1.542 
Number of 
household failing 
on this parameter 
676 355 69 239 195 
Percentage of 
households failing 
on this parameter 
30% 16% 3% 11% 11% 
Shifting the focus to the case-by-case service level data, the analysis shows that 13 
of the cases studies have a median measure of ‘basic’, ‘improved’ or ‘high’ on the 
composite indicator in programme villages. The services delivered in these cases 
therefore, on average, meet or exceed the standards for all the individual service 
level parameters. From these, there are six case studies that have a median service 
level of ‘high’, giving a sub-group of what can be considered very successful service 
level outcomes. In the middle there are seven that achieve the ‘basic’ or ‘improved’ 
level, whilst seven of the case studies have medians that come at either ‘sub-
standard’ or ‘no service’.  
Based on the research methodology, those latter seven case studies cannot be 
considered ‘successful’ rural water services as per government norms. For this 
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research the three groups, as shown in Table 6-4, can be labelled as the ‘high 
service level group’, ‘basic or improved service level group’ and ‘sub-standard or no 
service level group’. This finding can be interpreted in different ways. It shows that 
community management can play a role in delivering service levels at various ranks 
of success suggesting it has a role to play in countries progressing from a focus on 
basic access to increasing service levels. However, it also shows that a third of 
‘reportedly successful’ community management programmes fail to deliver even 
basic service levels calling into question the overall approach the sector takes to 
delivering such services. 
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Table 6-4 - Descriptive statistics on service level composite indicator (all cases, programme villages only) 
Service 
Level 
Grouping 
Case 
Study 
# 
Case Study State Median Mean N Std. 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skewnes
s 
Mann 
Whitney 
Null 
Hypothesis 
(programme 
and control are 
the same) 
Sign. 
High 
Performan
ce Group 
14 Kerala II 5 4.97 90 0.181 26.553 -5.288 0 Reject 0 
13 Kerala I  5 4.76 90 0.812 12.763 -3.648 1032.5 Retain 0.8 
11 Punjab 5 4.63 70 0.705 11.224 -2.895 720.5 Reject 0 
16 Gujarat II 5 4.57 90 0.735 6.522 -2.231 14 Reject 0 
3 Odisha 5 3.87 91 1.586 -1.041 -0.872 615.5 Reject 0 
10 Himachal Pradesh 5 3.78 60 1.574 -1.36 -0.681 1067 Reject 0.045 
Medium 
Performan
ce Group 
19 Maharashtra  4 3.89 90 0.461 13.884 -3.947 0 Reject 0 
15 Gujarat I 4 3.74 91 0.68 2.961 -2.213 830 Reject 0 
8 Telangana 4 3.66 38 0.878 3.494 -2.027 321 Reject 0.001 
17 Tamil Nadu I 4 3.16 89 1.032 -1.338 -0.387 708 Reject 0 
5 Meghalaya 4 3.06 89 1.792 -1.833 -0.086 1076 Retain 159 
18 Tamil Nadu II 4 2.93 90 1.169 -1.571 -0.343 628 Reject 0 
4 Chhattisgarh 3 2.68 90 1.235 -0.757 0.276 720 Reject 0 
Low 
Performan
ce Group 
9 Karnataka 2 2.69 49 1.025 -1.579 0.418 1037 Reject 0.001 
20 Sikkim 2 2.69 89 1.345 -1.523 0.11 1365 Retain 0.848 
1 Jharkhand 2 2.24 90 1.074 1.146 1.108 871500 Reject 0.002 
6 Rajasthan 2 2.13 90 0.902 0.344 0.953 834 Retain 0.194 
2 Madhya Pradesh 1 2.18 88 1.369 -1.648 0.488 2190 Reject 0 
7 West Bengal 1 1.06 90 0.23 13.884 3.947 1275 Retain 0.189 
12 Uttarakhand 1 1.14 80 0.347 2.67 2.146 724.5 Retain 0.073 
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6.2 Service level outcomes by sub-groups 
This section now considers patterns of service level outcomes across different 
groups of cases. It begins by providing some further details linked to the 
previous chapter by comparing the types of enabling support environment and 
community service providers. However, it also goes beyond these categories to 
consider service level outcomes by technical stratifications and the context of 
the case study. The intention of this analysis is not to identify a single critical 
stratification but to illustrate how outcomes change across groups so to provide 
further insight into the conditions that are associated with successful rural water 
services. 
6.2.1 Organisations types 
Focusing on the differences between organisational types, Table 6-5 and 6-7 
confirm the findings presented in the previous chapter. Using a Kruskal Wallis 
test they prove that there are statistically significant difference between at least 
one the organisational types from the remainder of the sample in terms of 
service level outcomes at both the enabling support environment and 
community service provider level. The post hoc Dunn-Bonferroni tests as 
presented in Tables 6.7 and 6.9, respectively, show the pair-wise differences 
between these organisational types. As argued in the previous chapter, these 
differences are more marginal when stratifying the cases by enabling support 
environment with three categories – SRWSA, LSG and Hybrid – delivering a 
median outcome of ‘improved’ (4) whilst the external support category comes 
out at the ‘sub-standard’ (2) level. The lower performance of the external 
agencies is considered to reflect the role the largely NGO-orientated category 
plays in the Indian sector – they operate in the most challenging contexts when 
government supplies have failed and hence the level of service they deliver is 
likely to be lower. 
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Table 6-5 – Composite service level outcomes by enabling support environment 
category (programme villages only)  
Category Median Mean N Std. 
Deviation 
Kruskal-Wallis Test Null 
Hypothesis 
the samples 
are the same 
Statistical 
significance 
External 
Support 
2.00 2.78 209 1.723 
27.259 Reject 0.000 
Hybrid 4.00 3.20 557 1.673 
LSG 4.00 3.54 268 1.399 
SRWSA 4.00 3.19 630 1.352 
 
Table 6-6 – Enabling Support Environment categories pair-wise testing (Dunn-
Bonferroni post hoc test results for significant Kruskal-Wallis test) 
Sample 1 Sample 2 Test Statistic Adjusted 
Significance 
Null 
Hypothesis 
the samples 
are the same 
External 
Support 
SRWSA -95.635 0.061 Retain 
External 
Support 
Hybrid -126.123 0.005 Reject 
External 
Support 
LSG -218.324 0.000 Reject 
SRWSA Hybrid 30.487 1.000 Retain 
SRWSA LSG 122.688 0.002 Reject 
Hybrid LSG -92.201 0.047 Reject 
 
For the community service provider typologies the difference in terms of service 
level outcome is more pronounced. The Registered Society as a VWSC has a 
median outcome of ‘high’ (5) that shows that this is the organisational type that 
can most directly be associated with high service level outcomes. The VWSCs 
as representative sub-committees of the LSG achieves a ‘basic’ (3) level of 
service whilst the other two categories come out at sub-standard and no 
service. As these categories were the subject of extensive discussion in the 
previous chapter they are not discussed in detail here but it was considered 
appropriate to present the descriptive statistics within this chapter and within the 
broader statistical analysis.  
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Table 6-7 - Composite service level outcomes by community service provider 
category (programme villages only) 
Category Median Mean N Std. 
Deviation 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
Test 
Null 
Hypothesis 
the samples 
are the 
same 
Statistical 
significance 
LSG 
Autonomous 
2.00 2.13 90 .902 
370.716 Reject 0.000 
LSG 
Representative 
3.00 2.93 676 1.282 
Registered 
Society 
5.00 3.99 660 1.421 
Unregistered 
Society 
1.00 2.16 238 1.567 
Table 6-8 – Community Service Provider categories pair-wise testing (Dunn-
Bonferroni post hoc test results for significant Kruskal-Wallis test) 
Sample 1 Sample 2 Test Statistic Adjusted 
Significance 
Null 
Hypothesis 
the samples 
are the same 
LSG-
Autonomous 
Unregistered 
Societies 
-1.872 1.000 Retain 
LSG-
Autonomous 
LSG-
Representativ
e 
-208.054 0.000 Reject 
LSG-
Autonomous 
Registered 
Societies 
-563.279 0.000 Reject 
Unregistered 
Societies 
LSG-
Representativ
e 
203.182 0.000 Reject 
Unregistered 
Societies 
Registered 
Societies 
561.408 0.000 Reject 
LSG-
Representati
ve 
Registered 
Societies 
-355.225 0.000 Reject 
6.2.2 Types of water-source access and system design 
The pattern of service level outcomes by system design and the type of water-
source access are now considered. Figure 6-3 helps illustrate how services 
levels vary by system design with what is considered to be a distinction 
between three overall groups. Non-piped water supply, in this study from a 
single case containing a handpumps, delivers universally unacceptable service 
levels. The SVS from open wells and gravity-fed systems delivered services 
where the majority of survey respondents reported service levels that did not 
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meet the basic criteria. This is considered to be because of the use of public 
stand posts in such contexts (Ramamohan Roa and Raviprakash, 2016a; 
Saraswathy, 2016b, 2016c). The other types of piped supply delivered services 
where the majority of the population received acceptable service levels. 
 
Figure 6-3 – Percentage of households meeting at least basic on the composite 
service level indicator across water source types 
As well as the technical system design, the household survey recorded the type 
of water-source access available to respondents. This could be a household tap 
connection, public stand post or hand pump, for example. The sub-sample sizes 
for these categories indicate that the sample predominately covered services 
provided through household connections rather than communal sources. With 
Indian policy focusing on piped water supply (Government of India, 2013a) the 
data shows that household connections deliver significantly better services than 
public stand posts (and that even private wells deliver consistently higher 
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services than public stand posts). Overall, the data here suggests that the type 
of water delivery is an extremely important factor in terms of differential 
performance between the case studies, more so, than the technical design of 
the system. In additional to the figures provided, Table 6.9 and 6.10 provide 
further details on the descriptive statistics. 
 
Figure 6-4 - Percentage of households meeting at least basic on the composite 
service level indicator across water delivery types 
  
Household Connection Other 
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Table 6-9 - Descriptive statistics for water delivery types (service level indicator; 
whole sample) 
Tech Median Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
Test 
Null Hypothesis 
the samples are 
the same 
Sign. 
Household 
Connection 
4.00 3.51 1537 1.400 
393.814 Reject 0.000 
Public Stand 
Post 
1.00 1.92 287 1.289 
Private Well 2.00 2.68 60 1.444 
Handpump 1.00 1.14 179 .379 
Spring 2.00 2.69 119 1.364 
Other 1.00 2.11 56 1.569 
 
Table 6-10 Water delivery types pair-wise testing (Dunn-Bonferroni post hoc test 
results for significant Kruskal-Wallis test) 
Sample 1 Sample 2 Test 
Statistic 
Adjusted 
Significance 
Null Hypothesis 
Other Public Standpost -236.994 0.000 Reject 
Other Private Well -361.456 0.000 Reject 
Other Spring -454.056 0.000 Reject 
Other Household 739.468 0.000 Reject 
Public Stand 
Post 
Private Well 124.462 1.000 Retain 
Public Stand 
Post 
Spring 217.062 0.001 Reject 
Public Stand 
Post 
Household 502.473 0.000 Reject 
Private Well Spring -92.600 1.000 Retain 
Private Well Household 378.011 0.000 Reject 
Spring Household 285.412 0.000 Reject 
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6.2.3 Broader context of case study 
Due to links between broader development indicators and rural water services 
(as outlined in Chapter Three) it is considered useful to assess the cases by the 
two broad contextual factors that were related to rural water service outcomes 
at the state level. It is acknowledged that the case studies cannot be considered 
representative of state-level trends as they are purposively selected single 
cases, however the strength of the synergistic relationship between water 
services and broader societal development mean that this approach is still 
considered useful. As such, Figure 6-5 shows service level outcomes are better 
in the case studies from the richest states (when excluding case studies from 
the mountain and hilly states which it was previously argued are considered a 
special case for water services in India).  
Comparing the middle-income to high-income aggregate service level data also 
reinforces the arguments made about the social democratic tendencies versus 
development tendencies which tend to be found in the middle-income and high-
income states (Kohli, 2012), respectively . Control villages in the middle-income 
state have better service level outcomes than programme villages reported on 
in low-income and mountainous states, whereas the control villages in the 
development states have the lowest overall outcomes from across the whole 
study. This would support the connections the thesis makes between the 
political economy of the state and rural water service outcomes. The 
Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu II case studies, for example, are considered to 
reflect examples whereby the state government has taken a top-down approach 
to constructing large MVS piped supply, which delivers strong service level 
outcomes to the villages it serves. However, beyond these large schemes, the 
‘forgotten’ villages seem to lack the capacity or enabling environment to deliver 
good service themselves, whereas, in Kerala, for example, even for villages 
outside the main programmes studied, widespread literacy and development 
appears to allow villages to deliver services adequately. 
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Figure 6-5 – Percentage of households meeting at least basic on the composite 
service level indicator across wealth categories 
The difference between the service level outcomes in the case studies from the 
mountainous and hilly states versus the rest is less clear, as shown in Figure 6-
6. In the programme villages, the rest of the sample outperforms the 
mountainous case studies but the control villages have better outcomes than 
the programme villages in the mountainous villages (although the difference is 
within the margin of error). This may reflect a sampling bias for the control 
villages in the mountainous states. In conversation with the field-researchers for 
these case studies the remoteness of the programme villages was mentioned, 
specifically in relation to the Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh case studies 
(Harris et al., 2016c; Smits et al., 2016). Selecting control villages that were as 
remote as the programme villages may have been due to a geographically-
orientated sampling bias with researchers selecting control villages that were 
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closer to the main roads. Similar sampling bias has been reported in other 
development research projects (Chambers, 2008).  
 
Figure 6-6 - Percentage of households meeting at least basic on the composite 
service level indicator across wealth categories 
6.3 Service level overview 
The analysis of the service level data from the household surveying has 
revealed that there are statistically significant differences across various sub-
groups of the sample that support the theoretical justifications for selecting the 
case studies. This includes higher service levels in programme rather than 
control villages, differences between economic income categories, technical 
mode of supply and organisational types. It is not argued, nor was the analysis 
intended to test, whether any of these factors are causal variables as the 
research understands rural water service outcomes to be shaped by complex 
pathways of causality. Rather the descriptive analysis was designed to validate 
 160 
 
the level of success across the cases and provide empirically-grounded insights 
into the conditions associated with success that can be used to further 
structure, and triangulate with, the broader analysis of community management 
in India. 
6.4 Financial analysis 
This section begins the process of moving the quantitative analysis from the 
validation measures of the study (i.e. service levels) to one of the critical 
elements for answering the research questions (i.e. financial flows). Similarly, it 
begins by providing an overview of the general financing pattern across the 
major cost categories. It then moves to a cross-case analysis that 
disaggregates the cost sharing arrangements between communities and 
external support entities for each case study. These patterns are then analysed 
by the major groupings used in the previous section including organisational 
types, technical modes of supply and economic income categories. 
As discussed in the methodology chapter, the financial data was consolidated to 
the case level based on the average of three programme villages at the 
community service provider level and the costs collected at the enabling support 
environment level. Inconsistent data was collected at the enabling support 
environment level for control villages so the financial analysis does not compare 
programme against control data. With this section focusing on financial data, 
the basic central tendency measure used is the mean and the interquartile 
range (IQR) as opposed to the median in the section before. With significant 
variability in interval data this is deemed an appropriate approach (Black, 2012) 
– especially as this replicates the approach followed in the WASHCost research 
(Burr and Fonseca, 2013; Fonseca et al., 2011; Mcintyre et al., 2014) enabling 
direct comparison between the data as the analysis is presented.  
6.5 Financial costs across the sample 
There is considerable variability across the cases in terms of the level of 
financial investment found. As shown in Table 6-11, at the whole sample level 
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the average CapEx on hardware was $207 per person with an IQR of $93 to 
$233, whilst the mean CapEx on software was $25 with an IQR of $0.7 to $17. 
With the mean above the IRQ it is clear an outlier has pulled up the average for 
the CapEx on software. The mean recurrent costs come to around $20 per 
person but again there was variability across the programmes. For OpEx and 
OpEx Enabling Support this research reports ranges of $3.5 to $12 and $0.1 to 
$2.4 per person, respectively. These compare against the international 
benchmarks in contrasting ways for CapEx and OpEx as compared below. 
Table 6-11 - Descriptive statistics on major cost categories (whole sample) 
  CapEx 
Hardware 
CapEx 
Software 
OpEx OpEx 
Support 
CapManEx 
Hardware 
CapManEx 
Software 
Programmes (N) 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Mean $207 $25 $8.75 $2.35 $7.58 $0.19 
Std. Deviation 214.30 51.88 7.85 5.21 10.88 0.68 
Percentiles 25 $93 $0.72 $3.56 $0.14 $0.38 $0.00 
50 $164 $2.83 $5.72 $0.51 $4.75 $0.00 
75 $233 $17 $12 $2.40 $11 $0.00 
 
First, comparing CapEx costs, the new data reported here are significantly 
higher than compared to the WASHCost datasets (Burr and Fonseca, 2013). 
Based on the consolidated global dataset, the WASHCost research reported the 
following IQR for CapEx of $31 to $132 per person for rural piped schemes 
(Burr and Fonseca, 2013). Yet when focusing on just the WASHCost India data 
the benchmarks are even lower at $23 to $81 for CapEx (Burr, 2015). This 
means the lower IQR for CapEx hardware from this study is already higher than 
the highest benchmark reported from the WASHCost Andhra Pradesh research.  
Second, for OpEx costs, the data from the international WASHCost IQRs are 
$0.5 to $5.3 and for OpEx Enabling Support they are $1.1 to $3.2 (Burr and 
Fonseca, 2013). The data from this research provides a much higher range of 
OpEx costs but lower OpEx Enabling Support costs. This is considered to 
reflect the way operational support is structured in India, which includes 
significant direct subsidy to community service providers during the OpEx stage, 
which in turn allows the level of OpEx Enabling Support to be lower.  
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Overall, the whole sample findings from this research indicate higher combined 
OpEx and OpEx Enabling Support costs than the international benchmarks. 
Again, when comparing directly to the WASHCost India data the differences are 
even greater. That study found recurrent costs in the Indian sector hard to come 
by but reports a benchmark for the combined costs of between $0.2 and $2.5 
per person per year (Burr and Fonseca, 2013). When comparing that against 
the findings from this thesis, again the lower benchmarks from this research are 
higher than the upper benchmarks provided by the WASHCost project. 
The final cost categories reported on are for CapManEx in hardware and 
software. There were 18 case studies in which CapManEx was reported but two 
case studies (Odisha and Karnataka) reported no CapManEx hardware data. 
There were only four cases where any form of CapManEx software was 
conducted suggesting this is an area of underinvestment. The data provided 
gives a range of $0.4 to $11 for CapManEx compared to the WASHCost India 
range of $0.0 to $1.2. At this aggregate level, the data presented here clearly 
shows that the levels of expenditure found in these ‘reportedly successful’ 
community managed rural water service programmes are at a significantly 
higher level than has been previously reported.  
6.6 Financial cost sharing between support and community 
A core contribution this thesis makes to the literature is to reassess what cost 
sharing arrangements can support successful community management in the 
context of the various calls for a shift to community management plus 
(Baumann, 2006; Lockwood, 2002, 2004; Moriarty, Butterworth, Franceys, et 
al., 2013). This section focuses on this issue through analysing the financial 
cost sharing arrangements between support agencies and communities.  
As shown in Table 6-12, the mean proportional contribution of communities to 
capital costs is 5% which is around half of the often held standard for ‘demand-
responsive’ community management which was 10% of capital costs in the 
Indian context (Government of India, 2003; Hutchings, Franceys, et al., 2016). 
The range given for community contribution to CapEx across the cases is 0%-
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7%. Significantly, there are four case studies where communities do not 
contribute any money to capital costs which reflects a complete departure from 
the principle that communities need to make a financial contribution in the 
implementation phase of a community management programme in order to 
demonstrate some degree of ‘ownership’ and therefore commitment to future 
management. For CapEx software this research indicates a range of between 
1%-7% of total capital costs which is lower than the 10% estimate used by the 
Water and Sanitation Program of the World Bank in their calculation of 
investment needs in the sector (Hutton and Varughese, 2016). 
Table 6-12 - CapEx cost sharing 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
CapEx Hardware 
Support 
CapEx Software 
Support 
CapEx Community 
Mean (%) 84% 11% 5% 
IQR 99%-87% 1%-7% 0%-7% 
The recurrent cost sharing arrangements are presented in Table 6-13. The 
IQRs presented show greater variability in the pattern of cost sharing for 
recurrent costs than capital costs. Focusing on the operational costs, the IQR 
for community contributions is 52-93% of the total. Reflecting this finding back 
against the principles of the demand-responsive approach to community 
management it is clear that generally speaking communities are not covering 
100% of operational costs as is implied under a demand-responsive model 
(Government of India, 2003; Hutchings, Franceys, et al., 2016). Instead, they 
are reliant on significant direct and indirect financial support. The direct support 
through subsidies to OpEx range from 1-30% and the OpEx Enabling Support 
range from 6-18% of the overall operational costs. In Chapter Two the financing 
used in the Capital Maintenance Phase of the service delivery cycle, was 
identified as the critical failure point in many rural water service programmes. 
The data here shows communities can contribute 11-21% of these costs in 
successful programmes with the remaining 29-89% covered by supporting 
agencies. The study found very little CapManEx on software across the cases 
indicating this is an area of systemic underinvestment, although also perhaps a 
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function of studying generally longer-life piped water supply systems (as 
compared to handpumps). 
Table 6-13 - Recurrent cost sharing 
 Descriptive 
Statistics 
OpEx 
direct 
support 
OpEx 
enabling 
support 
OpEx 
community 
CapManEx 
support 
hardware 
CapManEx 
support 
software 
CapManEx 
community 
Mean (%) 26% 21% 53% 82% 3% 15% 
IQR 1%-30% 6%-18% 52%-93% 79%-89% 0%-0% 11%-21% 
 
The cost sharing data in terms of dollars invested by support and community is 
now considered. This helps to quantify the level of financial investment found 
and shows an IQR of $2.4 to $6.6 per person for community contributions to 
OpEx costs whilst the external support for that category is $0.6 to $4.8 each 
year, as displayed by Table 6-14. This indicates there is a “willingness to pay” 
for services through the community management model but tariffs continue to 
require significant subsidy even to cover the basic OpEx costs. Similarly the 
data shows that for many of the case studies community members 
demonstrated a willingness to pay for capital costs of up to around $17 per 
person for a one-off payment for CapEx and just over $2 annually to cover 
CapManEx.  
Table 6-14 – Financial data on cost sharing 
 CapEx 
Support 
CapEx 
Community 
OpEx 
Support and 
OpEx 
Enabling 
Support 
OpEx 
Community 
CapManEx 
Support 
CapManEx 
Community 
Mean $220 $13 $5.3 $5.8 $5.6 $2.2 
IQR $98-$245 $0-$17 $0.6-$4.8 $2.4-$6.6 $0.0-$8.2 $0.1-$4.6 
The cost sharing data has so far been focused on the trends across the sample 
but the individual case study data is also presented below to illustrate 
specificities across the cases. It shows some outliers in terms of the cost 
sharing such as the four case studies where there has been no community 
contribution to CapEx (Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and 
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Maharahstra). As argued, this is considered to represent a significant departure 
from the principles that communities should contribute to CapEx. There are also 
three cases where the proportional contribution of support to recurrent costs is 
less than 5% showing that there are still examples where communities cover 
the vast majority of OpEx. However, for the majority of cases, the substantial 
levels of recurrent support found confirm the community management plus 
paradigmatic claims that substantial on-going support is required for successful 
community management. 
Table 6-15 – Case by case cost sharing financial data 
Case 
No. 
State CapEx 
Support 
CapEx 
Community 
OpEx 
Support 
and 
OpEx 
Enabling 
Support 
OpEx 
Community 
CapManEx 
Support 
CapManEx 
Community 
1 Jharkhand $207.50 $0.00 $3.9 $1.2 $0.0 $0.4 
2 Madhya 
Pradesh 
$165.78 $0.00 $0.3 $3.6 $0.0 $5.9 
3 Odisha $137.92 $30.74 $0.4 $3.5 $0.0 $0.0 
4 Chhattisgarh $112.32 $0.00 $0.7 $2.3 $0.1 $0.2 
5 Meghalaya $80.83 $3.92 $3.4 $2.4 $0.3 $0.0 
6 Rajasthan $82.69 $10.63 $1.0 $5.0 $0.7 $4.4 
7 West Bengal $37.18 $0.97 $0.8 $0.4 $1.0 $0.1 
8 Telangana $245.03 $33.99 $3.0 $5.9 $6.7 $0.8 
9 Karnataka $267.86 $14.10 $0.5 $11.3 $0.0 $0.0 
10 Himachal 
Pradesh 
$330.78 $11.00 $0.2 $5.7 $0.0 $0.6 
11 Punjab $231.42 $15.94 $5.7 $21.4 $17.3 $5.9 
12 Uttarakhand $487.36 $48.43 $5.1 $1.1 $2.0 $4.8 
13 Kerala Kodur $152.55 $31.60 $4.4 $13.5 $11.3 $1.0 
14 Kerala 
Nenmeni 
$214.30 $6.77 $0.0 $13.9 $9.6 $8.6 
15 Gujarat $67.08 $5.98 $4.4 $1.7 $0.1 $0.0 
16 Gujarat Kutch $178.13 $17.83 $4.6 $3.7 $0.0 $0.6 
17 Tamil Nadu $115.23 $12.72 $8.5 $6.9 $12.2 $0.0 
18 Tamil Nadu II $16.50 $1.65 $28.6 $6.4 $4.6 $6.6 
19 Maharashtra $1,019.4
1 
$0.00 $4.3 $3.6 $2.7 $2.5 
20 Sikkim $245.21 $5.70 $25.5 $3.4 $43.6 $0.9 
6.7 Financial costs by sub-group 
This section investigates the cost sharing arrangements by organisational 
types, technical modes of supply and economic wealth. As the sample becomes 
stratified the number of cases in each sub-group becomes smaller, yet the 
approach is still to present the IQRs to indicate that there is variability even 
 166 
 
between sub-groups. However, it is acknowledged for some analysis this 
means that the IQR can reflect the entire range of results.   
6.7.1 Organisational types 
Developing the arguments made in the previous chapter about the different 
organisational types, this section explains the cost sharing patterns between 
these groups. At the enabling support environment level, a notable difference is 
the higher levels of investment in the service delivery stage in the decentralised 
LSG cases compared to the other enabling support environment types. This 
includes higher tariff payments by communities and also greater external 
support from governments. The interquartile ranges of the other costs 
categories did not suggest a strong pattern of difference between the models as 
shown in Table 6-16. 
Table 6-16 - Financial costs by enabling support environment type 
ESE CapEx Support CapEx 
Community 
OpEx Support 
and OpEx 
Enabling Support 
OpEx Community 
SRWSA $81-$208 $0-$11 $1.0-$4.4 $1.7-$3.7 
LSG $115-$245 $6-$32 $4.4-$25.5 $3.4-$13.5 
Hybrid $166-$331 $0-$16 $0.2-$5.7 $3.6-$13.9 
External 
Agency 
$37-$245 $1-$34 $0.4-$3.0 $0.4-$5.9 
Figure 6.7 provides a box and whisker plot illustrating the proportions of costs 
covered by communities under each type of programme. For CapEx, the 
SRWSA and hybrid support approaches have an interquartile range 0-9% and 
0-6% respectively. The lower quartile of 0% is considered to be a relevant 
finding to highlight as it indicates the shift away from communities necessarily 
contributing towards CapEx, which had been a key principle in the popular 
demand-responsive mode of community management (Joshi, 2003; Moriarty, 
Butterworth, Franceys, et al., 2013; Schouten and Moriarty, 2003). With local 
self-government and external agency support systems there is an interquartile 
range of community contribution to CapEx of 2-17% and 3-18%, respectively. 
The high variety indicates the level of investment is programme specific and can 
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range from significantly below, to nearly double, the 10% contribution level 
highlighted in the literature as standard practice (Joshi, 2003; Moriarty, 
Butterworth, Franceys, et al., 2013; Schouten and Moriarty, 2003).  
 
Figure 6-7 - Community proportional contribution to CapEx and OpEx by 
enabling support environment type 
The proportional community contribution to OpEx also has high variety across 
the enabling support environment types. Yet in considering the interquartile 
ranges, the difference between the two government support programmes types 
– the SWRSA and LSG – and the hybrid and external agency is with regards to 
the upper quartiles. Those government enabling support environment types 
share an upper quartile of 75% whilst in the other categories it is 90% (external 
agency) and 97% (hybrid). Again, this is considered indicative of the shift in 
Government of India supported community management away from the cost 
sharing principles that have come to be associated with community 
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management (Joshi, 2003; Moriarty, Butterworth, Franceys, et al., 2013; 
Schouten and Moriarty, 2003), including that communities cover 100% of OpEx. 
It is the community management programmes either lead by or in partnership 
with non-government partners where the upper quartiles getting close to the 
100% level for community contribution associated with the demand responsive 
approach to community management (Joshi, 2003). This difference between the 
domestic interpretation of the community management model and the more 
international ideals of community management is considered in more detail in 
Chapter Seven.  
When cutting the case studies by community service provider types, the 
previous chapter demonstrated that the Registered Societies as VWSC model 
for the community service provider was the typology most associated with good 
service level outcomes. The financing of this type of model shows it has the 
highest level of community contribution to CapEx and OpEx suggesting a link 
between the level of community contribution and the success of these services. 
Direct support for OpEx and OpEx Enabling Support are also higher in in the 
Registered Societies than the next most successful typology of Representative 
VWSCs.  
Table 6-17 Financial costs by community service provider type 
CSP CapEx Support CapEx 
Community 
OpEx Support 
and OpEx 
Enabling 
Support 
OpEx 
Community 
Autonomous 
VWSC (single 
case) 
$83 
$11 
 
$1.0 
 
$5.0 
 
Representative 
VWSC 
$97-$257 $0-$9 $2.1-$17.0 $2.4-$6.6 
Registered 
Society 
$145-$238 $11-$33 $1.7-$4.8 $2.6-$13.7 
Unregistered 
Society 
$37-$331 $0-$11 $0.2-$0.8 $0.4-$5.7 
In considering the proportional cost-sharing between community and support, 
the Representative VWSC – which are so closely intertwined with the local self-
government system – and Unregistered Societies, have very low levels of 
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community contribution to CapEx. The interquartile range is 0-5% and 0-3%, 
respectively. As the Representative VWSC case studies is the institutional set 
up most closely linked to the prescriptions of the NRDWP guidelines 
(Government of India, 2013a), it shows how this shift is part of the 
institutionalised move away from community contribution to CapEx as a 
precondition for a community management programme in India. Interestingly, 
though, the Registered Society which has the best overall service level 
outcomes retain the more conventional cost sharing arrangements for CapEx 
with a interquartile range of 7% to 15% for the case studies in that category. 
This would suggest that there remains a link between community contribution 
and service level performance, which can be considered an implicit assumption 
underpinning the community management model.    
 
Figure 6-8 Community proportional contribution to CapEx and OpEx by 
community service provider type 
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As shown in Figure 6.8 and Table 6.18, comparing the community service 
provider typologies by OpEx contribution again indicates the lower levels of 
contribution found within the government prescribed model of the 
Representative VWSC as compared to the other types of service provider 
arrangements. That typology has an interquartile range of 21-61% against 36%-
84% (Registered Society) and 34-97% (Unregistered Society) with the single 
Autonomous VWSC having 83% community contribution for OpEx. This is again 
considered evidence of a distinction between the most recent Government of 
India influenced case studies, and those that have non-government actors 
involved as well. 
 
Table 6-18 - Financial costs by community service provider type 
CSP CapEx Support CapEx 
Community 
OpEx Support 
and OpEx 
Enabling 
Support 
OpEx 
Community 
Autonomous 
VWSC (single 
case) 
$83 
$11 
 
$1.0 
 
$5.0 
 
Representative 
VWSC 
$97-$257 $0-$9 $2.1-$17.0 $2.4-$6.6 
Registered 
Society 
$145-$238 $11-$33 $1.7-$4.8 $2.6-$13.7 
Unregistered 
Society 
$37-$331 $0-$11 $0.2-$0.8 $0.4-$5.7 
 
6.7.2 Technical mode of supply 
The difference between costs of services by technical system design are now 
considered. Assessing costs in this way shows that CapEx increases along 
what can be described as a crude technical spectrum of complexity from the 
lowest level with the most simplistic technology to the highest level with very 
sophisticated systems (as shown in Figure 6-9). For example, the gravity-fed 
MVS in the Maharashtra case study is over 26 times more expensive per 
person than the handpumps in West Bengal, mainly because of the hydro-
geological need for long-term bulk water storage that justifies the construction of 
a multi-use dam. 
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The other forms of piped water supply regularly have a CapEx in the range of 
$100 to $200 per person, although the gravity-fed schemes tend to have a 
higher upper value, which is in part explained by the mountainous contexts of 
Sikkim and Himachal Pradesh. Here, the technical design of schemes is often 
more sophisticated whilst the construction and material costs tend to be higher. 
This is all compounded by small village sizes that reduce the economies of 
scale at which work can be undertaken.  
Higher CapEx costs do not necessarily mean higher recurrent costs though as 
the Maharashtra case has relatively low recurrent costs partly due to the lack of 
energy needed for pumping water (the design in this case taking advantage of 
the higher elevation of the reservoir and treatment works), which is normally a 
major recurrent cost requirement. In this sense, higher CapEx can be used to 
reduced recurrent costs but overall the recurrent costs of piped supply are still 
higher than handpumps.  
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Figure 6-9 – Capital costs by technical design of the system 
6.7.3 Context of case studies 
This section now considers the differences when cutting the cases by income 
group. Figure 6-10 below displays the data for operational costs, which 
combines both OpEx and OpEx Enabling Support. It shows the median level of 
per capita investment in support rises across the economic groupings from less 
than $1 in the low-income states to around $2.50 in the middle-income states 
and up to over $4.50 in the high-income states. The biggest difference in the 
figures is the higher levels of community contribution found in the middle-
income states, with a median of nearly $14 per person, compared with $3 to 
$3.50 per person in the low-income and high-income states.  
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These patterns of cost sharing are considered to be partly reflective of the 
different types of organisational arrangements across states but also partly 
reflective of the modes of political economy that dominate development 
processes in the different income groups. The case studies from the middle-
income states can be characterised as being more likely to follow the bottom-up 
– ‘social-democratic’ – approach to rural water services in which populations are 
the drivers of the development process and therefore are willing to contribute 
financially to public services (as shown in the data in Figure 6-8. However, in 
the high-income states the approach is more top-down – ‘developmental’ – as 
the support entities take on a higher level of investment and communities invest 
less of their own finance. In the low-income states the overall capacity for 
investment is lower and therefore this leads to lower levels of investment across 
the categories. 
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Figure 6-10 - Recurrent costs across socio-economic groupings of cases 
6.8 Costs and performance categories 
This section now considers how the level of financing directly relates to service 
level performance. It does this first by assessing the cases by the service level 
performance category set out in Section 6.1 before a simple correlation analysis 
between financial categories and service level outcomes is conducted. As 
shown in Table 6-19, the high performance category is shown to have higher 
levels of community contribution to CapEx and OpEx than the other categories 
– for example, a mean of $10 per person for OpEx in the high category against 
$4 and $3 in the medium and low categories, respectively. This again suggests 
a link between the performance of services and a willingness to pay although it 
is not possible to identify whether higher community payments lead to better 
performance or is because of it. The low performance category has higher 
levels of CapEx from the enabling support environment but recurrent levels of 
OpEx 
Support 
OpEx 
Community 
OpEx 
Support 
OpEx 
Community 
OpEx 
Support 
OpEx 
Community 
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investment are generally lower. This would therefore suggest that the level of 
CapEx is a less important category for determining the level of success.  
Table 6-19 – Costs of services by performance category 
Performance 
Category 
Statistic CapEx 
Support 
CapEx 
Community 
OpEx 
Support 
and OpEx 
Enabling 
Support 
OpEx 
Community 
CapManEx 
Support 
CapManEx 
Community 
High Mean  $208 $19 $2.5 $10.3 $6.4 $2.8 
IQR $153-
231 
$11-31 $0.2-4.6 $3.7-13.9 $0-11.3 $0.6-5.9 
 
Medium Mean  $237 $8 $7.6 $4.2 $3.8 $1.4 
IQR $67-
245 
$0-13 $3-$8.5 $2.3-6.4 $0.1-6.7 $0-2.5 
 
Low Mean  $213 $11 $5.3 $3.7 $6.7 $2.4 
IQR $83-
268 
$0-14 $0.5-$5.1 $1.1-5 $0-2 $0.1-4.8 
 
 
A correlation analysis was also conducted on a dataset containing all the case 
studies. The two dependent variables were the median service level outcomes 
as per the composite service level indicator and the percentage of the surveyed 
population that meets ‘basic’ or above on that indicator. The analysis shows that 
there is only one cost category that has a highly significant positive correlation 
with these two variables. That is the level of OpEx costs. As shown in Table 6-
20, the correlation between the OpEx is medium to large for the Kendall's tau 
test (Field, 2013). In considering this relationship the relative correlation of the 
community and support contribution to OpEx was also tested with this showing 
a significantly higher association between higher levels of community 
contribution to OpEx and higher service level outcomes. This again indicates 
that high levels of community contribution are a good indicator of success but 
as explained earlier in this chapter it is not possible to answer conclusively 
whether the higher contribution from community drives stronger performance or  
whether when good services are provided populations are more likely to pay for 
them. 
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Table 6-20 – Correlation analysis between service level outcomes and OpEx 
Overall 
Contribution 
Statistic Test Service Level 
(% meet all 
norms) 
Composite 
Service Level 
Indicator 
(Median) 
Interpretation 
OpEx 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(Kendell Tau) 
.468 .506 
Medium to large 
positive 
correlation at the 
highly significant 
level for both 
service level 
outcomes 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.004221 0.003835 
N 20 20 
OpEx Enabling 
Support 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(Kendell Tau) 
0.210987 0.282466 
Small positive 
correlation at a 
non-significant 
level for both 
service level 
outcomes 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.258897 0.157914 
N 16 16 
OpEx 
Communtiy 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(Kendell Tau) 
.436 .483 
Medium positive 
correlation at the 
highly significant 
level for both 
service level 
outcomes 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.007675 0.005835 
N 20 20 
Beyond the OpEx category there is no linear relationship that is statistically 
significant between the cost categories and service level outcomes for CapEx, 
OpEx Enabling Support or CapManEx investments. This would suggest that as 
the sector increases levels of investment, concentrating more financial subsidy 
directly to service provision tasks is likely to lead to better outcomes. However, 
the absorptive capacity of the service provider – in terms of being able to 
effectively use the additional financial resources effectively – is likely to be 
conditional on broader factors which can most likely be improved by broader 
investments in terms such as OpEx Enabling Support. Ultimately, the research 
continues to suggest that there is no single factor that leads to successful 
community management. However this section has helped identify the 
conditions in which success arises within the Indian context which do involve 
substantial on-going support to communities reflecting the assumptions of the 
community management plus paradigm. 
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6.9 Chapter summary and contribution to the thesis 
This chapter has provided a descriptive analysis of service level outcomes and 
financial data across the case studies. For the service level outcomes, the 
analysis shows that community management can deliver high service levels 
with six cases being labelled as high performance case studies. Yet even 
though all cases have 100% access to an improved water source there remain 
seven cases with basic performance and seven cases that fail to meet 
government norms. The research therefore adds to the evidence about the 
limited nature of using the concept of access as a measure of success in rural 
water services (Clasen, 2012). The research also reinforces the importance of 
having household connections as compared to communal water points, such as 
public stand-posts or handpumps, with the service levels from these water 
sources significantly higher than any other type of improved water source. 
Beyond the service level analysis, this chapter provided a descriptive analysis 
of the financial data to answer research question two on the indicative financial 
costs of supporting successful community management programmes in India. 
Table 6-21 provides a summary of the total levels of financial investment in 
CapEx and recurrent expenditure for different levels of service level 
performance from this research against the WASHCost benchmarks. It shows 
that the levels of investment found are higher than these most widely used 
benchmarks for rural water service financing (Burr and Fonseca, 2013; Hutton 
and Varughese, 2016). The data from this research is most strikingly different to 
the results from the WASHCost India study that suggested extremely low levels 
of financing in the India sector, especially for recurrent costs. This research 
indicates an inverse situation in which the Indian sector has higher levels of 
financing than the suggested ranges for low and lower middle income countries. 
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Table 6-21 – Summary of financial requirements for successful community 
management 
Source CapEx (IQR) Recurrent (IQR) 
High Service Level 
Performance (Community 
Water Plus) 
$184-$247 $6-$32 
Medium Service Level 
Performance (Community 
Water Plus) 
$73-$279 $6-28 
Low Service Level 
Performance (Community 
Water Plus) 
$93-$281 $5-$13 
WASHCost International 
Benchmark (Burr and 
Fonseca, 2013) 
$31-$132 $4-$16 
WASHCost Andhra Pradesh 
Benchmark (Burr, 2015) 
$38-$66 $0.5-$1.6 
Conducting this research revealed many of the costs that go into the Indian 
sector are opaque and hard to trace without a detailed case study approach to 
the research. In a government programme, for example, finance comes through 
various State and Federal Government funds directly into the local self-
government Gram Panchayat accounts whilst other funding can be funnelled 
directly to VWSCs accounts or may come from indirect subsidies – often 
unacknowledged – such as discounted rates for electricity power. For this 
reason, it is contended that previous research has underestimated the cost of 
delivering services in India. The WASHCost project itself acknowledged that 
evidence of recurrent costs were hard to come by in the Andhra Pradesh study 
(Burr, 2015) and therefore many estimates were used. In this sense, although 
the research cannot be considered representative of the general workings of the 
India sector, the level of divergence between the estimates provided and the 
recurrent estimates from the WASHCost project, suggest that the accepted 
understandings of working in ‘low-cost’ India should be revised as there is 
significant financing being poured into the India sector. 
In terms of the financing patterns most strongly associated with delivering good 
service level outcomes, the analysis presented showed that higher levels of 
OpEx correlated with high performance outcomes. It was shown that the level of 
community contribution to OpEx was especially strongly correlated. This 
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indicates that although the sector is concentrating on how to structure and 
finance an effective enabling support environment for community management, 
providing direct financing to service providers and promoting community tariff 
contributions can be considered useful approaches for driving up performance 
levels.  
The following chapters further develop the theoretical implications of the 
research and draw out the conclusions by bringing together and triangulating 
the findings presented here with those presented in Chapter Five on the 
organisational arrangements for community management. Those chapters also 
considers what the implications of the findings are for the practice and policy of 
community management in India and other contexts, as well as what it means 
for conceptual understandings of the model. 
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7 DISCUSSION – THE INSTITUTIONALISED CO-
PRODUCTION OF RURAL WATER SERVICES IN 
CONTEMPORARY INDIA 
This research started from the premise that community management was a 
flawed paradigm for rural water services due to the way it has led to the 
abdication of responsibility from governments and an overemphasis on the role 
of local communities (Broek and Brown, 2015; Moriarty, Smits, et al., 2013). 
With empirical evidence pointing particularly to the lack of sustainability during 
the service delivery and rehabilitation phases of water programmes (Lockwood 
and Smits, 2011; Reddy et al., 2010), the concept of community management 
plus – involving more continuous support to communities from governments and 
other agencies throughout the service delivery cycle – was framed as a 
potential new paradigmatic approach (Baumann, 2006; Lockwood and Smits, 
2011; Moriarty, Smits, et al., 2013). Through studying twenty case studies of 
reportedly successful community management programmes within India, the 
research sought to provide empirical evidence on the features and 
characteristics of such programmes so to inform the broader debates about the 
future of community management. This chapter now builds on that evidence, 
which was presented in Chapter Five and Six, to further develop the theoretical 
contribution of the thesis.  
In those chapters, it was argued that the dominant traits of successful 
community management programmes in India do better reflect the principles of 
community management plus rather than the conventional community 
management model. However, it was also shown, that the level of involvement 
of local self-government institutions went beyond much of the standard 
description of community management plus in the literature (Baumann, 2006; 
Lockwood and Smits, 2011; Moriarty, Smits, et al., 2013). This was because the 
institutional set-up in many programmes involved local self-government 
employees working together with private-community members to coproduce 
services between the state and community. As visually represented in Figure 
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7.1, there was a significant overlap between community management 
approaches and local self-government provision as mandated through the 
Constitution of India (Government of India, 1993). The thesis therefore adopted 
the concept of “institutionalised co-production” (Joshi and Moore, 2004) as a 
more appropriate framing of this hybrid approach. This chapter further advances 
that specific theoretical contribution of the thesis and explains how it informs the 
understanding of the emerging community management plus paradigm. 
 
Figure 7-1 - Visual representation of service delivery model (adapted from 
Lockwood and Smits, 2011) 
The structure of discussion follows the advice of Whetten (1989) regarding the 
building blocks of a comprehensive theoretical discussion. It begins with 
explaining ‘what’ is being claimed by (re)assessing the empirical results 
reported in Chapters Five and Six against the four criteria of institutionalised co-
production explained in the foundational paper on the concept (Joshi and 
Moore, 2004). It then provides insight into ‘how’ the identified patterns of service 
delivery have emerged within the Indian context by bringing in a discussion of 
the political economy of Indian public administration and devolution. The 
chapter then advances to more exploratory territory to consider ‘why’ such 
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patterns of public administration and service delivery emerged specifically in 
India by considering the different international and domestic ideologies of 
development that influence the rural water sector in the country. Finally, the 
chapter examines the boundaries of the theoretical discussion in terms of 
Whetten’s (1989) ‘who? where? when?” questions regarding the context in 
which any theoretical inferences are considered appropriate. Together, these 
sections provides  an opportunity for the chapter to consider the broader 
implications of the institutionalised co-production as an approach to rural water 
service delivery both going forward within the Indian context but also within the 
broader international context. 
7.1 Institutionalised co-production of rural water services 
This section now seeks to further justify the application of the institutionalised 
co-production concept as empirically valid in explaining the dominant forms of 
service delivery found in this research. As described in Chapter Two, the basis 
of the co-production concept – which has been applied in both the developed 
and developing world (Bovaird, 2007; Bovaird et al., 2015; Cepiku and 
Giordano, 2014; Joshi and Moore, 2004) – is to describe a form of public 
service provision that involves the sharing of resource, labour and responsibility 
between public agencies and citizens. However, beyond that basic notion, Joshi 
and Moore (2004, p. 50) develop four particular characteristics they used to 
characterise it more precisely within the context of low and middle-income 
countries, in order to develop their specific sub-concept of institutionalised 
coproduction: 
1) service delivery that involves substantial resource contribution from the 
state and private citizens; 
2) service delivery that is based on long-term relationships between the 
involved parties; 
3) service delivery that has the potential for informal arrangements 
governing those relationships;  
4) service delivery that involves a blurring of distinctions between the 
traditional divide of public and private actors.  
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This section now considers each of these four points in turn. The discussion 
presented is intentionally framed as an examination of the dominant trends 
across the case studies and thus seeks to explain the most common 
arrangements. This is particularly in relation to the 17 case studies that involved 
water committees that were either part of the local self-government or were 
registered under them, as identified in Chapter Five, Section 5.2.  
The research investigated the financial costs of services across the case 
studies, which provides evidence regarding the balance of resource contribution 
from between the state and citizens. It was explained in Chapter Two that the 
most common ‘default’ cost sharing arrangement for community management 
involved communities covering 100% of the on-going OpEx for rural water 
services (Joshi, 2003). In that context, the sector understanding of community 
management is not considered to reflect a sharing of resources as per the 
institutional coproduction principle. The community management plus literature 
does, however, advocate for structured and continuous support to communities 
(Baumann, 2006; Lockwood and Smits, 2011; Moriarty, Smits, et al., 2013) but 
does not specify further details on cost sharing and the available evidence on 
such recurrent support costs is limited (Burr and Fonseca, 2013). This research 
helps fill that gap by showing that in these successful programmes from India, 
there is significant cost sharing between communities and support agencies.  
Taking direct OpEx across all the case studies, the findings reported in Chapter 
Six, show that communities cover 63-94% (IQR) of OpEx costs with support 
agencies providing subsidy for the remaining 6-37% (IQR). This means that 
significant subsidies cover everyday costs, such as energy and bulk water. 
Beyond direct operational costs, there are OpEx Enabling Support costs which 
are covered by support agencies so, overall, 7-48% (IQR) of the everyday-
recurrent costs of services come from external agencies. The evidence that is 
provided therefore clearly indicates that both citizens and support agencies – 
usually government – provide substantial recurrent resource contribution in 
these successful cases of ‘community management’ in India. However, due to 
the extent and consistency of resource sharing, these arrangements are 
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considered to be more appropriately framed within the institutionalised 
coproduction concept (Joshi and Moore, 2004). 
The longevity of the relationship between the state and citizens is another 
characteristic highlighted by Joshi and Moore (2004). At a basic level, as 
reported in Chapter Four, the average length of operation across the cases was 
seven years which helps to verify that the service delivery arrangements studied 
are durable at least over the medium term. Yet more broadly, part of the 
challenge of shifting from community management to community management 
plus, is related to developing a bipartite sense of responsibility between 
communities and support agencies over the long term (Lockwood, 2002, 2004). 
What this research indicates is that there is a high degree of permanence in 
institutional relationships within government programmes in India as they have 
been embedded and partially prescribed within constitutional reforms from the 
early 1990s (Banerjee, 2013; Government of India, 1993). That constitutional 
amendment prescribes that the local self-government of the village – the Gram 
Panchayat – is ultimately responsible for the local management of rural water 
services (Government of India, 1993) and successive policy programmes have 
sought to maintain this principle whilst promoting community management 
(Government of India, 2003, 2013a)13. 
As described in Chapter Five, this means that the water committee can be an 
official sub-committee of the local self-government, as shown in nine case 
studies. Within the government system, it is also possible to have a water 
committee that is a separate Registered Society (as found in eight case studies) 
yet these only exist with official approval and oversight from the Gram 
Panchayat. It was only in three case studies documented in this research, that 
the Gram Panchayat did not have an official role within service provision, with 
this described as the NGO-influenced Unregistered Society model. Despite this 
                                            
13
 The reconciliation of the domestic devolution agenda with what could be described as the 
more internationally influenced ideals of community management is considered critical to 
understanding the Indian context and is a point further examined in Section 6.3 and 6.4 below. 
 186 
 
last group, the dominant trait across the case studies was for the 
institutionalisation of ‘community management’ within the government system. 
This is considered to compare favourably to the model of community 
management that had become common in some parts of the world whereby 
external agencies such as NGOs have a minimal relationship with communities 
beyond the implementation phase of projects, or even no relationship at all 
(Broek and Brown, 2015; Harvey and Reed, 2006). The Indian experience 
suggests that for developing permanence in relationships between citizens and 
support agencies it is most likely to be beneficial to root such arrangements 
within the (local) government system. Conceptually, however, this shifts the 
arrangement from one which is best described through the prism of community 
management to a set-up more accurately described as a form of coproduction. 
Part of the arguments developed by Joshi and Moore (2004) is that despite 
having some level of permanence the arrangements for institutionalised co-
production can be based on informal relationships. This research suggests that 
this is rare in India with it only being found in the three Unregistered Society 
case studies described above, with the remaining 85% of the cases being 
recognised formally within the legislative framework of Indian law. In this sense, 
the informality proposed by Joshi and Moore (Joshi and Moore, 2004, p. 50) is 
not recognised in this research at this legalistic level, however they position this 
as a tendency rather than a rule, specifying that “institutionalised co-production 
need not involve the kinds of contractual or quasi-contractual arrangements 
between state agencies and organised non-state actors”. Therefore, this is not 
considered to invalidate the applicability of the institutionalised co-production 
concept in describing the general patterns of institutionalised arrangements 
found across the case studies. Moreover, as discussed in the methodological 
limitations section in Chapter Four and reconsidered in the following conclusion 
chapter, the cross-case study analysis methodology was considered limited in 
capturing informal arrangements across the case studies. Synthesising 
evidence from twenty case studies has involved a selection bias towards more 
codified and standardised data (Yin and Heald, 1975), such as the comparative 
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participation ladder. Within the specific case study delivered by this author in 
Tamil Nadu, there was evidence that even within the local self-government 
system there are informal processes that take place such as Gram Panchayat 
President using personal money to supplement government subsidy in order to 
gain democratic advantage at forthcoming elections (Hutchings, 2015). It is 
expected that such informality could be identified in the workings of local self-
government in many villages across India. 
The final key criteria associated with institutionalised co-production is that it: 
“implies blurring and fuzziness in the lines that Max Weber, in particular, taught 
us to try to define clearly and precisely: the boundaries between public and 
private.” (Joshi and Moore, 2004, p. 50). This is considered to be especially 
applicable to describing the public-private institutional set-up found in the case 
studies where the VWSC is an official sub-committee of the local self-
government. Under this arrangement as prescribed in the official rural water 
supply policy (Government of India, 2012, 2013a), the water committee should 
have between nine and twelve members. However, at least two of the most 
important members of the water committee are employees of the local self-
government and their role is considered part of their duty as a public servant. 
These two members include the President of the Gram Panchayat who 
operates as the water committee chairman and the Secretary of the Gram 
Panchayat who is the treasurer of the committee. In this sense, much of the key 
labour contribution comes through professionalised public servants with the 
remainder of the committee made up of private citizens. The level of 
contribution from the private committee members can be limited to attendance 
of committee meetings, rather than direct labour contributions towards the 
operation, maintenance or administration of the system. Beyond the 
chairmanship and book keeping, undertaken by the public servants, the most 
labour intensive role is the ‘pump operator’ which is undertaken by a private 
citizen directly appointed by the committee. This individual is paid a wage 
agreed by the committee but together with the public servants it means that the 
individuals contributing towards service delivery tasks are all remunerated for 
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that purpose. This again helps distinguish the Indian experience captured in this 
research with the implicit volunteerism that is associated with the community 
management model in an international context (Moriarty, Butterworth and 
Franceys, 2013). In the context of the institutionalised coproduction concept, the 
arrangement shows how services are delivered through an institutional structure 
that combines public servants, private employees and voluntary members 
leading to a model that blurs the line between public-provision and private-
community management.   
In summary, the thesis is considered to have provided sufficient evidence on 
the institutional arrangements and resource sharing arrangements to indicate 
that government agencies (and in some cases other external entities) play a 
major role alongside citizens in coproducing rural water services in the 
programmes studied. In order to reflect the role of these external agencies, the 
thesis has moved beyond the discourse of community management and, even, 
community management plus to adopt the concept of “institutionalised co-
production” (Joshi and Moore, 2004). This is to help shift the discourse of the 
sector beyond community management which is considered to misrepresent 
what an effective – and sustainable – balance of responsibility should be 
between private citizens and public servants in delivering rural water services in 
India and other similar contexts. 
7.2 The political economy of institutionalised coproduction 
This section now examines in further detail how – and to some extent why – the 
institutionalised co-production arrangements have emerged within India. To 
inform this discussion, the section again makes use of the Joshi and Moore 
(2004) paper that introduced the concept and which argues that that there are 
two main drivers of shift to institutionalised coproduction: 
“Some co-production arrangements have evolved in response to declines in governance 
capacity at local or national level. Government no longer provides certain services very 
effectively, and as a result, organised groups of citizens with something at stake move in to 
help shore them up…Some services cannot effectively be delivered to the ultimate recipients 
by state agencies for reasons that are more ‘natural’: because the environment is too complex 
or variable, and the costs of interacting with very large numbers of poor households is too 
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great, especially in rural areas. In such cases, users become involved in an organised way at 
local level.” (Joshi and Moore, 2004, p. 41) 
Both these drivers are framed in relation to the capacity of the state to deliver 
public services and, in this sense, they provide a simple description of drivers 
that provide a useful starting point for assessing and comparing the major 
underlying processes of change. Before proceeding, it is acknowledged that the 
research methodology is cross-sectional in nature and has not sought to track 
longitudinal trends over time. Yet Chapters Two and Three provide historical 
context to changes in global and Indian policy whilst the history of each case 
study was reviewed in developing the case summaries (as presented in 
Appendix C). Together, those contributions inform this discussion of the 
institutionalised co-production arrangements presented in this section. 
Applying the logic of the governance and logistical drivers to the emergence of 
community management in a broader context, they neatly fit the arguments 
made in Chapter Two. In that chapter, it was argued that in the 1980s and 
1990s community management emerged as a ‘model-solution’ for donors and 
NGOs that could use it to circumvent deficient local governments in developing 
countries (Broek and Brown, 2015; Harvey and Reed, 2006). It was framed as a 
way international actors could respond to a lack of capacity in local government 
(i.e. a decline in or absence of governance capacity). Furthermore, the setting 
of rural water services meant that the preferred service delivery model had to be 
appropriate for sparse and remote communities leading to a ‘natural’ preference 
for involving local communities (i.e. a logistical driver) (Harvey and Reed, 2006). 
The contemporary situation in India, as documented throughout the thesis, can 
also be analysed by this framework but the situation is considered to fit an 
almost reversal of that early community management narrative. Instead, the 
local self-government has become constitutionally empowered within rural water 
services to such an extent that it prohibits an independent form of community 
management emerging (i.e. a governance driver towards coproduction). 
Furthermore, the long-term trajectory of economic growth and societal 
development (World Bank, 2016b), means the logistical drivers that may have 
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traditionally prevented the state’s effective involvement in rural water services 
have shifted as public administration becomes (at least relatively) more effective 
even in the complex and high cost rural areas. In this sense, the overarching 
and long-term drivers within India are considered to be shifting away from 
community management towards institutionalised coproduction. 
Building on this logic, however, it could be argued that as states become richer 
and institutional capability grows, then the governance and logistical drivers will 
shift further to placing the government in charge of public services with less 
intense forms of community involvement in service delivery. Yet this research 
would suggest that such a model of progression is an oversimplification and that 
instead shifts in service delivery are also shaped by the political economy of 
rural water services in particular states. In developing Kohli’s (2012) State-
Society Framework to explain the developmental, social democratic and neo-
patrimonial tendencies found across Indian states, Chapter Three sought to 
provide some insight into the different development models found across India. 
For example, the top-down ‘developmental’ pathway that shaped development 
in Maharashtra was contrasted with the ‘social democratic’ model of Kerala 
(Kohli, 2012). The cross-case analysis reflected this divide, with the 
Maharashtra state programme scoring the lowest level of “passive participation” 
on the participation ladder (Chary Vedala et al., 2016c). In contrast, the case 
study from the Kerala state programme (Chary Vedala et al., 2016b), retained a 
high participation ranking of “interactive participation” despite being a relatively 
wealthy state. It is acknowledged that differences are more nuanced between 
states with less distinctive political economy tendencies. Yet these are 
highlighted to illustrate how coproduction is not considered the result of some 
form of linear march from community management towards full public-provision 
but is something that is shaped by the political-economy context of particular 
states. This indicates that governments in other parts of the world can actively 
pursue coproduction through public policy but should be prepared to allow 
national and/or regional adaptation in how the relationship between local 
government and communities is structured and organised.  
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7.3 Ideologies of institutionalised coproduction  
 
“My idea of the village Swaraj is that it is a complete republic independent of its neighbours for 
its own vital wants.” – Mahatma Gandhi 
The constitutional reforms that have been linked to institutionalised 
coproduction throughout this thesis are rooted in the political-ideology of Swaraj 
or “homerule” (Banerjee, 2013; Johnson et al., 2005b). As explained in Chapter 
Three, that ideology, developed during the Indian freedom struggles, advocated 
a form of home rule that went beyond ending European – chiefly British – 
colonial rule, to a more radical vision of Indian society based around a collection 
of self-ruling village republics14. It was this adopted ideology that shaped the 
constitutional reforms that empowered the Panchayat Raj system of local self-
government which has in turned shaped the forms of rural water service 
delivery documented in this research. This section therefore moves to more 
exploratory territory to argue that understanding the intersection of the domestic 
Swaraj political-ideology and the ‘international’ ideologies of community 
management is a potential route to understanding the fundamental causes of 
institutionalised coproduction in India.  
In order to develop that argument, the section again begins by revisiting the 
arguments made about community management in Chapter Two. In that 
section, it was contended that the political malleability of community 
management contributed to its widespread adoption around the world (Broek 
and Brown, 2015; Harvey and Reed, 2006; Schouten and Moriarty, 2003). The 
two most dominant development-ideologies of the late 20th Century included 
neoliberalism and the “grassroots post-Marxist developmentalists”, with both 
advocating rolling back the state and promoting local control over public 
services (Broek and Brown, 2015, p. 51). Community management fitted the 
narrative of both ideologies by placing local people at the centre of rural water 
                                            
1414
 The Swajal also a more deeply philosophical aspect links to the aspiration of self-realisation 
or enlightenment which is rooted in Hindu teachings. However, for the purpose of this thesis the 
research is interested in how the ideology has shaped the devolution agenda within India. 
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services contributing towards the popularity of the model in the eyes of 
Western-dominated donors and NGOs (Harvey and Reed, 2006). It was such 
agents that have been influential in spreading the model and cementing its 
positions as the dominant paradigm for rural water service delivery (Broek and 
Brown, 2015). In this sense, part of the justification for community management 
was that it was an alternative to deficient public provision with the principle that 
NGOs could help facilitate community participation as some kind of replacement 
for public sector involvement, rather than having that public participation as 
facilitated through the public sector itself.  
However, within the contemporary Indian context, this kind of narrative is not 
considered applicable. First, for a structural reason, the relative influence of 
non-governmental actors is lower than in many other low and lower-income 
countries. This is partly because of the general hostility or suspicion that 
Government of India has had of international NGOs (Sen, 1999) but also due to 
the sheer size of the sector that means the influence of NGOs or, even, donors 
is minimal compared to other national contexts. Second, for more ideological 
reasons, the way community management is framed within India is not in 
opposition to the state but rather as an approach that is compatible with the 
local self-government system (as explained within the National Rural Drinking 
Water Programme policy document: Government of India, 2013a). With the 
constitution seeking to promote the self-rule of villages through the democratic 
system, the local self-government system is considered to be the vehicle for 
community empowerment, rather than some kind of barrier to it. This makes the 
narrative of community management in India qualitatively different to what could 
be described as the generic international narrative of community management 
as a response to the deficient local government.  
This research sought to define participation as a form of “citizen power” and 
traced its modern day origins back to the community development movement in 
the USA (Arnstein, 1969). This approach is considered to have implicitly 
adopted a rivalrous distinction between community participation and 
government, which is rooted in a Western-centric division between citizen 
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power and government power. Within the Indian context the distinction between 
participatory approaches and the Swajal inspired devolution is not clear and it is 
difficult to divide them. Relating this point back to the arguments about 
institutionalised coproduction, Joshi and Moore (2004) maintain they do not 
associate their conception of the term with “communitarian or participatory” 
approaches to public service delivery (Joshi and Moore, 2004, p. 50). Yet within 
this research’s context, its application is still considered valid due to the way 
public participation is framed within the democratic election of local self-
governments within India. Further empirical and theoretical investigation into the 
way public participation is understood within the local self-government system 
could prove fruitful for further unpacking how and why ‘community management’ 
has taken the form it has within India. 
Looking forward, however, this researcher would also argue another critical 
distinction for understanding the future trajectory of institutionalised 
coproduction in India is likely to be the interaction of local self-government and 
the centralised SRWSAs. The legacy of devolution across in India is not even 
and there are still states where centralised state agencies have not ceded 
power to the local self-government system (Banerjee, 2013). In this research, it 
was shown in Chapter Five that the SRWSA continue to play an important role 
in all government programmes with a mandate to take on many implementation 
tasks, however in some states – particularly the poorer ones – they also retain a 
strong role in recurrent support for service delivery even though this should be 
the domain of the local self-government. In a separate study, these agencies 
have been labelled as “hierarchical and technocratic bureaucracies that are well 
suited to send down technical designs and subsidies for physical infrastructure” 
but which are poorly suited to promoting local control and participation (Hueso 
and Bell, 2013, p. 1013). In this sense, in places where devolution is not fully 
implemented and SRWSAs retain control, the future trends in the Indian sector 
may shift towards low participation models as seen in Maharashtra rather than 
the community-engaged form of institutionalised coproduction reported on in 
Kerala. Understanding the roles and relationships of the local self-government 
 194 
 
and centralised agencies across different states is also considered another 
potentially productive avenue for anticipating the balance of community and 
state provision when looking forward at the trajectories of development in 
specific states. 
7.4 The limits to the institutionalised co-production of rural 
water services 
In rounding off the theoretical discussion it is important to clarify its application 
to specific contexts, which means answering Whetten’s (1989) questions on the 
‘who? where? when?’ on the range of the discussion. The application of the 
institutionalised coproduction concept to describing the dominant modality of 
service delivery from the case studies has been initially limited to describing the 
seventeen case studies whereby the water committee is either part of, or 
supported by, the local self-government. That is, those case studies, which 
were described as the Representative VWSC, Autonomous VWSC and 
Registered Society models in Chapter Five. In each of those cases, the 
programme set-up was considered to meet the four criteria of institutionalised 
coproduction described in Section 6.1. However, this conceptual framing is 
positioned as emergent from the research findings as the researcher adopted 
the concept in order to explain a set of results that was not well accounted for 
by either the community management or community management plus 
paradigms described in Chapter Two. This is encouraging as it suggests novelty 
in the research yet it is considered to make it difficult to precisely specify the 
limits of the institutionalised coproduction concept in explaining rural water 
service delivery in India, as it was not built into the research design. However, 
the research is still considered to provide some key insights that help indicate 
where these could be but before tackling them in detail, a broader point is made 
about the relevance of the discussion to the broader literature. 
There have been critiques and concerns raised about community management 
as unsustainable (RWSN, 2009), inequitable (Chowns, 2014) and not reflecting 
consumer-demand (Hope, 2015). The notion that the approach had reached it 
‘limits’ has been raised (Moriarty, Butterworth, Franceys, et al., 2013) and yet it 
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remains a dominant approach for managing rural water services in many parts 
of the world (Broek and Brown, 2015). In this context, the reforms towards 
community management plus are considered radical in terms of recasting 
responsibility for service delivery as a shared responsibility between 
governments and communities (Baumann, 2006) yet, discursively, they are 
extremely reformist-in-scope. That is, they have retained the discourse of 
‘community management’ and continue to be limited by the traditional 
distinctions of the public-private divide. Yet in India the dominant forms of 
service delivery documented throughout this study exhibit institutional and 
financial costing arrangements that reflect a balance of recurrent inputs from the 
state (or other agencies) and communities that challenge that public-private 
divide and, more broadly, the discourse of community management. In 
explaining the arrangement found it is tempting to still be limited by a binary 
discourse with a continued emphasis on either describing it as a form of 
community management when the community takes the lead, or in cases where 
Gram Panchayats are more prominent, then a form of direct public provision 
(Rout, 2014). Yet the findings from across the case studies consistently 
suggested a more nuanced situation with water committees working within, 
alongside and with approval from local self-government in nearly all ‘community 
management’ programmes captured in this study. The services provided are 
also recurrently financed between a balance of tariffs and public subsidy (taxes) 
and so, in response, this researcher sought to introduce the emergent concept 
of institutionalised coproduction (Joshi and Moore, 2004) into the rural water 
service lexicon to explain these more nuanced arrangements.  
The introduction of this concept forms a modest attempt to suggest a shift in 
discourse beyond community management, which promotes a sense of 
equivocation or, even, contradiction when used by governments, NGOs and 
donors to describe the programmes that they deliver. Even in the conventional 
community management paradigm, external agencies played a critical role in 
leading the implementation of schemes, including finance, construction and 
capacity building, but with ambiguous on-going support arrangements. 
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Community management plus was an attempt to emphasis the on-going 
responsibility of the governments, NGOs and donors to those programmes in 
terms of recurrent monitoring, finance, technical support and capacity building 
(Lockwood and Smits, 2011). Yet this is considered to reflect a sort of 
discourse-lag, in which the conventional discourse of the sector has been 
reformed rather than changed. This is considered to provide a sense that the 
status quo is acceptable rather than highlight the importance of fully 
reconceptualising how rural water services should be delivered. In this sense, 
the coproduction discourse, which through its basic definition, indicates a 
shared role for governments and communities, is considered such a potentially 
useful route for shifting sector thinking beyond the ‘limits’ of community 
management as an approach. 
Beyond those comments on the general application of the institutionalised 
coproduction concept as a means for shifting the sector discourse, this section 
now seeks to further clarify the specific application of the term in this research. 
Firstly, the precise mode of institutionalised coproduction discussed throughout 
this chapter is considered to be limited to the Indian-national context. This is 
due to its intersection with the Panchayat Raj devolution agenda and more 
broadly with the ideology of the Swajal. This makes any inferences from the 
theoretical discussion limited in their direct relevance to other national contexts. 
Secondly, in a temporal sense, the theoretical claims made are considered to 
apply particularly to the period from the Swajaldhara (2003) policy programme, 
in which Government of India began to reconcile community management with 
its own public devolution agenda. However, the situation is considered dynamic 
and has changed since this time. In Chapter Five evidence suggested that there 
were differences between the Swajaldhara programme and the later, more 
flexible, NRDWP (2009-onwards). In the later programme many of the 
internationally influenced ideas about community management had become 
diluted. It had become only an option (rather than a requirement) to include 
community contribution to CapEx, for example, whilst the role of the Gram 
Panchayat was strengthened relative to the VWSCs. This is considered to 
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reflect a process in which the Indian state has adapted and re-casted many of 
the basic assumptions about community management to better suit its own 
political economy of rural administration. This means that the concept of 
institutionalised co-production has become more relevant since 2009 in terms of 
explaining the major approaches followed, particularly in government 
programmes. It is therefore likely that the arrangements described throughout 
the research will become even more relevant for explaining rural water service 
delivery in the coming years.  
7.5 Chapter summary and contribution to the thesis 
This chapter has further developed the theoretical contribution of the thesis in 
terms of institutionalised coproduction and explains how this challenges the 
understanding of the emerging community management plus paradigm. It 
began by explaining how the dominant institutional models and financial cost 
sharing arrangements analysed in this research matched the ideals 
underpinning the concept of institutionalised coproduction in terms of resource 
sharing, longevity as well as challenging the public-private divide (Joshi and 
Moore, 2004). That section was designed to demonstrate that the application of 
the ‘emergent’ concept of institutionalised coproduction is both empirically valid 
and theoretically coherent in terms of explaining the dominant trends found in 
the research.  
The following section then sought to analyse the context and form of 
institutionalised coproduction that have emerged within India through linking it 
with the broader political economy context. For this purpose, it applied the logic 
of the governance and logistical drivers of coproduction, as proposed by Joshi 
and Moore (2004), to compare the emergence of community management, as 
explained in the international literature (Broek and Brown, 2015; Harvey and 
Reed, 2006; Schouten and Moriarty, 2003), to the evolution of community 
management in the Indian context. This led a discussion of the influence of local 
self-government devolution in the country. In this sense, it was argued that 
community management programmes had taken on the characteristics of 
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institutionalised coproduction due to active public policy, rather than just 
resultant of insufficient public or community capacity to deliver the services.   
Building on these arguments the chapter moved to more exploratory territory to 
contend that a key difference between India, and what can be described as the 
international WASH sector, is with regard to how community participation is 
understood in relation to government. With the Indian ideal – based on the 
ideology of Swajal and expressed through the local self-government system – 
positioning community management as operationalised through the state. In 
contrast, the implicit position of the international WASH community, at least 
historically, positions community management in opposition to the state – as a 
way to circumvent deficiencies in local government. 
The chapter ended by considering the broader implications of the theoretical 
discussion in terms of the community management plus paradigm. It was 
argued that although community management plus offers an appropriate 
response to the deficiencies of the community management paradigm, retaining 
the community management discourse indicates a reformist agenda that could 
lead to the status quo being perpetuated as people continue to use the reformist 
discourse of community management plus. Whereas, through moving towards a 
discourse of coproduction – and as this research would suggest institutionalised 
coproduction – the paradigm of rural water services can be more effectively 
moved on to reflect the need for shared responsibility between states (and other 
agencies) and communities to ensure successful service delivery over the long-
term. 
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8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter considers the conclusions from the research. First, it brings 
together the major findings from the thesis and considers them in relation to the 
research questions and the general paradigmatic claims about community 
management, as set out at the end of Chapter Two. Second, it discusses the 
implications of the research in relation to the SDGs that will shape the global 
approach for delivering rural water services over the next 15 years. Third, it 
offers some further reflection on the strengths and weaknesses of the research 
methodology. Fourth, it discusses routes for further research building on the 
thesis. Fifth, the thesis is concluded with a final comment on the relevance of 
the research findings to the wider rural water sector. 
8.1 Assessing the paradigmatic claims in the community 
management of rural water services 
A number of general paradigmatic claims about community management were 
set out in Chapter Two, Section 2.3. These were designed to summarise the 
literature into what were described loosely as the ‘paradigmatic claims of 
community management’ and the ‘next generation paradigmatic claims of 
community management plus’. These were also related to each research 
question as represented in Table 8-1. Together, the findings reported in 
Chapters Five and Six, were considered to reflect the community management 
plus paradigm rather than the conventional community management paradigm. 
However, more broadly, it was argued in Chapter Seven that re-conceptualising 
the forms of service delivery identified as a form of ‘institutionalised 
coproduction’ (Joshi and Moore, 2004), was a discursively more appropriate 
framing for the rural water sector. Concluding remarks about the major sources 
of evidence and underpinning logic for this argument are discussed in this 
section. 
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Table 8-1 – Paradigmatic claims in the community management of rural 
water services 
Level of investigation Paradigmatic claims for 
community management 
New generation 
paradigmatic claims for 
community management 
plus 
Research Question One - 
What are the type and 
characteristics of 
organisational arrangements 
found in successful 
community management 
programmes in India? 
 
- Community 
participation in 
service delivery will 
deliver successful 
service outcomes 
(Prokopy, 2009) 
- Professionalisation of 
community role in 
service delivery will 
delivery successful 
service outcomes 
(Lockwood and Smits, 
2011) 
Research Question Two - 
What are the indicative 
financial costs and cost 
sharing arrangements for 
successful community 
management programmes in 
India? 
- Community 
contributes 10% of 
capital costs and 
then covers recurrent 
costs through tariffs 
(Joshi, 2003) 
- Recurrent costs have 
to be subsidised by 
support agents to 
become sustainable – 
although the level of 
subsidy is not clear 
Research Question Three - To 
what extent do the findings 
from questions one and two 
support the justification for the 
community management plus 
paradigm as a dominant 
management model for rural 
water services in India and 
other relevant contexts? 
- Paradigm framed 
through ideas about 
collective-action and 
participation 
 
- Institutionalised co-
production of public 
services to frame new 
generation of 
community 
management 
In Chapter Six, the financial analysis demonstrated that successfully served 
communities receive significant recurrent support both via direct subsidy to 
OpEx and through OpEx Enabling Support activities that account for 7-48% of 
recurrent expenditure, excluding CapManEx. This evidence, presented 
specifically in Section 6.6, is in stark contrast to the conventional principle that 
communities can cover 100% of recurrent costs (Joshi, 2003; Schouten and 
Moriarty, 2003). In this sense, it is considered to validate the next generation 
community management plus paradigmatic claims on the importance of external 
support for successful service delivery, as set out in Table 8.1. However, the 
research also showed that community contribution to OpEx – effectively tariff 
payments – is the factor most strongly associated with high service level 
performance across all case studies, as reported in Section 6.8. This to some 
extent reaffirms the emphasis on the value of community contribution in the 
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conventional community management paradigm. Withstanding that finding, the 
research is considered to have robustly demonstrated that community 
contributions should be matched by significant recurrent subsidy from 
governments and other agencies to deliver successful outcomes. Practically, 
the thesis also provided some level of guidance for the wider sector on the 
extent and level at which this support should be subsidised, as summarised in 
Chapter Six, Section 6.9.  
Within the institutional analysis, as presented in Chapter Five, the various 
qualitative-quantitative indicators that were used to compare case studies can 
also be considered to support the ‘next generation paradigmatic claims’. In 
Section 5.2, on the organisational arrangements for community service 
provision, it was shown that, on average, high levels of professionalisation in 
service provision are more closely associated with successful service level 
outcomes than high levels of community participation. However, more 
fundamentally, the institutional analysis revealed a close intersection between 
the local self-government and water committees as the key characteristics of 
the service deliver arrangements studied in India. When compared to the 
international origins of community management as a vehicle for bypassing 
failing government supply (Harvey and Reed, 2006), the contemporary Indian 
experience shows different situation in which a constitutionally empowered local 
self-government played a significant role within the programmes studied. This 
was described as a form of institutionalised coproduction rather than community 
management or community management plus. 
In Chapter Seven, Section 7.1, it was explained that the conditions associated 
with institutionalised co-production were considered to be when public agencies 
work alongside private citizens to deliver public services and there is: 
substantial resource contribution from both parties; long-term relationships; 
informal or formal arrangements governing the relationship; and, there is a 
blurring of distinctions between public and private sectors (Joshi and Moore, 
2004). That chapter demonstrated that the characteristics of service delivery 
studied in India were deemed to match these circumstances across all the case 
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studies apart from those three labelled as external agency support, which 
involve NGOs rather than governments. The introduction of this new concept 
was therefore considered empirically valid as a general description of the 
service delivery models studied. It was also considered discursively important 
as it explicitly takes into account the role of government in ensuring successful 
service delivery in the country. 
This is an important contribution of the research as in Chapter One and Two the 
thesis started by expressing the general dissatisfaction with the community 
management paradigm and the associated levels of failure in rural water service 
delivery in both academic (Broek and Brown, 2015; Harvey and Reed, 2006; 
Hope, 2015; Moriarty, Butterworth, Franceys, et al., 2013) and practice-
orientated literature (Lockwood and Smits, 2011; Lockwood, 2002, 2004). 
Ironically, this contemporary criticism of community management echoed the 
historic literature that called into question the supply-driven approach of 
governments in the 1970s and 1980s (Churchill, 1987; Saunders and Warford, 
1976). In both situations the issues identified were connected to low levels of 
performance in the operation and maintenance of services that was leading to 
unsustainability. The contemporary practice of institutionalised coproduction in 
India can therefore be considered to be a kind of ‘third-way’ hybrid of public and 
community provision that offers some insights into future trajectories of service 
delivery models for low and lower middle income contexts. 
8.2 Research implications 
The major theoretical implications of the work have been discussed in Chapter 
Seven, so the intention here is to consider the research’s implications for the 
policies and practices associated with rural water services. For this purpose, 
this section frames the discussion in the context of the Sustainable 
Development Goal 6 to “ensure availability and sustainable management of 
water and sanitation for all” (United Nations, 2015). That goal commits the 
global community a number of targets and principles of which two are 
particularly relevant in terms of this research:  
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- Target 6.1 By 2030, achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable 
drinking water for all; 
- Target 6.B: Support and strengthen the participation of local communities in improving 
water and sanitation management 
Target 6.1 has some particularly critical words in terms of shaping the ambitions 
of the global water community. They are considered to be universal, equitable, 
safe and affordable. This research has findings that are especially relevant for 
the debates about safe and affordable drinking water whilst it also provides 
findings that have secondary implications for debates about universal and 
equitable services. It also has implications for Target 6.B in terms of the 
participation of local communities which will be addressed below. 
Initially, focusing on the notion of safe water services there is evidence that 
many improved water supply services do not provide technically safe water 
services (Clasen, 2012; Onda et al., 2012; Parker et al., 2010). This research 
did not attempt to measure water quality but through the service level approach 
provided a more sophisticated measure of different components of water 
services that contribute to their safety, as compared to the basic measure of 
improved and unimproved access used in the MDGs (Burr and Fonseca, 2013). 
As reported in Chapter Six, Section 6.2.2, the analysis showed that people with 
household connections were significantly more likely to have higher service 
levels, than any other water access point – over 70% of respondents with this 
type of access in programme villages reach at least basic on the composition 
service level indicator. In comparison, when taking data from the one case 
study with handpumps, 0% of respondents reported receiving a service that 
could be classified as basic on the service level ladder.  
The research can therefore be considered to show that rural water service 
policy around the world should have the ambition of delivering piped water 
supply with household connections in order to deliver high service levels. This 
reinforces the timeliness of the Indian policy shift in 2013 (Government of India, 
2013a) to concentrate resources on piped water supply with household 
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connections. Yet in terms of a wider context, Sub-Saharan Africa remains the 
region with the biggest overall need in terms of rural water services (WHO and 
UNICEF, 2013). In that context community management had become 
associated with handpumps, which are the most common form of water system 
in rural areas (Broek and Brown, 2015). The next generation challenge in that 
continent will be to move people from handpumps to piped water supply and, 
so, a key policy-related finding from India is that the forms of service delivery 
studied here can play a role in this transition.  
However, with increased technical sophisticated, comes increased cost. Table 
8-2 below illustrates the higher levels of investment found in this research than 
had previously been reported on (Burr and Fonseca, 2013; Burr, 2015). As 
discussed in Chapter Six, Section 6.9, through the cross-case study analysis 
methodology this research was able to reveal many ‘hidden costs’ related to 
rural water services, such as the subsidised power costs that rural water service 
providers receive in several states. It also revealed a diverse range of different 
funding mechanisms that feed into rural water services coming from various 
layers of government and specific funding streams. It is contended that previous 
research underestimated such costs by relying largely on survey data for 
collecting primary data on costs (Burr and Fonseca, 2013), rather than the key 
informant interviews that feed into the case studies for this work. In this sense, 
the research has demonstrated that the financial costs of delivering high-quality 
rural water services in India are higher than the widely used sector benchmarks 
indicated (Burr and Fonseca, 2013; Mcintyre et al., 2014), as illustrated in Table 
8-2. 
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Table 8-2 – Summary of financial requirements for successful community 
management 
Source CapEx (IQR) Recurrent (IQR) 
High Service Level 
Performance (Community 
Water Plus) 
$184-$247 $6-$32 
Medium Service Level 
Performance (Community 
Water Plus) 
$73-$279 $6-28 
Low Service Level 
Performance (Community 
Water Plus) 
$93-$281 $5-$13 
WASHCost International 
Benchmark (Burr and 
Fonseca, 2013) 
$31-$132 $4-$16 
WASHCost Andhra Pradesh 
Benchmark (Burr 2014) 
$38-$66 $0.5-$1.6 
In the context of the SDG target 6.1, recognising the higher than previously 
recognised costs associated with successful services means that the 
affordability of services to all in society is a significant challenge. In India the 
solution to this problem has been for government to leverage the capability of 
the local self-government and to subsidy services either directly or indirectly, as 
shown in Chapter 6, Section 6.6. This is considered a critical lesson from this 
research: rural water services require significant levels of subsidy if they are to 
be successful – a finding that has been recently recognised in other studies 
(Franceys et al., 2016). Mobilising sufficient funds for public investment is 
considered to be critical for ensuring the related challenges of equitable and 
universal services are achieved. Yet with public fund mobilisation limited in most 
low and lower-income countries (Norman et al., 2015), ensuring users that are 
able continue to pay for at least some of the costs through user charges is still 
likely to be important going forward. This balance of funding, as well as other 
forms of joint-contribution between the state and communities, is considered 
critical for the future of the sector and why the notion of institutionalised co-
production was discussed so extensively in Chapter Seven. 
In that spirit, moving onto SDG target 6B on the need to support and strengthen 
community participation in water (and sanitation) management, this research 
raises a sceptical note. This is not because of a belief that community 
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participation is bad for rural water services but rather that community 
participation is not a necessary condition for success. This observation is made 
in two regards. First, the data from this research shows no relationship between 
the observed community participation level and service level outcomes, as 
presented in Chapter Five and discussed in Chapter Seven. Second, the 
emphasis – almost fetishism – of participation in rural water supply is 
considered to be misplaced in terms of achieving universal coverage as per the 
SDG target 6.1. There are many communities – or parts of communities – 
where active participation in rural water services is problematic due to issues 
such as social structures of patronage and exclusion (Nelson and Agrawal, 
2008) or, simply, some community members having limited capacity to be 
effective managers of water services. Based on the evidence presented and the 
explained logic of reasoning, the thesis supports a change in emphasis in policy 
and practice around community participation. Communities should still be 
involved but there are different ways for this to happen – either through highly 
devolved democratic systems, conventional participatory approaches or shifting 
towards an urban-consumer type arrangement. Key to the shift though is that 
whatever role communities take in particular programmes there needs to be an 
emphasis on greater responsibility sharing with governments and other external 
agencies. It is in this sense, that a shift in the paradigmatic discourse of rural 
water supply from one focused on community management to one about 
coproduction is considered the most critical implication of the research.  
8.3 Reflections on the limitations of the research 
The limitations of the research methodology were considered in Chapter Four 
but this section provides a useful window for some brief, final reflections on the 
limitations of the research. As discussed in that chapter, the methodological 
tension in this research has been the balance between a conventional ‘large-n’ 
and ‘small-n’ research design into what has been described as a ‘med-n’ study. 
Synthesising so much quantitative and qualitative data within a thesis has 
necessitated having what could be described as a ‘constrained analysis’ on 
certain elements. In terms of qualitative analysis the approach has been 
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focused almost exclusively on formal organisational arrangements and 
characteristics. This research has not attempted to interrogate what could be 
characterised as the informal aspects of service delivery, such as how personal 
relationships at the village level may impact outcomes. This is partly because 
the resolution and scope of the synthesis was not considered conducive to 
studying such informality.  
The precise methodology of qualitative synthesis relied on a series of 
qualitative-quantitative data processing tools. This researcher undertook a 
harmonisation process of results across the case studies through which it was 
clear that some elements had been interpreted in different ways by certain 
research teams. However, the research remained exposed to an inherent 
potential bias in the subjective interpretation of the use of these tools meaning 
that the findings from such a specific tool should be treated with some degree of 
caution. It is, however, through the process of triangulation between these types 
of qualitative-quantitative tools and other data streams (such as the financial 
analysis) that the research is able to provide a comprehensive picture of 
community management in India in one coherent study. In this sense, this 
mixed methodological approach, whilst exposing the study to potential bias, has 
also provided an inherent strength in that different types of data can be 
triangulated together to provide new evidence on this old problem. 
8.4 Future research 
The thesis is considered to have a number of implications for future research on 
rural water service delivery, institutionalised co-production and related areas. 
The empirical focus for these future research trajectories are considered to be 
both within India and also in the aforementioned context of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Within the Indian context it is suggested that this thesis (and the broader 
Community Water Plus study more generally) has provided a comprehensive 
overview of contemporary practices of community-involved service delivery 
(which have been conceptualised as through the prism of institutionalised 
coproduction). As India is becoming increasingly wealthy and successful in 
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delivering rural water services, the pragmatic need for further research on such 
matters becomes reduced. This research has already largely captured which 
models are working in order to provide knowledge and insight for application in 
some of the lower performing regions of India and other countries. In this sense, 
the researcher does not advocate further large-scale research on a similar 
agenda in this context.   
More broadly, a related challenge to water services in India remains sanitation 
access and use. Some 600 million Indians practice open defecation with the 
vast majority living in rural areas (WHO and UNICEF, 2013). The sanitation 
challenge is considered distinct to the water service challenge largely due to the 
scale at which systems are usually developed. For piped water services – and 
even handpumps – the physical systems developed are conventionally 
designed to serve a community which makes them ‘naturally’ suitable for some 
form of communal management structure. Sanitation, on the other hand, is 
conventionally (and most appropriately) constructed at a household scale – 
noting that most installations in rural areas will be non-networked and hence 
modular. There would therefore be an interesting research avenue in India 
seeking to assess the relationship between rural households and the public 
agencies in initiatives such as the Swachh Bharat Mission (Gramin) 
(Government of India, 2014) which is the main policy programme designed to 
promote sanitation use in rural areas. There are interesting questions regarding 
whether the institutionalised co-production between VWSCs and Gram 
Panchayats can facilitate the expansion and use of modular sanitation units at 
the household scale rather the communal water systems. Also, in a related 
sense, in assessing the level of support that is required from government 
agencies – in terms of financial subsidy and support services – to trigger 
sustainable sanitation use across varying contexts in the country. It is 
anticipated that the strategies for enabling this would differ from the rural water 
service sector and the continued low level of sanitation need in India indicates 
that there is a strong research need to deliver better solutions for this problem. 
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Beyond India the rural water services challenge remains significant. The 
successful forms of institutionalised coproduction in India are deeply intertwined 
with the particular system of local self-government. They are also linked to the 
increasing wealth of the country that enables the government to subsidise rural 
communities for a range of public services. Further research building on this 
study could therefore be focused on delivering research in a number of 
countries at varying levels of development and with different forms of 
government system (degrees of centralisation and decentralisation) particularly 
in the Sub-Saharan African context. With an attempt to identify forms of, or 
strategies for promoting, the institutionalised co-production of rural water 
services. A particular challenge for future research in such contexts will be 
focused on learning how best to facilitate, finance and govern the transition from 
handpumps to piped water supplies in rural areas using a community 
management plus approach. 
8.5 Final conclusions 
Evidence from the low and lower middle income world of low levels of 
sustainability and poor service level outcomes in rural water services had left 
many questioning the dominant management model – the community 
management approach. This had led to a number of calls for reform toward an 
approach in which communities received substantial recurrent support for 
service delivery – a model labelled community management plus. In this 
context, the research investigated twenty cases of successful community 
management programmes in India. This has revealed there is much to learn 
from these experiences that can provide answers to a number of simple 
questions: what does successful community management plus look like? How 
much does it cost to support it? And what do these successful approaches tell 
us, if anything, about the future of community management plus in 
contemporary India and elsewhere?  
The research demonstrated that successful forms of ‘community management’ 
in India were distinct to what was described as ‘the conventional community 
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management paradigm’. It showed that communities received significant 
subsidy to cover operation and maintenance costs and therefore can be 
considered to confirm that these successful cases exhibit the characteristics of 
the community management plus paradigm. However, the showed that on-
going support represented up to 50% of the recurrent costs of services whilst it 
was also identified how water committees has become embedded within the 
local self-government system in India. It was argued it was therefore useful to 
reconceptualise community management plus as a form of institutionalised co-
production (Joshi and Moore, 2004). This shift in discourse is considered 
discursively important as it more accurately captures how private citizens work 
alongside the state to deliver rural water services, rather than it being the 
community’s responsibility alone. Going forward, it is such coproduction that is 
considered essential to the world overcoming the cycle of unsustainability that 
has plagued the rural water sector. 
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APPENDICES 
The Appendices provide supplementary material to the thesis. To maintain an 
appropriate length it has been decided to include what is considered to be the 
most relevant information directly in this document and then provide links to 
publically available documents for the full supplementary information. 
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Appendix A – Journal papers and author 
bibliography 
This appendix provides access to two led-authored journal papers published 
that provide a broader review of the global evidence on community 
management plus and community management in India. It also provides a list of 
other publications published in the course of this PhD. 
A.1 Systematic review paper 
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Reference: Hutchings, P., Chan, M.Y., Cuadrado, L., Ezbakhe, F., Mesa, B., 
Tamekawa, C., Franceys, R. (2015). A systematic review of success factors in 
the community management of rural water supplies over the past 30 years. 
Water Policy. Vol 17, Iss 5, P 963-983. 
Abstract: Community management is the accepted management model for 
rural water supplies in many low and middle income countries. However, 
endemic problems in the sustainability and scalability of this model are leading 
many to conclude we have reached the limits of an approach that is too reliant 
on voluntarism and informality. Accepting this criticism but recognising that 
many cases of success have been reported over the past 30 years, this study 
systematically reviews and analyses the development pattern of 174 successful 
community management case studies. The synthesis confirms the premise that 
for community management to be sustained at scale, community institutions 
need a ‘plus’ that includes long-term external support, with the majority of high 
performing cases involving financial support, technical advice and managerial 
advice. Internal community characteristics were also found to be influential in 
terms of success, including collective initiative, strong leadership and 
institutional transparency. Through a meta-analysis of success in different 
regions, the paper also indicates an important finding on the direct relationship 
between success and the prevailing socio-economic wealth in a society. This 
holds implications for policy and programme design with a need to consider how 
broad structural conditions may dictate the relative success of different forms of 
community management. 
Keywords: Community management; Participation; Rural water supply; Service 
delivery; Sustainability 
Link to published article (firewall):  
http://wp.iwaponline.com/content/17/5/963 
Link to public Dropbox: 
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https://www.dropbox.com/s/jh0fo2h6zo5utfz/Systematic%20review%20of%20gl
obal%20CM%20evidence.pdf?dl=0 
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A.2 History, concepts and typologies of community 
management in India paper 
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Reference: Hutchings, P., Franceys, R., Smits, S., Mekala, S. and James, V. 
(2016) Revisiting the history, concepts and typologies of community 
management for rural drinking water supply in India, International Journal of 
Water Resources Development, DOI: 10.1080/07900627.2016.1145576 
Abstract: Community management has been widely criticized, yet it continues 
to play a significant role in rural drinking water supply. In India, as with other 
‘emerging’ economies, the management model must now adapt to meet the 
policy demand for ever-increasing technical sophistication. Given this context, 
the paper reviews the history and concepts of community management to 
propose three typologies that better account for the changing role of the 
community and external support entities found in successful cases. It argues 
that external support entities must be prepared to take greater responsibility for 
providing ongoing support to communities for ensuring continuous service 
delivery. 
Link to published article (firewall):  
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07900627.2016.1145576 
Link to public Dropbox: 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/etpw7kxulj1ykho/CM%20of%20RWS_journalpaper.
pdf?dl=0 
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A.3 Academic bibliography from PhD period 
Journals 
 Hutchings, P. et al. (2015) ‘A systematic review of success factors in the 
community management of rural water supplies over the past 30 years’, 
Water Policy, 17(5) IWA Publishing, p. 963. Available at: 
10.2166/wp.2015.128 (Accessed: 7 May 2015). 
 Hutchings, P. et al. (2016) ‘Revisiting the history, concepts and 
typologies of community management for rural drinking water supply in 
India’, International Journal of Water Resources Development, pp. 1–18. 
Available at: 10.1080/07900627.2016.1145576 (Accessed: 21 March 
2016). 
 Hutchings, P. et al. (2016) ‘The political risks of technological 
determinism in rural water supply: A case study from Bihar, India’, 
Journal of Rural Studies, 45, pp. 252–259. 
Conferences 
 Hutchings, P. and Franceys, R. (2016) ‘Utilitisation’ of rural water supply 
for villages and small towns in the developmental states of India. 
Proceedings of the International Water Association World Water 
Congress and Exhibition 2016. Brisbane.  
 Franceys, R. and Hutchings, P. (2016). Community management plus: 
successful rural water supply (India).  Proceedings of WASH Futures 
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 Hutchings, P., Franceys, R., Smits, S., and Mekala, S. (2015). 
Community Water Plus: Assessing the ‘Plus’ of successful community-
managed rural water supply. Proceeding of the 38th WEDC International 
Conference. Refereed Paper 2194. Loughborough University. 
Loughborough.  
 Snehalatha, M., Smits, S., Jasthi, S., Hutchings, P., Poonia, R., Daniel, 
Ch., Chandra Dash, P. Assessing the “Plus” of successful community-
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managed water supply programs in India. Proceedings of India Water 
Week 2015. New Delhi.  
 Hutchings, P. (2013). “Discourse, institution and technology in water 
crisis: Contested development in rural Bihar, India.” Proceeding of the 
Early Career Researchers in Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Conference. 
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Appendix B – Research protocols and ethics form 
The research protocols used for the fieldwork come in three documents 
covering a total of 92 pages. This section therefore provides links to the three 
fieldwork protocols which cover the Enabling Support Environment, Community 
Service Provider and Household level respectively. The household survey 
format used and the ethics form approving the research within the body are 
presented in this document below the links. 
B.1 Protocol links 
 
1 – Enabling Support Environment Research Guidance Document 
Community Water plus (March 2014) 
Link to public Dropbox: 
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/213512409/1%20-
%20Enabling%20Support%20Environment%20Research%20Protocol.docx 
 
2 – Community Service Provider Research Guidance Document 
Community Water plus (March 2014) 
Link to public Dropbox: 
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/213512409/2%20-
%20Community%20Service%20Provider%20Research%20Guidance%20B
ooklet.docx 
 
3 – Household Research Guidance Document Community Water plus 
(March 2014) 
Link to public Dropbox: 
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/213512409/3%20-
%20Household%20Service%20Levels%20Research%20Guidance%20Book
let.docx  
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B.2 Household Survey Format 
 
Household survey 
1.1 IDENTIFICATION OF HABITATION 
 Name (enter text)  
Name (enter 
text) 
Habitation  Gram Panchayat  
Revenue Village  District  
Location of the House from main 
water source/service reservoir 
(circle the right option) 
Close Medium  Distant 
 
1.2 HOUSEHOLD PARTICULARS (Enter text or circle the right option) 
House Number       
Type of house Pucca  Semi-pucca  Kuchcha  
Religion Hindu Muslim Christian  Others  
Caste OC BC       MBC   SC ST Others  
Does he/she own land? YES NO     
If yes, how many acres Wet: Dry:   Others:  
Does he/she have a ration card? YES NO If yes Pink White O
t
h
e
r
s 
 
1.3 HOUSEHOLD DETAILS 
Circle who is 
being surveyed 
Name Sex 
(M/F) 
Age 
(Yrs) 
Education 
(Use Code) 
Occupation 
(Use Code) 
Annual Income 
Main 
Subsidiar
y 
Main Subsidiary 
Head Male         
Head Female         
Survey 
respondent*  
        
Educational level: Illiterate– 1; 1st to 5th class -2; 6th to 10th Class-3; intermediate – 4; Degree – 5; Post Graduate – 6 and 
professional degree7, Occupation: Agriculture-1, Agricultural Wage Labour-2, Govt/Regular/Irregular non-farm employment-3, 
Self employment including business-4, Student-5, Retired – 6 Homemaker – 7 Others - 8 
*Only complete if the survey respondent is not the Head Male or Head Female 
 
1.4 HOUSEHOLD DETAILS CONT.  
Total Family 
size 
Males Females Children Elderly Disabled Any other household 
income  
       
2.1 WHAT WATER SOURCES DOES THE HOUSEHOLD USE?  
Water Source 
label 
List all the water sources the household 
uses for drinking, cooking, domestic 
(washing, bathing etc.), toilet usage, 
kitchen gardens and livestock each day.  
Is this water source managed by the 
community service  provider under 
study? (Enter: Yes, No or Don’t Know) 
A.   
B.*   
C.*   
 Comments  
Source Code: 1 -  Household connection, 2 - Pit tap, 3 - Public stand post, 4 - Private open well, 5 – Private well with handpump, 
6 -Communal open well, 7 - Communal open well with hand pump, 8 - Agricultural well,  9 - Bottled water, 10 – Tanker, 11 – 
Other [explain in comments section].  
*If further sources are used regularly alongside Source A, fill out the details for Source B & C. If not leave blank. 
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2.2.    WHAT IS THE HOUSEHOLD WATER COLLECTION AND USE OF THE DIFFERENT WATER SOURCES EACH DAY? 
 Source 
(use 
code) 
Size of 
house
hold 
storag
e* 
Time it 
takes to 
fill 
storage
*(mins) 
Time 
it 
takes 
to use 
storag
e*(ho
urs)  
Time 
per 
trip** 
(min) 
Size of 
water 
pot ** 
(litres) 
Pots 
used 
per 
day** 
(numbe
r) 
Trips 
per 
day** 
(numb
er) 
Water 
fetche
r (use 
code) 
Time 
availabl
e per 
day 
(min) 
Regulari
ty of 
supply 
(Y, N, 
DK) 
Perception of 
Quality (tick) 
 
Bad Accep
table 
Good 
Summer               
Water Source 
A 
              
Water Source 
B 
              
Water Source 
C 
              
Non-Summer 
Water Source 
A 
              
Water Source 
B 
              
Water Source 
C 
              
Comments 
Source Code:  1 -  Household connection, 2 - Pit tap, 3 - Public stand post, 4 - Private open well, 5 – Private well with handpump, 
6 -Communal open well, 7 - Communal open well with hand pump, 8 - Agricultural well,  9 - Bottled water, 10 – Tanker, 11 – 
Other [explain in comments section].  
Water Fetcher  Women = W, Man = M, Child = C  then add number to indicate how many of each (I.e. “W2, C1” indicates two 
women and one child collects water) 
*These need only be answered if this water source is a household connection 
**These need only be answered if the household fetches water from this water source  
COLLECT FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE PRIMARY WATER SOURCES 
(UP TO A MAXIMUM OF 3 SOURCES) 
3.1    WATER SERVICE DELIVERY STATUS: WATER SOURCE A (Circle the right answer) 
Satisfaction with supply (summer) 
VS – Very satisfied            SWS – Somewhat Satisfied                   NS – Not 
Satisfied 
 Satisfaction with supply (non- 
summer) 
VS – Very satisfied            SWS – Somewhat Satisfied                   NS – Not 
Satisfied 
 Comments  
 
3.2    WATER SERVICE BREAKDOWNS: WATER SOURCE A 
Number of times this water supply has broken down in the last 
12 months (enter number of times) 
 
 
Average time taken for repairs (enter time in hours)  
If you have a problem with this water supply, is it clear who you 
complain to? (circle the answer) 
YES….NO 
Have you ever had to complain about this water supply? YES….NO 
If so, was your complaint responded to adequately? YES….NO….NA 
 
3.3 PAYMENTS FOR WATER: WATER SOURCE A 
 3.3.1 Does the household pay a water tariff for this water source?     YES   NO   NA 
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3.3.2 If yes, how much per month Rs. ____________________/ NA  
 3.3.3 If No, what are the reasons for non payment? 
Not satisfied with water service 
YES         NO 
YES         NO 
YES         NO 
YES         NO 
Forget to pay on time 
No compulsion to pay (e.g., penalties) 
Other (specify) 
Comments  
3.4 Have you had to pay an additional payment for repairs? YES   NO   NA 
 
3.5 If yes, how much per repair  Rs. ________________________________________  / NA 
 
4.1    WATER SERVICE DELIVERY STATUS: WATER SOURCE B* (Circle the right answer) 
*Complete when necessary 
Satisfaction with supply (summer) VS – Very satisfied            SWS – Somewhat Satisfied                   NS – Not 
Satisfied 
Satisfaction with supply (non- 
summer) 
VS – Very satisfied            SWS – Somewhat Satisfied                   NS – Not 
Satisfied 
Comments     
 
4.2    WATER SERVICE BREAKDOWNS: WATER SOURCE B 
Number of times this water supply has broken down in the last 
12 months (enter number of times) 
 
 
Usual time taken for repairs (enter time in hours)  
 
If you had a problem with this water supply, is it clear who you 
complain to? (circle the answer) 
YES….NO 
Have you ever had to complain about this water supply? 
 
YES….NO 
If so, was your complaint responded to adequately? 
 
YES….NO….NA 
 
4.3 PAYMENTS FOR WATER: WATER SOURCE B 
 4.3.1 Does the household pay a water tariff for this water source?     YES   NO   NA 
  
4.3.2 If yes, how much per month Rs. ____________________/ NA  
 4.3.3 If No, what are the reasons for non payment? 
Not satisfied with water service YES       No 
Forget to pay on time YES       No 
No compulsion to pay (e.g., 
penalties) 
YES       No 
Other (specify) YES       No 
Comments  
4.4 Have you had to pay an additional payment for repairs? YES   NO   NA 
 
4.5 If yes, how much per repair Rs. ________________________________________  / NA 
 
5.1    WATER SERVICE DELIVERY STATUS: WATER SOURCE C* (Circle the right answer) 
*Complete when necessary 
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Satisfaction with supply (summer) VS – Very satisfied            SWS – Somewhat Satisfied                   NS – Not 
Satisfied 
Satisfaction with supply (non- 
summer) 
VS – Very satisfied            SWS – Somewhat Satisfied                   NS – Not 
Satisfied 
Comments     
 
5.2    WATER SERVICE BREAKDOWNS: WATER SOURCE C 
Number of times this water supply has broken down in the 
last 12 months (enter number of times) 
 
 
Usual time taken for repairs (enter time in hours)  
If you had a problem with this water supply, is it clear who 
you complain to? (circle the answer) 
YES….NO 
Have you ever had to complain about this water supply? 
 
YES….NO 
If so, was your complaint responded to adequately? 
 
YES….NO….NA 
 
5.3 PAYMENTS FOR WATER: WATER SOURCE C 
 5.3.1 Does the household pay a water tariff for this water source?     YES   NO   NA 
  
5.3.2 If yes, how much per month Rs. ____________________/ NA  
 5.3.3 If No, what are the reasons for non payment? 
Not satisfied with water service YES       No 
Forget to pay on time YES       No 
No compulsion to pay (e.g., 
penalties) 
YES       No 
Other (specify) YES       No 
Comments  
5.4 Have you had to pay an additional payment for repairs? YES   NO   NA 
 
5.5 If yes, how much per repair Rs. ________________________________________  / NA 
 
 
6. GENERAL INFORMATION ON COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN WATER SUPPLY 
6.1 Is any of your family a part of a water management committee?  Yes / No 
6.2 Are any meetings held on water supply issues by the committee?  Yes / No 
6.3 Did any one in the family attend any meetings on water supply?  Yes / No 
6.4 Were there any awareness campaigns or training conducted in 
support of water supply issues? 
 
Yes / No 
6.5 Did any one in the family attend any training on water supply issues?  Yes / No 
 
7. FINALLY IS THERE ANY COMMENTS ABOUT THE WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO MAKE?  
 
 
8. ENUMERATOR SIGN-OFF 
Investigator name, mobile 
number and email address 
 
 
Date  
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B.3 Ethics form 
Community Water Plus 
High risk ethics proposal 
 
Research conducted by: Alison Parker (a.parker@cranfield.ac.uk), Richard Franceys (PI, 
r.w.a.franceys@cranfield.ac.uk), Paul Hutchings (TBC) and subcontractors at ASCI, IRC, MNIT 
and CEC. 
 
This research is high risk because some participants will be incentivised for participating, and 
only verbal consent will be obtained. 
 
Fieldwork from Jan 2014 to March 2016. 
 
The research question is: 
What type, extent and style of supporting organisations are required to ensure sustainable 
community managed water service delivery relative to varying technical modes of supply? 
Specific research sub-questions are: 
• What are the current modalities of successful community management and how do 
they differ in their degrees of effectiveness? 
• What supporting organisations are in place to ensure sustainable water service 
delivery relative to alternative modes of supply? 
• Can particular trajectories of professionalising and strengthening the support to 
rural water be identified? 
The methodology will use interviews and focus-groups to develop 18 case studies of 
sustainable community managed water service delivery.   The informants will be community 
members and key informants on the community management of water supply.   These 
participants do not require insurance.   The sponsor, AusAID, will not be providing access to the 
research participant’s.   No vulnerable groups will be targeted in the research although they may 
be encountered during the research activities as informants will be interviewed in their homes 
where vulnerable people may be present. 
 
The information sought from community members is: 
• Basic demographics and wealth indicators  
• Household water supply service level  
• Household financial contribution to water supply / willingness-to-pay 
• Community engagement in the water supply system, looking at influence over 
technology choice, tariff setting, service level (demand) – and also discussing the 
structures of the community organisation  
 
The information sought from key informants is: 
• The structure and style of support services for the given water supply 
system 
• The resource cost of these support services, including financial and labour 
costs 
• The sources of funding for these support services 
• Any available data on the performance of support services 
 
The results will be published in academic journals as well as reported to AusAID. 
 
The following ethical issues will be addressed: 
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Informed consent 
Key informants will be asked to complete the consent form in Appendix A.   Community 
members will have the statement in Appendix B read to them in their local language and asked 
to give verbal consent.   Consent will be sought before the interviews start. 
 
Deception 
Participants will not be deceived at any stage in the study. 
 
Freedom of participation 
There will be no pressure on individuals to participate. Researchers will be aware of the 
influences of peer pressure, power relationships, and vested interests when approaching 
individuals to participate in a study.   Community members will be identified to take part in the 
research by the village administration. 
 
Confidentiality 
Community respondents will not be identified in the research outputs.   Key informants will be 
informed that their responses may not remain anonymous, although permission will be sought 
to use specific quotes.   All data stored will be password protected. 
 
Protection from harm  
No  physical,psychological, emotional, social, spiritual, career, reputational, financial 
or legal harm is anticipated form this activity. 
 
Observational intrusion 
No observation is planned, although participants’ responses may be triangulated by informally 
observing practices in public areas.   Particular account should be taken of local cultural values 
and of the possibility of intruding upon the privacy of individuals who, even while in a normally 
public space, may believe they are unobserved 
 
Debriefing 
Once data has been collectedrespondents will be thanked for taking part in the study and 
community members will be assured that data will be held anonymously. Respondents will be 
reminded of their right to withdraw their data without explanation although this opportunity might 
be time-limited (i.e.anonymising the data for analysis purposes will mean we are no longer able 
to identify their data). Respondents will be provided with the researcher  contact details. 
 
Right to withdraw 
Respondents will be reminded of their right to withdraw their data without explanation at the 
start and the end of the interview. 
 
Data storage 
Data will be password protected. 
 
Conflicts of interest 
The conduct of research will be fair, honest and transparent. No conflicts of interest personal, 
professional, economic and political)between the researcher, funder/s, and/or participants and 
the wider community are anticipated but researchers will inform the relevant stakeholders if any 
arise.     
 
Professional Conduct 
The researchers will not engage in any of the following activities. 
• Fabrication: e.g. the creation of fictitious data, evidence, documentation or 
results. 
• Falsification: e.g. the inappropriate manipulation or selection of data, evidence, 
imagery or documentation. 
• Misrepresentation: this may include: 
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- Misrepresentation of data: e.g. the undisclosed suppression of 
evidence or findings, or the deliberate or negligent presentation of a flawed 
interpretation of data. 
- Misrepresentation of interests: e.g. the failure to disclose the interests 
of the researcher or of the funder of the research. 
- Misrepresentation by the researcher of their qualifications or 
experience. 
- Misrepresentation of involvement: e.g. the inappropriate or unjustified 
claim by a researcher to authorship or attribution, or the denial of others' rights 
to authorship or attribution. 
- Misrepresentation of publication: e.g. the undisclosed duplication of 
publication, or undisclosed duplicate submission of works for publication, where 
this involves deception or the deliberate circumvention of publishers’ or funders’ 
policies. 
• Plagiarism: the misappropriation or use of the ideas, intellectual property or 
work (written or otherwise) of others without acknowledgement or permission. 
• Mismanagement of research data or results: the failure to ensure that research 
data, evidence and research results are preserved and accessible for a reasonable 
period after the completion of research. 
• Breach of duty of care: this may occur where the researcher deliberately, 
recklessly or negligently: discloses improperly the identity of research participants, or 
information provided by research participants, without their consent or in breach of 
confidence. 
 
 
Incentives or compensation for participants 
Before research is commenced in any state, the state government will be consulted.   If they 
request it, a resource payment will be made to all villages surveyed in the state.   They payment 
will be made to the village administration, and will be 1000INR (~£10).   As this payment is 
made to the village administration and is of quite a low magnitude, it will not be valuable enough 
to encourage someone to participate who would really prefer not to take part. 
 
I confirm that as part of the research activity described above: 
 I will secure and record the informed consent of all human subjects. 
 I will ensure that no-one is coerced or compelled to participate in the research. 
 I will not use any form of deception as part of the research method. 
 I will explain to participants the level of confidentiality which they can expect and 
 I will aim to maintain participant confidentiality wherever practicable. 
 I will design and execute the research in a way which protects participants from 
 harm (including but not restricted to - physical, psychological, emotional, social, 
 spiritual, career, reputational, financial or legal harm). 
 I will, prior to any data gathering activity, brief participants about the project and 
 their rights. 
 I will, prior to any data gathering activity, brief any individuals involved in data 
 gathering on my behalf (e.g. translators or interviewers) about ethical research 
 practices. 
 I will, following any data collection activity, debrief participants. 
 I will not be using any observationally intrusive methods. 
 I will store any data I obtain in accordance with the Data Protection Act. 
 
I also confirm that: 
 The information I have provided on this form is accurate to the best of myknowledge 
and belief. 
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 I have read the advice on research ethics contained in the document ‘BasicPrinciples of 
Research Ethics for Studies Involving Human Subjects’ 
 The project described above will abide by the University’s Ethics Policy. 
 There is no potential material interest that may, or may appear to, impair 
theindependence and objectivity of researchers conducting this project. 
 Subject to the research being approved, I undertake to adhere to the projectdescription 
and statements provided above. 
 I understand that the project, including research records and data, may besubject to 
inspection for audit purposes, if required in future. 
 I understand that personal data about me as a researcher in this form will beheld by 
those involved in the ethics review procedure (e.g. the EthicsAdministrator and/or ethics 
reviewers) and that this will be managed accordingto Data Protection Act principles. 
 All the individual projects that fitunder the generic project are compatible with this 
application. 
 I undertake to inform SEREC of any significant changes to the research activitywhich 
might invalidate the statements made above 
 
Name of individual submitting this form : Alison Parker 
Email address of individual submitting this form : a.parker@cranfield.ac.uk 
Electronic Signature of Researcher :  
I am one of the staff supervising the project. 
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Appendix C – Case study summaries 
This appendix provides access to the narrative summary of the individual case 
studies. These are presented by four different categories. These include three 
income groups of cases – low-income, middle-income and high-income – and 
there is a fourth category containing case studies from the mountainous and 
hilly states as these we identified as a special sub-group of cases in Chapter 
Three of the thesis. The document containing the summaries compiled by this 
author is available from the following link: 
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/213512409/Appendix%20C%20-
%20Case%20Study%20Summaries.docx 
 
Hutchings – Appendix C. 
Appendix C Case study Summaries 
This appendix contains a narrative summar of the individual case studies. It is 
structured by three income groups of the state – low-income, middle-income and 
high-income. There is a fourth category containing case studies from the the 
mountainous and hilly states as these we identified as a special sub-group of cases 
in Chapter 3 of the thesis. 
C.1 Low-income case studies 
This section first focuses on the government support community management in the 
low-income states and then the NGO support community management. 
 Government supported community management in Jharkhand, 
Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan 
The government supported programmes in this chapter help illustrate the differences 
between two of the recent Government of India flagship rural water supply 
programmes. The Rajasthani case provides insight into the earlier Swajaldhara 
(2002-2009) community management programme that followed the ‘demand-
responsive approach’ with communities expected to contribute 10% to capital costs 
and operate schemes in relative independence (Government of India, 2003). In 
contrast, the Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh cases showcase the National Rural 
Drinking Water Programme (NRDWP) (2009-present.) that has shifted back to a 
more recognised supply-driven model with a stronger role for the GP (Ministry of 
Drinking Water and Sanitation, 2013). Figure 24 below helps illustrate the differences 
between the two with a simplified schematic of the organisational set-up across the 
programmes. As it shows, the arrangements are similar in that they both have a 
SWSA as the primary support entity for community management but in the NRDWP 
there is also meant to be a new organisation labelled a ‘Block Resource Centre’ that 
can provide specialist capacity building and broader software support to villages. 
However, in both the NRDWP cases presented in this chapter, these organisations 
were not found to be providing any direct support in the studied villages.  
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The full case study reports authored by the collaborating research teams are 
available online from the following link: http://www.ircwash.org/projects/india-
community-water-plus-project 
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Appendix D – Data storage and management 
Through the course of the synthesis a series of databases were compiled 
containing the household survey data, financial data and the qualitative-
quantitative indicators. Ultimately these were consolidated into a database 
containing all the household survey data (n=2335) and then a database 
containing service level, finance and qualitative-quantitative indicators 
summarised to the case study level. In according with good data management 
procedures the main databases will ultimately be stored within the Cranfield 
University Data Storage System which is being developed to meet the 
standards set out by the Research Council United Kingdom (RCUK) 
specifications on good data storage management. However, these facilities are 
still in development at the time of submission of the thesis. Therefore, in the 
meantime, the databases will be available from the following links from the time 
of PhD submission to the completion of any steps set out in the viva 
examination. This data remains the property of Cranfield University and cannot 
be reproduced without explicit permission of this author. The format of the 
databases is “IBM SPSS Statistics 21”.  
Household Survey Database 
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/213512409/Household%20Database%20C
ommunity%20Water%20Plus.sav 
Case-level database (Service levels, financial and qualitative-quantitative 
Indicators)  
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/213512409/Case_level_data.sav 
 
